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ABSTRACT 
 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have seen an exponential growth over the last decade, 
with Facebook having more than 1.49 billion monthly active users and Twitter having 135,000 
new users signing up every day as of 2015. Users are sharing 70 million photos per day on the 
Instagram photo-sharing network. Yahoo Answers question-answering community has more than 
1 billion posted answers. The meteoric rise in popularity has made OSNs important social 
platforms for computer-mediated communications and embedded themselves into society’s daily 
life, with direct consequences to the offline world and activities. OSNs are built on a foundation 
of trust, where users connect to other users with common interests or overlapping personal 
trajectories. They leverage real-world social relationships and/or common preferences, and 
enable users to communicate online by providing them with a variety of interaction mechanisms. 
This dissertation studies abuse and privacy in online social networks. More specifically, 
we look at two issues: (1) the content abusers in the community question answering (CQA) 
social network and, (2) the privacy risks that comes from the default permissive privacy settings 
of the OSNs. Abusive users have negative consequences for the community and its users, as they 
decrease the community’s cohesion, performance, and participation. We investigate the reporting 
of 10 million editorially curated abuse reports from 1.5 million users in Yahoo Answers, one of 
the oldest, largest, and most popular CQA platforms. We characterize the contribution and 
position of the content abusers in Yahoo Answers social networks. Based on our empirical 
observations, we build machine learning models to predict such users. 
x 
Users not only face the risk of exposing themselves to abusive users or content, but also 
face leakage risks of their personal information due to weak and permissive default privacy 
policies. We study the relationship between users’ privacy concerns and their engagement in 
Yahoo Answers social networks. We find privacy-concerned users have higher qualitative and 
quantitative contributions, show higher retention, report more abuses, have higher perception on 
answer quality and have larger social circles. Next, we look at users’ privacy concerns, abusive 
behavior, and engagement through the lenses of national cultures and discover cross-cultural 
variations in CQA social networks. 
However, our study in Yahoo Answers reveals that the majority of users (about 87%) do 
not change the default privacy policies. Moreover, we find a similar story in a different type of 
social network (blogging): 92% bloggers’ do not change their default privacy settings. These 
results on default privacy are consistent with general-purpose social networks (such as 
Facebook) and warn about the importance of user-protecting default privacy settings. 
We model and implement default privacy as contextual integrity in OSNs. We present a 
privacy framework, Aegis, and provide a reference implementation. Aegis models expected 
privacy as contextual integrity using semantic web tools and focuses on defining default privacy 
policies. Finally, this dissertation presents a comprehensive overview of ! the privacy and security 
attacks in the online social networks projecting them in two directions: attacks that exploit users’ 
personal information and declared social relationships !for unintended purposes; and attacks that 
are aimed at the OSN service provider itself, by threatening its core business. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon for
millions of Internet users. Combining user-constructed profiles with communication mecha-
nisms that enable users to be pseudo-permanently “in touch”, OSNs leverage users’ real-world
social relationships and/or common interests and blend even more our online and offline lives.
As of 2015, Facebook has 1.49 billion monthly active users and it is the second most visited site
on the Internet [7]. Twitter, a social micro-blogging platform, claims over 314 million monthly
active users, who send 500M Tweets per day in more than 35 languages [280]. According to
the GlobalWebIndex’s 2014 survey, users on average spend 1.69 hours each day doing social
networking [25].
In general, OSNs are a digital representation of the sets of relations, which the registered
users exercise in the physical world [61]. This digital representation forms a network of users,
which spans all enclosed parties and their contacts. Moreover, there are interest-based social
networks, where users get connected to people they may not even know to cater common inter-
ests. For example, in Pinterest, users tend to find photos of shared passions. In Yahoo Answers,
people follow users who provide questions and answers on a topic of common interest. Boyd and
Ellison’s widely used definition captures the key elements of an OSN, according to which Social
Network Sites or Online Social Network Services are:
“web-based service that allows individuals to (i) construct a public or semi-public profile
within the bounded system, (ii) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connec-
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [145, 146, 148–150]. Permission is included in
Appendix A.
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tion, and (iii) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
service” [37].
Their definition captures some basic elements of an OSN, however, OSNs offer some
additional elements depending on the type of the OSN. For example, message exchange function-
ality enables users to communicate with other users, multi-media features allow users to upload
and share photos, audio and videos, users can annotate contents using tag functionality, group
features enable users to join various social groups and collaborate with people who have common
preferences.
Perhaps more than previous types of online applications, OSNs are blending in real life:
companies are mining trends on Facebook and Twitter to create viral content for shares and likes;
employers are checking Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter profiles of job candidates [230]; law
enforcement organizations are gleaning evidence from OSNs to solve crimes [153]; activities on
online social platforms change political regimes [185] and swing election results [141].
1.1 Abuse and Privacy in Social Networks
As users in OSNs are typically connected to friends, family, and acquaintances, a com-
mon perception is that OSNs provide a more secure, private and trusted internet-mediated envi-
ronment for online interaction [61]. In reality, however, abuse and privacy issues are common in
OSNs.
Generally speaking, abusive behavior is a pervasive and serious problem on the Internet,
perhaps since the day it has become popular among the common public. This problem has been
aggravated in OSNs, as it has become easier to interact with others and get more exposure of the
published content. Moreover, similar to other online environments (e.g., chat rooms, forums),
anyone can create an anonymous or fake identity in OSNs and can exhibit abusive behavior with-
out fear of damaging reputations. With more people joining the OSNs, even the most popular so-
2
cial network sites are overwhelmed by the degree and consequences of abuse. Recently, Twitter’s
CEO has admitted the failure and frustration of dealing with abuse and trolling [126].
Community Question Answering (CQA) sites, such as Yahoo Answers and Quora, are
crowd-sourced services for sharing user expertise on various topics, from mechanical repairs to
parenting. These services are suitable platforms for studying content abuse at scale for multiple
reasons. First, social networks in CQA platforms are built on common interests, that carry a very
different purpose from Facebook-like social networks, where users “hang-out” with their friends.
As real-world social relationships are less emphasized in the CQA online relationships, users
may care less about interacting with others compared to Facebook-like social networks where
most of one’s friends are personally known. Second, similar to general-purpose OSNs (e.g., Face-
book), CQA platforms are rich and mature repositories of user-contributed content (questions
and answers), thus, they enable to study content abuse at scale. Third, as the usefulness of CQA
platforms depends heavily on fair user contributions (questions and answers), they employ strict
community rules and regulations and human moderators. As such, ground truth data of abusive
content are reliable, as the content is user reported and human verified.
Not only users are facing the risk of exposing themselves to abusive content or users, but
also users’ privacy is also at risk in social networks because of the availability of an astonishing
amount of personal user data which would not have been exposed otherwise. More importantly,
OSNs expose new information from multiple social spheres – for example, personal information
on Facebook and professional activity on LinkedIn – that, aggregated, leads to uncomfortably de-
tailed profiles [218]. This high volume of personal data, either disclosed by the technologically-
challenged average user or due to OSNs’ failure to provide sophisticated privacy tools, have
attracted a variety of organizations (e.g., GNIP) that aggregate and sell user’s social network data.
Unwanted disclosure of user information combined with the OSNs-induced blur between the pro-
fessional and personal aspects of user lives allow for incidents of dire consequences. The news
media covered some of these, such as the case of a teacher suspended for posting gun photos [62]
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or employee fired for commenting on her salary compared with that of her boss [190]), both on
Facebook.
In general, OSN privacy problems are of three types: surveillance, institutional and social
privacy [120]. The surveillance privacy threat arises when users’ personal information and social
interactions are leveraged by authorities or service providers for unintended purposes. For ex-
ample, facial-recognition technologies have made social tagging easier—users can conveniently
tag their friends in pictures. However, at the same time, this has aggravated surveillance risks.
Dictatorial and authoritarian regimes could identify protesters from demonstration pictures [68].
Not only that, even democratic governments might be overly curious and keep the mass public
under state surveillance. The US government’s PRISM project targeting various Internet service
providers, including top OSNs has generated much controversy in recent years.
Institutional privacy refers to those privacy problems related to users losing control and
oversight over the institutional aggregation, processing and mining of social information [237].
For example, professional data aggregators build databases using public views of social media
profiles and social relationships and sale the databases to insurance companies, background-
check agencies and credit-ratings agencies [31].
“Social privacy” problems emerge when OSN mediated social interactions disrupt so-
cial boundaries [120]. Contrary to surveillance and institutional privacy problems that come
from established and consolidated group entities such as government or organizations, social
privacy problems are related to other individuals in the social network. The consequences of
social privacy problems include, but are not limited to, information oversharing (e.g., using de-
fault permissive OSN privacy settings expose more information), unwanted contacts (e.g., privacy
settings might allow anyone to contact or send messages), damaged reputations, and context
collapse (e.g., coworkers, family members, close friends, or acquaintances are flattened into a
single homogeneous group such as Facebook “Friends”).
4
1.2 Research Questions
This dissertation focuses on abuse in community question answering (CQA) social net-
works and the social privacy risks that come from the default privacy settings of the OSNs. The
thesis statement is as follows:
Lessons from large-scale analysis of user behavior in online social networks have the po-
tential to limit content abuse, improve user engagement, and define appropriate privacy settings.
User behavior is considered abusive if it violates community norms and users feel that
it should not belong to that particular online environment [41, 67]. In the real world of face-to-
face social interactions, anonymity and deindividuation have been linked to increased likelihood
of nonconformity with social norms. These phenomena are more pronounced in general online
settings [67, 140]. Abusive behavior has negative effects on the community and its members: it
decreases community’s cohesion [294], performance [82] and participation [67]. In the worst
case, users who are the targets of abusive behavior may leave or avoid online social spaces [67].
Social networks that are built on common interests, like Yahoo Answers CQA social
networks, also experience a high volume of abusive content. In order to limit abuse, CQAs define
community rules and expect users to obey them. To enforce these rules, published as community
guidelines and terms of services, these platforms provide users with tools to flag inappropriate
content. In addition to community monitoring, some platforms employ human moderators to
evaluate abuses and determine the appropriate responses, from removing content to suspending
user accounts. These digital recordings of abusive behaviors enable the study of human behaviors
at much larger scale than what is possible in lab experiments and has the potential of guiding the
design of mechanisms that foster good behavior. We can leverage them to automatically predict
abusive users, that could not only keep fair users safe from abusive users, but also lessen work-
load of human moderators. More specifically, we ask the following research questions:
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1 : How can we use crowd-sourced rule violations reports to understand the position and the
contribution of abusive users?
2 : How can we design predictive models to automatically predict abusive users?
Moreover, users expose an unprecedented amount of personal information, and face pri-
vacy leakage risks. Hence, it’s expected for users to be concerned about their privacy. The im-
portant question is how users’ privacy concerns are related to their engagement—are privacy
concerns turning users off from participating and contributing? On one hand, users might be
afraid that their privacy is being compromised, so they might produce less content and show
less engagement. On the other hand, users might also properly exercise their privacy rights (for
example, by restricting the visibility of their content) and hence feel having more control over
their content and contribute more. We focus on community question answering social networks
and ask the following question:
3 : What is the relationship between users’ privacy concerns and their contribution behavior
in CQA social networks?
Users’ (un)ethical behavior, privacy perception, and engagement might not be the same
across cultures. Researchers sometimes predicted that the online world would be converging
into a “one-world culture” [175]. However, research has already shown that the Internet is not
a homogeneous subcultural community, significant behavioral differences exist between users
from different countries [104, 224, 239]. We might also see differences if we zoom into users’
engagement, privacy concerns and (un)ethical behavior to country levels. We focus on commu-
nity question answering social networks and ask the following question:
4 : Do privacy concerns and contribution behavior vary across cultures in CQA social net-
works?
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Our study of privacy concerns vs. contribution behavior reveals that the majority of the
users do not change their privacy settings. Studies in other social networks reveal similar sto-
ries. For example, studies [1, 163] show that the majority of Facebook users have default or per-
missive privacy settings. More worrisome, when the default settings are not matched with user
preferences, they almost always tend to be more open, exposing the content to more users than
expected [184]. Much of the social privacy problems occur when access to social data is inap-
propriately protected due to wrong default or personalized privacy settings. Often the default
settings serve the business model of the service provider rather than the user’s interests, following
the “opt out” model. And as we see from the literature and our results on Yahoo Answers social
network, although users are allowed to change the default permissive privacy settings, in reality
very few do it.
Default privacy related problems have been further aggravated in social ecosystems. So-
cial ecosystems, aggregate user data from various sources (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter) and
provide processed and useful information to social applications. This aggregation of data from
different contexts presents a more complete profile of a person’s life, hence more vulnerable to
permissive default privacy settings. As such, appropriate default privacy settings are expected
that will allow user information to be shared or transferred appropriately. We ask the following
research questions:
5 : How can we limit the vulnerabilities associated with default permissive privacy policies in
social ecosystems? Can we generate default privacy policies that restrict user information
to be shared or transferred inappropriately?
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions:
• Characterizing and predicting the content abusers in CQA social networks [150]: We in-
vestigate the reporting of rule violations (flags) and identify content abusers in Yahoo An-
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swers. The usefulness of CQAs depends heavily on user contributions (questions and an-
swers), but also on respecting the community rules. As a crowd-sourced service, such
platforms rely on their users for monitoring and flagging content that violates community
rules. Common wisdom is to eliminate the users who receive many flags. Our analysis of a
year of traces from Yahoo Answers site shows that the number of flags does not tell the full
story: on one hand, users with many flags may still contribute positively to the community.
On the other hand, users who never get flagged are found to violate community rules and
get their accounts suspended. This analysis, however, also shows that abusive users are
betrayed by their network properties: we find strong evidence of homophilous behavior
and use this finding to detect abusive users who go under the community radar. Based on
our empirical observations, we build a classifier that is able to detect abusive users with an
accuracy as high as 83%.
• An analysis of how privacy concerns correlate with user behavior in the CQA social net-
work [148]: We analyze one year of recorded traces from Yahoo Answers to understand
the association between users’ privacy concerns as manifested by their account settings
and their activity in the CQA platform. The results show that privacy preference is corre-
lated with behavior in the community in terms of engagement, retention, accomplishment
and deviance from the norm. We find privacy-concerned users have higher qualitative and
quantitative contributions, show higher retention, report more abuses, and have larger social
circles. However, at the same time, these users also exhibit more deviant behavior than the
users with public profiles.
• An analysis of cross-cultural variations in CQA social networks [149]: We investigate the
influence of national culture on people’s online questioning and answering behavior. For
this, we analyzed a sample of 200 thousand users in Yahoo Answers from 67 countries.
We measure empirically a set of cultural metrics defined in Geert Hofstede’s cultural di-
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mensions and Robert Levine’s Pace of Life and show that behavioral cultural differences
exist in community question answering platforms. We find that national cultures differ in
Yahoo Answers along a number of dimensions such as temporal predictability of activities,
contribution-related behavioral patterns, privacy concerns, and power inequality.
• Aegis: A Semantic Implementation of Privacy as Contextual Integrity in Social Ecosys-
tems [145, 146]: We propose an ontology-based social ecosystem data model to capture
users’ aggregated social data from diverse sources (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn etc.). This
data model can be used to acquire information from an unrestricted set of social sources
and export it to an ever-evolving collection of socially-aware applications and services.
We employ semantic web technologies to generate default privacy policies based on Nis-
senbaum’s contextual integrity theory [216]. We provide an architecture and a prototype
implementation of our privacy model that automatically enforces access control policies on
a social ecosystem knowledge base. Our experimental evaluation on three real-world large
networks demonstrates the applicability in practice of our solution.
• A comprehensive review of privacy and security in online social networks [147]: We pro-
vide an overview of the privacy and security issues that emerged so far in OSNs. We intro-
duce a taxonomy of privacy and security attacks in OSNs, we overview existing solutions
to mitigate those attacks, and outline challenges still to overcome.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related work
that this dissertation builds on. We describe the dataset in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, our work
characterizes the position of the content abusers in the CQA social network and predicts such
user. Chapter 5 shows how users’ privacy concerns relate to their engagement related contribution
behavior in CQA social networks. Chapter 6 zooms in on users’ contribution, privacy concerns,
and (un)ethical behavior in CQA social networks to the national culture level and investigates
9
cross-country cultural variations in Yahoo Answers. We present Aegis, a privacy framework and
a reference implementation in Chapter 7. Aegis implements privacy as contextual integrity by
using semantic web tools and focuses on defining default privacy policies. Next, in Chapter 8,
we present a review of privacy and security attacks in OSNs projecting them on two directions:
attacks that exploit the implicit trust embedded in declared social relationships; and attacks that
harvest user’s personal information for ill-intended use. Finally, we conclude the dissertation in
Chapter 9 with a summary of the main results and a discussion on future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATEDWORK1
In this chapter, we present the previous research that the dissertation builds upon. First,
we present research on CQA social networks in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents the studies re-
lated to the relationship between users’ privacy concerns and their behavior in OSNs. We present
previous work on OSN cultures in Section 2.3. Finally, we present the access control mechanisms
in OSNs related to Aegis in Section 2.4.
2.1 Community Question Answering (CQA) Social Networks
CQAs have attracted much research interest from diverse communities as information
science, HCI and information retrieval. We collate past research on community-based question
answering in five categories depending on whether it has dealt with content, users, applications,
bad behavior in online settings, or CQA communication networks.
Research in the content area has investigated textual aspects of questions and answers.
In so doing, it has proposed algorithmic solutions to automatically determine: the quality of ques-
tions [177, 269] and answers [4, 245], the extent to which certain questions are easy to answer [81,
241], and the type of a given question (e.g., factual or conversational) [122].
Research on CQA users has explored how users interface with the platform. Dearman
et al. [72] asked why users of YA do not answer questions and found that active answerers (who
contribute most of the answers) do not want to get reported for abuse and potentially lose access
to the community. Liu et al. [183] asked why users ask questions. They concluded that a vast
majority of the askers are failed searchers; when web search fails they become askers. Liu et
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [145, 146, 148–150]. Permission is included in
Appendix A.
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al. [182] also explored the factors (e.g., when users tend to answer and how they choose ques-
tions) that influence users’ answering behavior in YA. Pelleg et al. [226] investigated truthfulness
of YA users and found that users even post sensitive and accurate information about themselves
while asking questions in order to get right answers.
Research on applications has developed techniques and tools to improve system perfor-
mance and to provide better usability. Researchers have proposed effective ways of recommend-
ing questions to the most appropriate answerers [232, 272]. Shtok et al. [249] used the repository
of past answers to answer new open questions in order to reduce the number of unanswered ques-
tions. Weber et al. [293] derived “tips” (a self-contained bit of non-obvious answer) from YA to
address “how-to” questions.
Qualitative and quantitative studies of bad behavior in online settings have been done
before, including newsgroups [227], online chat communities [268], online multiplayer video
games [29], and geosocial networks [124]. A body of work has also investigated the impact of the
bad behavior. Researchers have found that bad behavior has negative effects on the community
and its members: it decreases community’s cohesion [294], performance [82] and participa-
tion [67]. In the worst case, users who are the targets of bad behavior may leave or avoid online
social spaces [67].
Research on communication networks analyzed users’ social networks on the CQA plat-
forms and attempted to understand the interplay between users’ social connections and their
Q&A activities. Wang et al. [289] analyzed the social network of Quora and found that users who
contribute more and better answers tend to have more followers. Panovich et al. [222] evaluated
the impact of tie strength in question answers. They found that stronger ties (close friends) con-
tribute a subtle increase in answer quality compared to weak ties. Rodrigues et al. [199] analyzed
intent when users ask questions: along with sharing knowledge, do users want to socialize as well
in CQAs? They categorized the questions into social, i.e., questions that are intended for purely
social engagement and non-social (e.g., information seeking, asking opinion) categories. Experi-
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menting on YA and MSN CQA platforms they concluded that users not only share knowledge, but
also socialize with others.
Our work in Chapter 4 sheds light on abusive behavior in CQA communities by studying
YA, one of the largest and oldest such communities. It quantifies how YA’s networks channel user
attention, and how that results in different behavioral patterns that can be used to limit abusive
behavior.
2.2 Relationships Between Privacy Concerns and User Behavior in OSNs
A number of studies [63, 235, 259] on social networks like Facebook have shown the
correlation between users’ self-reported privacy concerns and their self-reported behavior. For
example, Staddon et al. [259] showed that users who express concerns on Facebook privacy con-
trols and find it difficult to comprehend sharing practices also report less engagement such as
visiting, commenting, and liking the content. At the same time, users who report more control
and comprehension of privacy settings and their consequences are more engaged with the plat-
form. Similarly, the frequency of visits, type of use, and general Internet skills are shown to be
related to the personalization of the default privacy settings [63]. Acquisti and Gross’ [1] survey
on Facebook found that a user’s privacy concerns are only a weak predictor of his joining the
network: that is, despite expressing privacy concerns, users join the network and reveal great
amounts of personal information. Young et al. [304] used surveys and interviews on Facebook
users to show that Internet privacy concerns and information revelation are negatively correlated.
Tufekci’s study [279] on a small sample (704) of college students showed that students on Face-
book and Myspace manage privacy concerns by adjusting profile visibility but not by restricting
the profile information.
Wang et al.’s [291] demographic study on privacy concerns among American, Chinese,
and Indian social network users showed that American respondents are the most privacy con-
cerned, followed by Chinese. However, all of these studies are survey based and are subject to
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bias. Moreover, there has been no research on privacy concerns and user behavior in CQA plat-
forms. In this dissertation, we focus on understanding how the users’ behavior—characterized by
broad engagement, accomplishments and deviance metrics—relates to their privacy concerns in
CQA platforms using large-scale real activity traces of the users.
2.3 Cultures in Social Networks
Golder and Macy [111] studied collective mood in Twitter across countries from 509
million Twitter posts by 2.4 million users over a 2-year period. Despite having different cul-
tures, geographies, and religions, all countries (USA, Canada, UK, Australia, India, and English-
speaking Africa) in their study showed similar mood rhythms—people tended to be more positive
on weekends and early in the morning. Park et al. [224] examined the variation of Twitter users’
emoticon usage patterns in cross cultures. They used Hofstede’s national culture scores of 78
countries and found that collectivist cultures favor vertical and eye-oriented emoticons, where
people within individualistic cultures favor horizontal and mouth-oriented emoticons. Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions have also been used to study whether culture of a country is associated with
the way people use Twitter [105]. In another study on cross-country Twitter communication,
Garcia et al. [104] showed that cultural variables such as Hofstede’s indices, language and in-
tolerance have an impact on Twitter communication volume.
Silva et al. [250] used food and drink check-ins in Foursquare to identify cultural bound-
aries and similarities across populations. They showed that online footprints of foods and drinks
are good indicators of cultural similarities between users, e.g., lunch time is the perfect time
for Brazilians to go for slow food places more often, whereas Americans and English people
go for slow foods more at dinner time. Extracted features like these allow them to apply simple
clustering algorithms such as K-means to draw cultural boundaries across the countries.
Quercia [234] used Satisfaction With Life tests and measured happiness of 32,787 Face-
book users from 12 countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand,
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Norway, Singapore, Sweden, UK, USA ). He found that despite comparative economic status,
country-level happiness significantly varies across the countries and that it strongly correlates
with official well-being scores.
Reinecke et al. [239] used about 1.5 million Doodle polls from 211 countries and terri-
tories and studied the influence of national culture on people’s scheduling behavior. Using Hof-
stede’s cultural dimensions, they found that Doodle poll participants from collectivist countries
find more consensus than those from predominantly individualist societies.
However, there has been no empirical cross-cultural analysis of CQA platforms. This dis-
sertation is a first step in this direction and it verifies whether cultural differences are manifested
in one such platform, YA.
2.4 Access Control Mechanisms in OSNs
Different solutions have been proposed to control access to users’ data on social network-
ing applications in response to increasing popularity in this type of applications.
Trust-based access control policies are inspired by research and development in trust
and reputation in social networks. Kruk [165] proposed Friend-of-a-friend (FOAF)-Realm, an
ontology-based access control mechanism. FOAF uses RDF (Resource Description Framework)
to describe relations among users. The D-FOAF system [166] is a FOAF ontology-based dis-
tributed access control management system for social networks, where information inherent in
social networks is used to provide community-driven access rights delegation. Both systems use
a generic definition of relationships (“knows”) as a trust metric and generates rules that control
a friend’s access to resources based on the degree of separation in the social network. This ap-
proach that uses the degree of separation as the only way to quantify the level of relationship
between two users ignores the relationship type. Choi et al. [53] considered named relationships
(e.g., worksWith, isFriendOf, knowsOf) in modeling trust. A more nuanced trust-related access
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control model is proposed by Carminati et al. [47] based on relationship type, degree of separa-
tion, and trust levels among users in the network.
An inherent problem with trust-based privacy models is that the trust threshold values
should be smoothed as much as possible. In practice, it is difficult to comprehend and specify ap-
propriate trust thresholds without prior threshold value tuning experiments. Our approach, Aegis
(Chapter 7), avoids this problem by not using trust (always difficult to define), but by capturing
instead the information semantics using an ontology-based access control policy.
Semantic rule-based policies have also emerged as a promising choice to control access
to users social data. Rule-based policies represent the social knowledge base in an ontology (e.g.,
OWL) and define policies as Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) rules2. Access request re-
lated authorization is provided by reasoning on the social knowledge base. Systems that leverage
OWL and SWRL to provide rule-based access control framework are [46, 86]. Although concep-
tually similar, [46] provides richer OWL ontology and different types of policies; access control
policy, admin policy and filtering policy. The practicality of these solutions is difficult to evaluate
in the absence of a proof-of-concept implementation. A more detailed semantic rule-based model
is [192], which also provides a proof-of-concept implementation.
Rule-based privacy models have several limitations. First, authorization is provided by
forward reasoning on the whole knowledge base, challenging scalability with the size of the
knowledge base. Second, all authorizations must be recomputed if a change occurs in the social
knowledge base. And finally, rule management is complex and requires a team of expert admin-
istrators [88]. In our approach the social knowledge base can be easily distributed, such that a
user’s trusted peer handles the user-related social data requests (like in [158]). Furthermore, re-
computation of all policies is not required in case of knowledge base changes.
Role and Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) are other types of privacy models
that employ roles and relationships in defining privacy policies. Fong [98] proposed a ReBAC
2http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
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model based on the context-dependent nature of relationships in social networks. This model
targets social networks that are poly-relational (e.g., teacher-student relationships are distinct
from child-parent relationships), directed (e.g., teacher-student relationships are distinct from
student-teacher relationships) and tracks multiple access contexts that are organized into a tree-
shaped hierarchy. When access is requested in a context, the relationships from all the ancestor
contexts are combined with the relationships in the target access context to construct a network
on which authorization decisions are made. Our work of Aegis is similar in that we also model
relationships in a social context as the means to access and distribute social data. But our objec-
tive is different, as we do not target particular social networks, but generate default policies for
aggregated social data that could be accessed by diverse social applications.
Giunchiglia et al. [108] proposed RelBac, another relation-based access control model to
support sharing of data among large groups of users. The model defines permissions as relations
between users and data, thus separating them from roles. The formalization of the RelBac model
as an entity-relationship model allows for its direct translation into description logics, which also
allows reasoning. The model, however, does not provide any precise social aspect and lacks auto
generation of default policies.
The work conceptually closest to our work Aegis is PriMa [257]. PriMa also auto gen-
erates access control policies for users, acknowledging the fact that due to growing complexity
and diversity of user content, it is difficult for regular users to manually configure their access
control settings. The policies in PriMa are generated based on intuitive factors such as average
privacy preference of similar and related users, accessibility of similar items in similar and re-
lated users, the popularity of the owner (i.e., popular users have sensitive profile items), closeness
of owner and accessor (such as the number of mutual friends), etc. Access control policies for
profile items are finally generated aggregating these factors. This approach is vulnerable to highly
volatile policies due to changes in these factors. Moreover, a large number of factors and their
parametrized tuning contribute to longer policy generation and enforcement time. Unfortunately,
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these limitations are not addressed, so it is difficult to judge their impact in practice. Another
auto-generated policy framework is PolicyMgr [248]. PolicyMgr is based on supervised machine
learning techniques. It uses user-contributed example policy configurations as training sets and
builds classifiers to predict auto-generated policies for users’ profile objects. Again, its practical-
ity in terms of response time has not yet been shown.
Our privacy model differs from the above solutions with the focus on generating default
policies for a social ecosystem that deals with users’ aggregated social data from different do-
mains; the existing solutions target single application scenarios. Moreover, most of those solu-
tions do not take target default policy generation as a primary goal. Furthermore, to the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to consider a privacy framework proposed by social theorists and
translate it into an architecture and proof-of-concept implementation.
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CHAPTER 3: DATASET: YAHOO ANSWERS1
CQA platforms like Yahoo Answers, Quora and Stack Overflow have become rich and
mature repositories of user-contributed questions and answers over the past decade. For example,
Yahoo Answers, launched in December 2005, has more than one billion posted answers [195].
Quora, one of the fastest growing CQA sites, has seen three times growth in 2013 [277]. A study
on Yahoo Answers revealed that about 2% of web searches performed by Yahoo Answers users
lead to a question posted to the community [183]. These CQA platforms have a social network-
ing component, where users follow each other based on common interests. Given the social net-
work component, access control mechanisms and the popularity and specificity of the content
(e.g., questions and answers), CQAs are suitable platforms for studying content abuse, privacy
and culture at scale.
In this dissertation, we use a dataset from Yahoo Answers. After 10 years of activity,
Yahoo Answers has 56M monthly visitors from the U.S. only [171]. The functionalities of the
YA platform and the dataset used in this analysis are presented next.
3.1 The Platform
YA is a CQA platform in which community members ask and answer questions on var-
ious topics. Users ask questions and assign them to categories selected from a predefined tax-
onomy, e.g., Business & Finance, Health, and Politics & Government. Users can find questions
by searching or browsing through this hierarchy of categories. A question has a title (typically, a
short summary of the question), and a body with additional details.
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [150]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Figure 1 An answer (truncated and selected as best) for a question.
A user can answer any question but can post only one answer per question. Figure 1 shows
an example of a question and an answer in YA. Questions remain open for four days for others to
answer. However, the asker can select a best answer before the end of this 4-day period, which
automatically resolves the question and archives it as a reference question. The best answer can
also be rated between one to five, known as answer rating. If the asker does not choose a best
answer, the community selects one through voting. The asker can extend the answering duration
for an extra four days. The questions left unanswered after the allowed duration are deleted from
the site. In addition to questions and answers, users can contribute comments to questions already
answered and archived.
YA has a system of points and levels to encourage and reward participation [9]. A user
is penalized five points for posting a question, but if she chooses a best answer for her question,
three points are given back. A user who posts an answer receives two points; a best answer is
worth 10 points.
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A leaderboard, updated daily, ranks users based on the total number of points they col-
lected. Users are split into seven levels based on their acquired points (e.g., 1-249 points: level 1,
250-999 points: level 2, ..., 25000+ points: level 7). These levels are used to limit user actions,
such as posting questions, answers, comments, follows, and votes: e.g., first level users can ask 5
questions and provide 20 answers in a day.
YA requires its users to follow the Community Guidelines that forbids users to post spam,
insults, or rants, and the Yahoo Terms of Service [8] that limits harm to minors, harassment,
privacy invasion, impersonation and misrepresentation, and fraud and phishing. Users can flag
content (questions, answers or comments) that violates the Community Guidelines and Terms
of Service using the “Report Abuse” functionality. Figure 2 shows how reporting is done on
an answer. Users click on a flag sign embedded with the content and choose a reason between
violation of the community guidelines and violation of the terms of service. Reported content is
then verified by human inspectors before it is deleted from the platform.
Figure 2 Abuse reporting on an answer. Users can click on the “flag” sign of the answer and
report an abuse.
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Users in YA can choose to follow other users, thus creating a follower-followee relation-
ship used for information dissemination. The followee’s actions (e.g., questions, answers, ratings,
votes, best answer, awards) are automatically posted on the follower’s newsfeed. In addition,
users can follow questions, in which case all responses are sent to the followers of that question.
3.2 Dataset
We studied a sample of 10 million abuse reports posted between 2012 and 2013 originat-
ing from 1.5 million active users. These users are connected via 2.6 million follower-followee
relationships in a social network (referred to as FF in this study) that has 165,441 weakly con-
nected components. The largest weakly connected component has 1.1M nodes (74.32% of the
nodes) and 2.4M edges (91.37% of the edges). Out of the 1.5 million users, about 9% of the users
have been suspended from the community.
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) plot the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) for the degree of followers (indegree) and followees (outdegree), respectively. The in-
degree and outdegree follow power-law distributions [21], with an exponential fitting parameter ↵
3.53 and 2.95 respectively.
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Figure 3 (a) Indegree distribution; (b) Outdegree distribution.
Along with the follower-followee social network, we built an activity network (AN ) that
connects users if they interacted with each other’s content. In the AN network, nodes are users
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who answered other users’ questions, directed edges point from the answerer to the asker, and
edge weights show the number of answers provided over the source user to the questions posted
by the destination user. The activity network has 1.2M nodes and 45M edges, thus being 141
times denser than the FF network.
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CHAPTER 4: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF CONTENT ABUSERS IN COMMUNITY QUESTION
ANSWERING SOCIAL NETWORKS1
This chapter investigates the reporting of rule violations in Yahoo Answers (YA), one
of the oldest, largest, and most popular CQA platforms. We characterize the contribution and
position of the content abusers in Yahoo Answers CQA social networks, and predict such users.
In order to preserve the health and usefulness of online communities, CQA platforms define com-
munity rules and expect users to obey them. These rules are published as community guidelines
and terms of services. To enforce community monitoring, CQAs provide users with tools to flag
inappropriate content. Moreover, CQAs employ human moderators to evaluate the reported flags.
Based on the report the moderator might keep or remove the content. In the worst case, users are
suspended for persistent posting of abusive content.
Our dataset contains about 10 million editorially curated abuse reports posted between
2012 and 2013 (the dataset has been described in Chapter 3). Out of the 1.5 million users who
submitted content during the one-year observation period, about 9% of the users got their ac-
counts suspended. We use suspended accounts as a ground truth of bad behavior in YA, and we
refer to these users as content abusers or bad guys interchangeably. The outcomes of this study
could aid human moderators with automated tools in order to maintain the health of the commu-
nity.
To understand the position and contribution of content abusers in Yahoo Answers, we
raise four research questions:
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [150]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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R1 : Are flags appropriate proxies for content abuse? If so, how can we use the flags to iden-
tify content abusers?
We discover that, although used correctly, flags do not tell accurately which users should
be suspended: while 32% of the users active in our observation period have at least one flag, only
16% of them are suspended during this time. Even considering the top 1% users with the largest
number of flags, only about 50% of them have their accounts suspended.
However, a high correlation between the number of content users post and flags they
receive suggests that a portion of the flags a user receives might be simply the results of the high
level of user activity. So, we use “deviance”, a measure that indicates given the amount of activity
a user has, how much she deviates from the norm of receiving flags, as a proxy of content abuse.
We find 65% among the top 1% most deviant users are suspended. Given that deviance is a better
metric than flags for identifying content abusers, we use the metric to understand the contribution
of deviant users. We ask:
R2 : Is deviance necessarily bad?
We find that, unlike in other environments where abusers are clearly the bad guys (e.g.,
cheaters in online games [56]), the situation is not black and white. That is, users flagged many
times for rule violations contribute positively to the community by increasing user engagement
and providing the best answers.
However, complicating an already complex problem, we find that 40% of the suspended
users have not received any flags. To reduce this large gray area of questionable behavior, we
employ social network analysis tools in an attempt to understand the position of content abusers
in the YA community. We ask the following question:
R3 : Does the follower-followee network impact behavior?
We learn that the follower-followee social network tunnels user attention not only in
terms of generating answers to posted questions, but also in monitoring user behavior. More
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importantly, it turns out that this social network divulges information about the users who go
under the community radar and never get flagged even if they seriously violate community rules.
In the light of the insights from our analysis, we aim to classify fair and suspended users. We ask
the following question:
R4 : How can we build predictive models to automatically detect suspended users?
The network-based information, combined with user activity, leads to accurate detection of the
bad guys: our classifier is able to distinguish between suspended and fair users with an accuracy
as high as 83%.
The chapter is structured as follows. We introduce a deviance score in Section 4.1 that
identifies the pool of abusive users more accurately than the number of flags alone. Section 4.2
demonstrates that deviant users are not all bad: despite their high deviance score, in aggregate
their presence in the community is beneficial. Section 4.3 shows the effects of the social network
on user contribution and behavior. Section 4.4 presents an analysis of the good guys, who volun-
tarily flag the abusive content. Section 4.5 shows the classification of suspended and fair users.
We discuss the impact of these results in Section 4.6.
4.1 Flags in Yahoo Answers: a Proxy for Content Abuse?
In this section, we study whether flags (we use flags and abuse reports interchangeably)
can be used as an appropriate proxy for content abuse. First, we investigate whether the flags
reported from users are typically valid, i.e. if human inspectors remove the flagged content and
further, how quickly this is done. Then, we explore how the flags can be used to detect content
abusers.
4.1.1 Abuse Reports
YA is a self-moderating community; the health of the platform depends on community
contributions in terms of reporting abuses. Besides participating by providing questions and
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answers, YA users also contribute to the platform by reporting abusive content. Reporters serve
as an intermediate layer in the YA moderation process since these abuse reports are verified by
human inspectors. If the report is valid, the content is promptly deleted.
To check if valid abuse reports are indeed an accurate sensor for the correct monitoring of
the platform, we look at how soon a report is curated. Figure 4 shows the distributions of the time
interval between the time when a content (question or answer) is posted and when it is deleted
due to abuse reports. About 97% of questions and answers marked as abusive are deleted within
the same day they are posted. All reported abusive questions and answers are deleted within three
days of posting.
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Figure 4 The CDF of the time delay between the posting of the content (questions or answers)
and its deletion due to valid abuse reporting.
This result highlights two facts. First, that the users monitoring the platform act very
quickly on content: within 10 minutes from being posted, 50% of the bad posts are reported. Sec-
ond, that validation of abuse reports happens within 3 days (and in vast majority within a day).
Hence, in our dataset, if there are abuse reports that did not have the chance of being curated yet
and thus we do not consider them, those are too few to impact our analysis.
However, the abuse reporting functionality might be abused as well, due to several rea-
sons. First, reporting is an easy and fast process, requiring only a few steps. Second, a user is
not penalized for misreporting content abuse, perhaps in an attempt to not discourage users from
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exercising good citizenship. And third, independent of their level in the YA platform (that limits
the number of questions and answers the user can post per day), users can report an unlimited
number of abuses.
To check whether users abuse the abuse reporting functionality, we compare the number
of flags received/reported with the number of validated flags received/reported per user.
Figure 5 shows the distributions of reported valid flags and received valid flags, along
with reported flags and received flags for questions and answers. For both questions and answers,
the distribution patterns are the same for flags reported and that are valid and also flags received
and that are valid. Reported valid flags lies very closely below the reported flags. This is also the
same for reported valid flags and reported flags. The distributions, thus indicate that there might
be good correlations between flags received/reported and that are valid.
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Figure 5 Distributions of abuse reports (flags) on (a) questions; (b) answers.
Figure 6 shows correlation heat maps of the flags received, flags received valid, flags
reported and flags reported valid on questions and answers for all contributors. For questions
(answers), we have a very high correlation between flags received by users and flags that are valid
(r = 0.90 (0.87), p < 0.01) and between flags reported by users and that are valid (r = 0.80
(0.92), p < 0.01).
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These high correlations indicate that, in general, users are not exploiting the abuse report-
ing functionality. When a user reports an abuse, it is very likely that the content is violating com-
munity rules. Another interesting finding from the correlation heat maps is that for both questions
and answers, users have almost negligible or very weak correlation between the number of flags
they reported that are valid and the number of flags they received that are valid. This hints that
the good guys of the community are not bad guys at the same time: the users who correctly report
a lot of content abuses are not posting abusive content themselves.
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Figure 6 The Pearson correlation coefficient heat map of flags received, flags received valid,
flags reported and valid flags reported on (a) questions; (b) answers. All values are statistically
significant (p-values <0.01).
4.1.2 Deviance Score
Given that flags are good proxies for identifying bad content, how should they be used to
detect content abusers and thus determine which accounts to be suspended? Common wisdom
might suggest that content abusers are those who receive a large number of flags. Of the top
1% flagged askers and answerers, we find 51.63% and 53.89%, respectively, are suspended. But
finding a threshold on the number of flags received by a user is not likely to work accurately for
content abuser detection: users with low activity who received flags for all their posts might go
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below this threshold. At the same time, highly active users may collect many flags even if for a
small percentage of their posts, yet contribute significantly to the community.
This intuition motivated us to measure the correlation between a user’s number of posts
and the number of flags received. Indeed, we find that the correlation between the number of
questions a user asks and the number of valid flags she receives from others is high (r = 0.49,
p < 0.05). Similarly, the number of answers posted and the number of valid flags received per
user are highly correlated (r = 0.37, p < 0.05). The distributions of the fraction of flagged
questions and answers is shown in Figure 7. While about 27% users have more than 25% flagged
questions, about 34% users have more than 25% flagged answers. Also, about 16% and 19% of
users have more than 50% flagged questions and answers, respectively.
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Figure 7 Distributions of fraction of flagged questions and answers.
So, instead of directly considering flags, we define a deviance score metric that indicates
how much a user deviates from the norm in terms of received flags considering the amount of
activity. Deviant behavior is defined by actions or behaviors that are contrary to the dominant
norms of the society [78]. Although social norms differ from culture to culture, within a context,
they remain the same and they are the rules by which the members of the community are conven-
tionally guided.
We define the deviance score for a user u as the number of correct abuse reports (flags)
she receives over the total content (question/answer) she posted, after eliminating the expected
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average number of correct abuse reports given the amount of content posted:
DevianceQ/A(u) = YQ/A,u   YˆQ/A,u (4.1)
where YQ/A,u is the number of correct abuse reports received by u for her questions/answers,
and YˆQ/A,u is the expected number of correct abuse reports to be received by u for those ques-
tions/answers.
To capture the expected number of the correct abuse reports a user receives for ques-
tions/answers, we considered a number of linear and polynomial regression models between the
response variable (number of correct abuse reports) and the predictor variable (number of ques-
tions/answers). Among them, the following linear model was the best in explaining the variability
of the response variable.
Y = ↵ +  X + ✏ (4.2)
where Y is the number of correct abuse reports (flags) received for the content, X is the number
of content posts and ✏ is the error term.
In eq. (4.1), a positive deviance score reflects deviant users, i.e., those whose deviance
cannot be only explained by their activity levels.
4.1.3 Deviance Score vs. Suspension
We have found 105, 340 users with positive question deviance scores and 121, 705 users
with positive answer deviance scores. Among the users with positive question deviance score,
31, 891 users (30.27%) have been suspended. Similarly, among the users with a positive answer
deviance score, 37, 633 users (30.92%) have been suspended. The CDF of suspended and deviant
(but not suspended) users’ deviance scores for both questions and answers is shown in Figure 8.
In both cases, suspended and deviant users are visibly characterized by different distributions:
31
suspended users tend to have higher deviance scores than deviant (not suspended) users. While
this difference is visually apparent, we also ensure it is statistically significant using two meth-
ods: 1) the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, and 2) a permutation test, to verify that
the two samples are drawn from different probability distributions.
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Figure 8 The CDF of suspended and deviant users’ deviance scores for (a) questions; (b) answers.
Distributions are different with p < 0.001 for both KS and permutation tests. For questions:
D = 0.22, Z = 46.04. For answers: D = 0.28, Z = 50.53.
We also find that 63.94% of top 1% deviant question askers’ and 64.77% of top 1% de-
viant answerers’ accounts have been suspended. This hints that the higher deviance score a user
has, the more likely (s)he is to be removed from the community. Figure 9 shows the probability
of a user being suspended as a function of its rank in the community as expressed by deviance
score and number of flags. We observe that the more deviant a user is, the more probable is that
she will be suspended. Also, in all cases, deviance score shows a higher probability of suspension
compared to the number of flags.
These results show that the deviance score is a better metric for identifying the content
abusers than the number of flags is by itself. However, both metrics fail to identify content abusers
who go under the community radar. We found that about 40% of the suspended users had never
been flagged for the abusive content they certainly posted, thus maintaining a negative deviance
score. Thus, our investigation into user behavior in the YA community continues.
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Figure 9 Probability of being suspended, given a user is within top x% of (a) question or (b)
answer deviance scores and flags. Local polynomial regression fitting with 95% confidence
interval area is also shown.
4.2 Deviant vs. Suspended Users
Despite the fact that deviance score better identifies the pool of suspended users, it is
clearly an imperfect metric. On one hand, there are high deviance score users who are not sus-
pended, despite the fact that the platform seems to be fairly quick in responding to abuse re-
ports. On the other hand, there are “ordinary” users, according to the deviance score (i.e., with
a negative deviance score) who are never reported for abusive content, yet get suspended. To
better understand these two groups of users—deviant but not suspended and suspended but not
flagged—we analyze in more detail their activity. Note that the two groups are disjoint (i.e.,
deviant users have received at least one flag).
4.2.1 Deviance is Engaging
One of the success metrics of CQA platforms is user engagement [191], which can be
measured by the number of contributions and by the number of users who respond to a particular
content. Thus, we use the number of answers deviant users receive to their questions and the
number of distinct users who respond to the deviant users’ questions as measures of deviants’
contribution to user engagement with the platform. To this end, for each category of users (typi-
cal, deviant but not suspended, and suspended) we randomly selected 500k questions they asked.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the number of answers received by typical, deviant but not
suspended, and suspended users per question.
Type Min. 1st Qu. Med. Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Typical 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.36 5.00 1296.00
Deviant 1.00 5.00 11.00 17.96 22.00 1205.00
Suspended 1.00 1.00 4.00 8.67 9.00 1144.00
For each question, we extracted all answers received and also the users who answered those ques-
tions. Table 1 presents the statistics of the number of answers received per category of users.
Deviant users’ questions get significantly more answers than typical users’s questions
get: on average, a question posted by a deviant user gets about 5 times more answers than the
average question posted by a typical user. This difference is also seen in the CCDF of the number
of answers received by typical, deviant and suspended users in Figure 10(a). The distributions
(pairwise) are different with pks < 0.01 and pperm < 0.01.
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Figure 10 (a) CCDF of the number of answers received by the typical, deviant but not suspended,
and suspended users on questions; (b) CCDF of the number of neighbors (distinct answerers) that
typical, deviant but not suspended, and suspended users have.
Deviant users not only attract more answers, but also interact with more users than typical
users do, as shown by Figure 10(b) and these two distributions are different (pks < 0.01, pperm <
0.01).
This result from analyzing a random sample of 500k questions is confirmed when look-
ing at the indegree of nodes in the activity network, which represents the number of users who
answered that node’s questions, as shown in Table 2 for typical and deviant users. Deviant askers
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the number of neighbors askers have in the Activity Network.
Type Min. 1st Qu. Med. Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Typical 0.00 1.00 5.00 28.16 19.00 13270.00
Deviant 0.00 3.00 20.00 103.40 90.00 5698.00
Suspended 0.00 2.00 13.00 88.62 60.00 6576.00
have a higher number of neighbors than typical askers. An explanation might be, as shown in [122],
that users who ask conversational questions tend to have more neighbors (with whom the asker
has interaction) than users who ask informational questions. This suggests that deviant users tend
to ask more conversational questions, which engage a larger number of responders.
4.2.2 Deviance is Noisy
We observed that deviant users impact the quantity of content in the system. Do they
impact quality, too? To address this question, we look at the percentage of the best answers with
respect to the total number of answers submitted per user.
Figure 11 shows the CDF of the percentage of best answers for different classes of users:
1) typical, 2) deviant but not suspended, and 3) suspended. The results show that users who are
moderately deviant but did not get suspended have higher percentage of best answers than sus-
pended users (distributions are different pks < 0.01, pperm < 0.01), but lower than that of typical
users (distributions are different pks < 0.01, pperm < 0.01).
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Figure 11 CDF of the ratio of best answers for typical, deviant but not suspended and suspended
users.
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To conclude, it turns out that while deviant users are beneficial in terms of platform suc-
cess metrics, as they increase user engagement by attracting more answers and attracting more
users who answer their questions, they do not contribute more than the norm-following users in
terms of content quality.
4.2.3 Deviance is Everywhere
Deviance is culturally determined and the perception of deviance changes from culture to
culture [80]. We investigate to what extent deviance is moderated across various languages and
how diverse the abuse reporters are.
Based on users’ question and answer deviance scores, we took 1% of the top deviant users
and randomly selected 10% of their questions and answers in each category, respectively. We
also took the same number of top fair users (negative deviance scores and not suspended from
the community) in both categories and took the same number of randomly selected questions and
answers. We used a language identification package in Python, LangID2, to detect the languages
in which these questions and answers are posted. LangID is a pre-trained language identification
classifier and it is not sensitive to domain-specific features such as HTML/XML markup.
As shown in Figures 12(a) and (b), English is the most dominant language in YA and
languages differ in terms of the percentage of questions and answers contributed by top deviant
and fair users. Top fair users in English language contributed most content (49.27% questions,
65.31% answers) among all content contributed by top fair users in different languages. Also, top
deviant users in English language contributed 16.10% questions and 49.24% answers among all
content contributed by top deviant users in different languages.
Given the differences of fair users’ contributions in different languages, we asked whether
some languages (e.g., English) enjoy better moderation than others. To answer that, we used top
deviant users who have been already suspended from the YA community as described in Sec-
2https://github.com/saffsd/langid.py
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Figure 12 Percentage of (a) questions and (b) answers contributed by top deviant, fair and
suspended users in different languages. Numbers inside a bar show the percentage of questions
(answers) that the specific language’s different types of users contributed among all languages.
A bar represents the percentage of questions (answers) different types of users contributed in that
language.
tion 4.1. Using the same procedure as before, we compared their languages in questions/answers
with fair and deviant users’ questions/answers (we refer to them as suspended users in Figure 12).
Suspended users in English language contributed 33.69% questions and 44.14% answers among
all contents contributed by suspended users in different languages. In English language, we see
more contribution from top fair users than top deviant and suspended users. Although in our
sample, deviant and suspended users’ combined contribution is twice than fair users, in English
we see that about 50% of questions and answers are from top fair users, where the rest are from
deviant and suspended users. However, this is not a trend in all of languages. In some languages,
top deviant and suspended users have higher contribution than top fair users, e.g., German and
Vietnamese for questions and answers. Moreover, the presence of suspended users in various
languages shows that deviance is moderated across languages.
To assess the diversity of abuse reporters in different languages, we map abuse reports
to reporter location. We used unique IP addresses of the reporters to get the number of distinct
reporters. Using an API from HostIP [131], we convert IP addresses to locations (cities and coun-
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tries). Figure 13 shows the percentage of abuse reporters from different countries normalized by
their Internet populations [19]. We find that users have reported from 197 countries and territo-
ries. The largest number of reporters (25.57%) is from the USA. The number of reporters is high
from American countries (both north and south), Western Europe, Southeast Asia and Australia.
These top countries represent all the languages in Figure 12, i.e., USA, Canada, Australia (En-
glish), Western Europe (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, French, German, Galician), Southeast Asia
(Malay, Vietnamese).
0.000187 25.6
Figure 13 Locations of abuse reporters.
4.2.4 Centrality of Suspended Users
In order to understand structural positions of the suspended users in YA, we study their
centralities in the FF network. Structural positions of the nodes are often correlated with their
characteristics and behaviors [10, 11]. For example, most central users in a competition-based
expertise network of YA are found to be an expert and knowledgeable answerers [13]. We study
centrality measures belonging to two main families: degree-based centrality (Indegree, Out-
degree) and spectral centrality (PageRank). We do not use path-based centrality, such as be-
tweenness or closeness, due to their computational complexity in large datasets. Indegree and
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Table 3 Percentage of the suspended users found in Top-N% of high centrality users in Yahoo
Answers.
Top-N% 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0
Indegree 0.30 1.43 2.71 10.61
Outdegree 0.28 1.31 2.34 8.13
PageRank 0.25 1.34 2.50 9.42
Outdegree centralities are based on the number of followers and followees respectively, i.e., most
indegree central users are the nodes with the highest number of followers. However, the im-
portance of the neighboring nodes is also crucial for a node to be central. PageRank centrality
considers this impact of neighboring nodes and assigns numerical weights to each node of a
network based on its relative importance within the network.
We compute the most central users in the network and analyze how many of them are
suspended. The percentage of the suspended users found in Top-N% of high centrality users
are shown in Table 3. Although suspended users are 9% of the population, they are only 0.30%,
0.28% and 0.25% within the top 0.1% Indegree, Outdegree and PageRank central users respec-
tively. The under-representation of suspended users doesn’t change if we increase top centrality
users from 0.1% to 5.0% gradually. These results suggest that on average, suspended users are
not central in YA and hence, their potential influence should be limited.
4.2.5 The Suspended but Not Flagged Users
While the results already presented show how the deviant users differ from the suspended
and from the typical users, we do not have yet an understanding of the behavior of the users who
get suspended without other users flagging their abusive content. An initial analysis of these
users—suspended but not flagged—shows the following particularities when compared to the
fair users (all users, independent of their deviance status, who are not suspended).
First, they are followed by and follow significantly fewer other users. Figures 14 (a) and
(b) show the distributions of indegree and outdegree of never-flagged-suspended users com-
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pared to those of fair users. Not only these users have smaller social circles, but they also have
lower activity levels, as shown in Figure 14 (c). Of course, these results could be correlated:
low activity may mean low engagement in the social platform. These results may also suggest
that (some of) these users join the platform for particular objectives that are orthogonal to the
platform purpose, such as spamming. More importantly, however, these results suggest directions
that we present in the following.
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Figure 14 Distributions of (a) indegree; (b) outdegree and (c) number of questions and answers
(QA) of never flagged suspended users and fair users. For outdegree: D = 0.28 and Z = 27.40,
p < 0.001. For indegree: D = 0.17 and Z = 15.86, p < 0.001. For activity: D = 0.30 and
Z = 40.30, p < 0.001.
4.3 Social Network Analysis
We investigate how the social network defined by the follower-followee relationships im-
pacts user activities and behaviors in YA. Our final goal is to understand how to separate fair users
from users who should be suspended even in the absence of flags. We learn that users close in
the FF network not only help each others by answering questions, but also monitor each other’s
behavior by reporting flags (Section 4.3.1). Thus, the social network allows users to implicitly
coordinate their behavior so much so that users who are socially close exhibit not only similar
behavior, but also a similar deviation from the typical behavior (Section 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Out of Sight, Out of Mind
We expect that users receive more answers from users that are close in the social network.
To verify this intuition, we randomly selected 7M answers such that both parties of the dialogue
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(the user who posted the question and the user who answered it) are in the social network, and
measured the social distances between the two users. For a user u and a social distance h, the
probability of receiving an answer from followers at distance h is the following:
ph =
# of u’s followers at distance h who answered u’s questions
# of u’s followers at distance h
(4.3)
Figure 15 plots the geometric average of all these probabilities at a given distance as a
function of social distance. The figure confirms that the probability of receiving answers from
h-hop followers decreases with social distance.
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Figure 15 Probability of getting answers from h-hop followers. Local polynomial regression
fitting with 95% confidence interval area is also shown.
Therefore, the FF network channels user attention, likely via its newsfeeds feature that
sends updates to followers on the questions posted by the user. Does the same phenomenon hold
true for abuse reports?
To answer this question we investigate both networks: along with the FF which is an ex-
plicit network, we also investigate the activity network (AN), which connects users based on their
direct interactions question-answer. For each (reporter, reportee) pair in the editorially-curated
abuse reports, we calculated the shortest path distance between them in the social network and
the activity network. We compare our results with a null model that randomly assigns the abuse
reports in our sample dataset to users in the two networks.
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Figure 16 shows the percentage of abuse reports users receive from close distances (up to
8 hops) for both (social and random) cases. About 75% of the reports that users receive are from
reporters located within 5 social hops in the FF network. However, when reports are distributed
randomly, about 9% are from within 5 social hops and very few from within 3 social hops.
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Figure 16 Percentage of the abuse reports received by users from different distances in the social
network, for the observed case and a random case.
When comparing the percentage of abuse reports users receive with respect to distance in
the AN (Figure 17), we notice that 94% of reports come from users within the first 3 hops, which
is significantly higher than the social network (about 32%). We believe this is due to the high
density of AN: most of the nodes are reachable from others within a few hops. However, even in
this denser network, the null model has only about 10% of reports applied from within 3 hops.
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Figure 17 Percentage of the abuse reports received by users from different distances in the
activity network, for the observed case and a random case.
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To further quantify this phenomenon, we calculate the probability of being correctly flagged
by users located at different network distances in the social and the activity network. For a user u
and a social distance h, the probability of being flagged by followers at distance h is the follow-
ing:
ph =
# of u’s followers at distance h who flagged u
# of u’s followers at distance h
(4.4)
Figure 18 plots the geometric average of all probabilities at a given distance against the
social distance for both networks. As expected, the probability decreases with social distances in
both the social and the activity network. The plot shows that users are likely to receive flags from
others close to them in terms of social relationships and interactions.
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Figure 18 Probability of being flagged by h-hop followers (a) social network; (b) activity
network. Local polynomial regression fitting with 95% confidence interval area is also shown.
These results confirm that the abuse reporting behavior is dominated by social relation-
ships and interactions: users are reported for content abuse more from their close social or ac-
tivity neighborhoods than from distant users. The underlying reason is likely content exposure:
a user’s contents (questions/answers) are disseminated to nearby followers, thus they get higher
exposure to that content compared to more distant users in the social graph. Similarly, users who
interact frequently with a user are more probable to view her contents and to report the inappro-
priate ones.
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4.3.2 Birds of a Feather Flock Together
Similarity fosters connection– a principle commonly known as homophily, coined by
sociologists in the 1950s. Homophily is our inexorable tendency to link up with other individ-
uals similar to us [196]. We verify in this section whether homophily is also present in terms of
deviance–that is, if deviant users tend to be close to each other in the social network.
One way to conclude about the homophily of a network is to compute the attribute assor-
tativity of the network [213]. The assortativity coefficient is a measure of the likelihood for nodes
with similar attributes to connect to each others. The assortativity coefficient ranges between -1
and 1; a positive assortativity means that nodes tend to connect to nodes of similar attribute value,
while a negative assortativity means that nodes are likely to connect to nodes with very different
attribute value from their own. If a network has positive assortativity coefficient, then it is often
called assortative mixed by the attribute, otherwise called disassortative mixed.
In this work, we used question and answer-based deviant scores. We considered each of
the scores as an attribute and calculated the assortativity coefficient r based on [214] for each
type of deviance. The assortativity coefficients r are shown in Table 4 and are positive.
In [214], Newman studied a wide variety of networks and concluded that social networks
are often assortatively mixed (Table 4), but that technological and biological networks (e.g., World
Wide Web r =  0.067, software dependencies r =  0.016, protein interactions r =  0.156)
tend to be disassortative. Comparing them quantitatively with the assortativity coefficients of
the YA network, we conclude that the YA network is assortatively mixed in terms of deviance.
So, users having contacts with (low)high deviance scores will also have (lower)higher deviance
scores.
We next measure how similar the deviance scores of a user’s contacts are with the user’s,
and how this similarity varies over longer social distances. For this, we randomly sampled 100, 000
users from the social network for each social distance ranking from 1 hop to 4 hops.
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Table 4 Assortativity coefficient r for deviance scores in the YA network. r values are also shown
for other social networks from [214].
Yahoo! Answers Other Social Networks
Question deviance r = +0.11 Mathematics coauthorship r = +0.120
Answer deviance r = +0.13 Biology coauthorship r = +0.127
Let Uh be the set of all the users (100,000) selected for the social distance h. We calcu-
lated the probability that user u’s h-hop contacts (with u 2 Uh) will have the same deviance score
as:
pu =
# of u’s followers at distance h with same deviance score
# of u’s followers at distance h
(4.5)
Rather than computing the exact similarity between a user and her follower’s deviance
scores, we focused on whether their difference is small enough to be dubbed as the same. We
considered two users’ deviance scores are the same if their corresponding deviance score dif-
ference is less than a “similarity delta”. More specifically, u will have about the same deviance
score with user s located at distance h if:
|devianceu   deviances| <   (4.6)
The same technique was used for both types of deviance scores.We experimented with
two values for   equal to one or two standard deviations of the distribution of deviance scores in
the network. We report the geometric average of all pu probabilities computed in each hop h.
Figure 19 shows the probability plots for both types of deviance, keeping similarity  
equal to one or two standard deviations. Although different values of the  , the shapes of the
figures are almost the same: up to 3-hops, the probability decreases gradually with the social
distance.
45
●●
●
●
Questions (2*SD)
Answers (2*SD)
Questions (SD)
Answers (SD)0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1 2 3 4
Social distance
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Figure 19 Probability that a h-hop follower has the same deviant score to the user for   =   and
  = 2 . SD: standard deviation.
4.4 The Good Guys
Crowd-sourced monitoring of the CQA platforms is facilitated by the Good guys. These
users voluntarily flag the abusive content, even without getting any incentive from the platform.
The flags are overwhelmingly correct, as seen by our previous results from Section 4.1. In this
section, we ask several questions about good guys to better understand their behavior. More
specifically, we ask (1) Are good guys few in numbers, or many? (2) Do good guys report con-
sistently? (3) Do good guys focus on specific categories or do they report on diverse categories?
(4) Are the good guys also good content contributors?
To answer the questions above, we first define a goodness score of the good guys by con-
sidering the correct and incorrect flags that they reported. Intuitively, the good guys are likely
to report a high number of valid reports, i.e., reports that lead to content deletion after human
inspection. As such, we define the goodness score of user u as follows.
Goodnessu = #V alidu  #Invalidu (4.7)
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where #V alidu and #Invalidu are the number of valid and invalid abuse reports, respectively,
submitted by u.
We first look at the distribution of abuse reports. We find that although a large number
of users interact with the platform by asking, answering questions or creating social connections
(our dataset has 1.5M active users), only about 20% of users report abuses. This might be due
to the fact that reporting has no incentives, e.g., reporters do not get any points in YA. The distri-
bution of the number of abuse reports is shown in Figure 20. This distribution is highly skewed:
most of the users have reported few abuses. About 46% of the users among the abuse reporters
reported only one abuse, and 10% of users reported more than 13. Overall, 60% of abuse reports
are contributed by only 932 users and 90% of abuse reports are contributed by 21,992 of such
users (7.96% of users).
1 10 100 1000 10000
1
10
0
10
00
0
Number of abuse reports by a user
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 20 Distribution of the reports.
To answer whether good guys report on a regular basis, we calculate their temporal pre-
dictability of reporting. We use entropy [58] to calculate the temporal predictability. In classical
thermodynamics, entropy is a measure of disorder. For a given report and T intervals (days), we
can compute p(rt), the probability that the report belongs to an interval t 2 T . We measure the
normalized entropy for a user for all reports as:
Report Entropy =  
P
t2T p(rt)log(p(rt))
|logT | (4.8)
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This normalized report entropy ranges from 0 to 1 and it defines how consistent users are
in reporting daily over the observation period. A normalized report entropy close to 1 indicates
that the user has reported in each day of the observation period. Figure 21 shows CCDF of report
entropies. We find that, in general, the good guys are regular in reporting. About 22% of the good
guys have entropies at least 0.35. It appears that few good guys, about 0.3%, have taken reporting
very seriously. Their entropy is at least 0.70, which means that they have reported almost 70%
of the days of a year. The correlation between goodness scores and entropies is strong (r=0.67,
p<0.001), which suggests that the better the contribution in reporting, the higher the consistency
of reporting over time.
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Figure 21 Distributions of report entropy.
Now we turn to answering how focused the good guys are at reporting, i.e., do they report
on different topics (e.g., different YA categories)? Similar to equation 4.8, we calculate entropies
of their reports on different categories over the observation period. This category entropy defines
how consistent users are in reporting on different categories. For a given report and C categories,
we can compute p(rc), the probability that the user has posted a report on a question or answer
from the category c 2 C. We measure the normalized entropy for a user for all reports as:
Category Entropy =  
P
c2C p(rc)log(p(rc))
|logC| (4.9)
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Figure 22 Distributions of category entropy.
Figure 22 shows the CCDF of category entropies. Given the high number (more than
1300) of categories in YA, in which users ask and answers questions, it will be unrealistic to as-
sume that some guys will report across all categories (in this case their entropy will be 1.00).
However, the distribution shows that about 8% of the good guys have entropies at least 0.25,
meaning that they have reported on at least 25% of the categories. Some users, although very
few (0.02%), have entropies at least 50%: these guys reported on half of the categories. The
highest entropy that we have found is 0.67. In general, users report on different categories; only
7.77% users have entropy less than 0.05. The correlation between goodness scores and entropies
(r=0.38, p<0.001) shows that the higher goodness score a user as, the more category entropy she
has.
We finally want to understand the content contribution of good guys compared to typical
users (who do not report) in the platform. We plot CCDF of the total number of questions and
answers (QA) of good guys vs. typical users in Figure 23. About 96% good guys have more than
10 QA, where 66% of typical users have more than 10 QA. While 59% good guys have more
than 100 QA, only 21% typical users have more than 100 QA.
While the differentiation is visually apparent from the distributions in Figure 23, we en-
sure it is statistically significant verifying that the two samples are drawn from different probabil-
ity distributions with pks < 0.001, D = 0.418, ppermute < 0.001, Z = 129.17. Also, goodness
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scores of good guys are correlated with their QA (r=0.41, p<0.001). These results show good
guys are also good contributors of content.
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Figure 23 Distributions of the QA from good guys and other users.
4.5 Suspended User Prediction
Based on our previous analysis, we extract various types of features that we use to build
predictive models. We formulate the prediction task as a classification problem with two classes
of users: fair and suspended. Next, we describe the features used and the classifiers tested, and
demonstrate that we are able to automatically detect fair from suspended users on Yahoo An-
swers with an overall high accuracy.
4.5.1 Features for Classification
Our predictive model has 29 features that are based on users’ activities and engagements
e.g., social, activity, accomplishment, flag and deviance. Table 5 shows the different categories of
features used for the classification. Social features are based on the social network of the users,
where Activity features are based on community contributions in the form of questions and an-
swers. Accomplishment features acknowledge the quality of user contribution (e.g., points, best
answers). Flag summarizes the flags of a user (both received and reported). Deviance Score
features are the scores that we have got based on users’ flags and activities. Finally, Deviance
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Homophily represents the homophilous behavior with respect to deviance. Although most of the
features are self-explanatory, below we clarify the ones which may not be.
Reciprocity measures the tendency of a pair of nodes to form mutual connections between
each other [106]. Reciprocity is defined as follows:
r =
L
L⇤
where L is number of edges pointing in both directions and L⇤ is the total number of edges. r =
1 holds for a network in which all links are bidirectional (purely bidirectional network), while a
purely unidirectional network has r = 0.
Status is defined as follows:
Status =
#followers
#followees
Thumbs is the difference between the number of up-votes and the number of down-votes
a user receives for all her answers. Award Ratings is the sum of the ratings a user receives for her
best answers.
Altruistic scores is the difference between a user’s contribution and his takeaway from the
community. For altruistic scores, we consider YA’s point system, which awards two points for an
answer, 10 points for a best answer, and penalizes five points for a question:
Altruistic scoresu = f(contribution)  f(takeaway)
= 2.0 ⇤ Au + 10.0 ⇤BAu   5.0 ⇤Qu
(4.10)
where Qu is the number of questions posted by u, Au is the number of answers posted by u, and
BAu is the number of best answers posted by u.
51
4.5.2 Experimental Setup and Classification
In our dataset, the percentage of fair users (about 91%) are high compared to the sus-
pended users (about 9%). This leads to an unbalanced dataset. Various approaches have been
proposed in the machine learning literature to fix the unbalanced dataset. We use ROSE [198]
algorithm to create a balanced dataset from the unbalanced one. ROSE creates balanced samples
by random over-sampling minority examples, under-sampling majority examples or by com-
bining over and under-sampling. Our prediction dataset has 250K users with 60-40% training–
testing split. Using the under and over sampling technique of ROSE, we sample 150K users (fair
and suspended each class has 75K users) to train the classifier. The testing set has 100K users,
who are not present in the training dataset. They are drawn randomly and fair vs. suspended ratio
in the testing dataset is the same as the original YA dataset.
We have used various classification algorithms, including Naive Bayes, K-Nearest Neigh-
bors (KNN), Boosted Logistic Regression, and Stochastic Gradient Boosted Trees (SGBT) and
found that the SGBT shows the best performance. SGBT offers a prediction model in the form of
an ensemble of weak prediction models [100]. Table 6 shows a summary of our experimental
setup. First, we use individual feature sets to investigate how successful one feature set is by
itself only, and finally used all features for prediction. For evaluation, we measure widely used
metrics in classification problems: Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1-score.
4.5.3 Classification Results and Evaluation
Figure 24 shows the performance (accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score) of the models
trained with different subsets of features using the Stochastic Gradient Boosted Trees (SGBT)
classifier. We observe that each feature set has a positive effect on the performance of the clas-
sifier across all performance metrics. This suggests that all our feature sets are important for
prediction. Particularly, accomplishment, deviance, flags and activity features individually can
predict more than 70% accuracy with good precision, recall and F1 score. However, when all the
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features are used for classification, the performance metrics yield the best results, i.e., accuracy is
improved by 4.11% compared to activity features.
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Figure 24 Performance of the SGBT while classifying fair and suspended users. Four perfor-
mance measures are shown: Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1 score.
The performance results of various classifiers while using all features are shown in Ta-
ble 7. The SGBT classifier outperforms other classifiers in all performance metrics. It achieves
82.61% accuracy in classifying fair vs. suspended users with a high precision (96.94) and recall
(83.52). The confusion matrix of the classifier is shown in Table 8. The matrix shows that the
SGBT classifier is able to correctly classify 83.52% of fair users and 73.39% of suspended users.
Figure 25 shows the most important features (top 15) in classification of fair vs. sus-
pended users. The model uses a backwards elimination feature selection method for feature im-
portance. For each feature, the model tracks the changes in the generalized cross-validation error
and uses it as the variable importance measure.
We observe that the number of flagged content and deviance scores are the best predictors
of fair and suspended users. Also, at least one feature from all feature sets is within the top 15
features.
4.6 Summary and Discussions
This chapter investigates the flagging of inappropriate content in a popular and mature
community Q&A, Yahoo Answers. Based on a year’s worth of activity records that included
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Figure 25 Relative importance of top 15 features in classifying fair and suspended users.
about 10 million flags in a population of about 1.5 million active users, our analysis revealed the
following:
The use of flags is overwhelmingly correct, as shown by the large percentage of flags
validated by human monitors. This is an important learning for crowd sourcing, as it shows for
the first time (to the best of our knowledge) that crowd sourced monitoring of content functions
well in CQA platforms. Moreover, although there are no explicit incentives (e.g., points) for
flagging inappropriate content, users take the time to curate their environment. In fact, 46% of the
users reported at least one abuse report, with the top abuse reporters flagging tens of thousands of
posts.
Second, we discover that many users have collected a large number of flags, yet their
presence is not necessarily bad for the community. Even more, their contributions are engaging,
which is certainly a benefit to the platform: the questions asked by the users who deviate from
the norm in terms of number of flags received for their postings receive many more answers and
from many more users than the questions posted by ordinary users or by users who later had
their accounts suspended. More content-based analysis is needed to understand how the deviant
users engage the community. We posit that they might ask conversational questions rather than
informative questions, as this behavior is shown to increase community engagement.
54
Third, we showed the importance of the follower-followee social network for channeling
attention and producing answers to question. This network also channels the attention of flaggers:
we showed that users in close social proximity are more likely to flag inappropriate content than
distant users. Social neighborhoods, thus, tend to maintain their environment clean.
Fourth, a significant problem in YA is posed by the users who manage to avoid flagging,
possibly by remaining at the outskirts of the social network. This relative isolation in terms of
followers and in terms of interactions probably allows such users to remain invisible. They are
likely caught by automatic spam-detection-like mechanisms and by paid human operators. Our
empirical investigations show that classifiers that use activity-based features and social network-
based features can successfully identify fair and suspended (40% of them are not flagged) users
with an accuracy as high as 83%.
Our insights might inform the design of new applications, which include:
• Quantified ‘Self’: One could imagine user interfaces that show to what extent one’s question-
answering behavior deviates from the typical community behavior. By being aware of
how their actions impact the community, users could accordingly modify or reinforce their
behavior.
• Collaborative Moderation Leadership: Being able to identify passionate abuse reporters
might well translate into promoting some of them to be community moderators and, as
such, reducing CQA human inspectors’ workload.
Our work has two main limitations. The first is that our analysis is not exhaustive as there
might be unethical/deviant behaviors we have not considered. Users could game the incentive
system for their own advantage. A user could, for example, post a question from a profile, answer
that question from another profile, upvote the answer, and consequently accumulate more rep-
utation points. The second limitation is that capturing deviance with a single metric (even after
controlling for activity) might be oversimplified. For example, we have assumed that a user’s
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behavior does not change over time. However, unstable behavior might be quite likely (especially
for active users) and cannot be fully captured by a single measure of deviance.
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Table 5 Different categories of features used for fair vs. suspended user prediction.
Category Number Features
Social 6
Indegree
Outdegree
Status
Reciprocity
Reciprocated networks degree
Reciprocated networks CC
Activity 4
#Questions
#Answers
#Flagged Questions
#Flagged Answers
Accomplishment 5
Points
#Best Answers
Award Ratings
Thumbs
Altruistic scores
Flag 8
#Question Flag Received
#Question Flag Received Valid
#Question Flag Reported
#Question Flag Reported Valid
#Answer Flag Received
#Answer Flag Received Valid
#Answer Flag Reported
#Answer Flag Reported Valid
Deviance Score 2 Question deviance scoreAnswer deviance score
Deviance Homophily 4
Followers’ question deviance score
Followers’ answer deviance score
Followees’ question deviance score
Followees’ answer deviance score
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Table 6 Details of experimental setup.
Dataset 250,000 users
Class Balancing Alg. Random Over-Sampling Examples (ROSE)
Classifiers Stochastic Gradient Boosted Trees (SGBT)
Naive Bayes, Boosted Logistic Regression
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
Support Vector Machines RDF
Feature Sets Social, Activity, Accomplishment
Flag, Deviance Homophily, All features
Train-Test Split 150K users training, 100K users testing
Cross Validation 10-folds, repeated 10 times
Performance Accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score
Table 7 Performance of various classifiers while using all features.
Classifier Name Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
Naive Bayes 47.21 96.93 43.34 59.89
Boosted Logistic Regression 71.61 96.62 71.28 82.03
KNN 73.81 96.41 73.97 83.71
SVM-RDF 75.92 95.62 77.06 85.34
SGBT 82.61 96.94 83.52 89.73
Table 8 Confusion matrix for SGBT classifier.
Actual
Fair Suspended
Predicted Fair 83.52% 26.60%
Suspended 16.47% 73.39%
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CHAPTER 5: PRIVACY CONCERNS VS. USER BEHAVIOR IN COMMUNITY QUESTION
ANSWERING SOCIAL NETWORKS1
Given the social privacy risks and abuse users face in OSNs, it is realistic to assume that
they might feel intimidated to actively participate in the community. However, one the other
hand, privacy-concerned users might feel more control of privacy settings and could engage more
with the community. It is unclear, thus, what is the association between users’ privacy concerns
and their behavior in an online social network.
Various studies [63, 235, 259] have shown the correlation between users’ self-reported
privacy concerns and their self-reported behavior in online social networks. For example, users
who express concerns on Facebook privacy controls and find it difficult to comprehend sharing
practices also report less engagement such as visiting, commenting, and liking content [259]. At
the same time, users who exercise their privacy rights (specifically, by restricting the visibility
of their content) are more engaged and thus contribute more to the community. Similarly, the
frequency of visits, type of use, and general Internet skills are shown to be related to the person-
alization of the default privacy settings [63]. However, measuring privacy concerns and behavior
through self-reporting is subject to bias [113, 215].
In this chapter, we focus on CQA social networks and empirically measure the relation-
ship between users’ privacy concerns and contribution behavior from their recorded activity logs.
Privacy settings are typically available for CQA platform users to personalize. We use modifi-
cations of the privacy settings as a proxy of privacy concern, and users’ recorded activity logs
to infer their behavior. We analyzed more than a year of activity traces from 1.5 million users
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [148]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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from YA (the dataset is discussed in Chapter 3) to answer the following questions related to users’
contribution behavior:
R5 : Are there quantitative and qualitative differences in user contributions between user groups
with private vs. public settings?
R6 : Is user engagement (measured by frequency of contributing content and number of social
contacts) correlated with user privacy settings?
R7 : Do users with privacy settings enabled tend to violate community norms more than users
with public content?
Our study finds that privacy-concerned users contribute more to the community. They are more
engaged, having higher retention and larger social circles, and have higher perception on answer
quality. However, they also exhibit more violations of platform rules in asking and answering
questions than the users with public profiles.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 overviews privacy settings in YA and
presents more granular level questions on users’ contribution behavior. Section 5.2 presents the
results. We conclude with a discussion of results in Section 5.3.
5.1 Privacy Settings in YA
Our goal is to study the association between privacy concerns and behavior in YA. Previ-
ous works [63, 259] on Facebook have inferred users’ privacy concerns using their self-reported
feedback on privacy. Rather than self-reporting, which is subject to bias [113], we use modifica-
tions on privacy settings as a proxy for privacy concern.
The available privacy configurations in YA allow 4 user groups:
1. Public: all information is publicly visible (87.20% of users). This is the default setting.
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2. QA-private: only Q/A information is private (2.23% of users), i.e., their questions and
answers are visible only to their followers.
3. Network-private: only network information is private (0.81% of users), i.e., only their
followers see the network.
4. Private: Q/A and network information is private (9.74% of users), thus only visible to the
user’s followers.
In the rest of the study we collectively refer to the QA-private and network-private users
as semi-private. The default privacy in YA is public. It might be possible that many of the users
in the pubic group are dormant: users who signed up, asked and answered some questions, and
disappeared quickly. These users might skew the results of our study, thus, we only consider
active users, who have asked and answered more than 10 questions. The active users are about
68% of the population and out of them 84.43% are public, 2.50% are QA-private, 0.89% are
network-private, and 12.16% are private. We note that our observations remain the same even
if we consider more active users by filtering-in users who have asked and answered more than 20
questions.
We measure several characteristics of user behavior that are related to CQA such as en-
gagement, retention, accomplishments, abuse reporting, and deviance. We ask the following
questions:
1. Is privacy preference associated with user engagement?
We consider two metrics of user engagement: retention, which measures the average in-
terval time between consecutive user contributions (addressed in Section 5.2.1), and social
engagement, given by the number of followers and followees (Section 5.2.2). This question
aims to investigate the pattern identified in survey-based Facebook studies, but using CQA-
specific and more nuanced engagement metrics on longitudinal activity traces.
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2. Do privacy-concerned users contribute differently to the community than public users?
Users contribute by posting questions and answering others’ questions. The quality of user-
generated content is measured in the number of best answers and the askers’ satisfaction
with the answer received. The overall activity is measured in points. We characterize user
contributions quantitatively and qualitatively in Section 5.2.3.
3. Do privacy-concerned users have different perception on answer quality than public users?
Users can themselves select best answers for their posted questions or they can rely on
community voting to mark the best answers. In Section 5.2.4, we look at how the com-
munity sees the best answers selected by the users who received them. Specifically, we
compare the quality of best answers selected by privacy-concerned users with those se-
lected by public users in terms of the number of thumbs-up and thumbs-down given by the
community.
4. Are privacy-concerned users also more abuse-conscious?
Intuitively, engagement is also correlated with the desire to keep the community free of
unethical users (who, for example, may post spam in violation of the community rules).
The related analysis is presented in Section 5.2.5.
5. Are privacy-concerned users more likely to violate community rules?
Intuitively, reduced visibility can give a false sense of confidence that might lead to vio-
lations of community rules. One study [30] in online gaming social networks shows that
newly found and banned cheaters are more likely to change their profile to a more restric-
tive privacy settings than non-cheaters. In YA, we ask, is this observed more with privacy-
concerned users than public users? This question is studied in Section 5.2.6.
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5.2 Results
This section presents the results of the research questions we asked in the previous sec-
tion.
5.2.1 Privacy and Retention
We define retention as the inverse of the average time difference between two actions
not marked as abusive (i.e., fair). We consider two types of retention, based on questions and
answers. For both types, if a user has a high average time difference between two fair actions,
her retention is low.
Figures 26(a) and (b) show the medians and CCDF of the question inter-event time for
the different groups, respectively. On average, private users have lower question inter-event time
(thus higher retention) than public users. The answer inter-event time in Figures 27(a) and (b)
show similar patterns. It seems semi-private (QA-private and network-private) users have higher
average inter-event time, compared to private users, but similar to public users.
We performed a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess the difference among privacy groups in
terms of retention. The test shows that at least one of the groups is different from at least one
of the others for question ( 2 = 458.83, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16) and answer retention ( 2 =
119.32, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). All-pairwise comparison tests after the Kruskal-Wallis test show
that besides the QA-private and network-private for question retention and network-private and
private for answer retention, all others are different for questions and answers retention (p<0.05).
These results show that privacy-concerned users are more retained than others.
5.2.2 Privacy and Social Circles
YA users can follow each other, thus, we compute the indegree (total number of follow-
ers) and outdegree (total number of followees) of different privacy group users. Figures 28(a)
and 29(a) show the median of indegree and outdegree, respectively, for the four privacy groups.
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Figure 26 (a) Median of question inter-event time in days with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of
question inter-event time in days.
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Figure 27 (a) Median of answer inter-event time in days with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of
answer inter-event time in days.
The CCDF of indegree and outdegree of them are shown in Figures 28(b) and 29(b), respectively.
While 20.56% of private users have more than 5 followers, only 4.42% of public users do. How-
ever, 15.33% of network-private and 14.48% of QA-private users have more than 5 followers.
Alternatively, while 14.79% of private users follow more than 5 users, only 5.85% of public users
do. For network-private and QA-private users, these numbers are 12.92% and 9.79%, respec-
tively.
The results indicate that more restrictive private settings users have richer social circles.
Indeed, Kruskal-Wallis tests show that at least one of the privacy groups is different from at least
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one of the other groups, for both the indegree ( 2 = 29383.67, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16) and
outdegree ( 2 = 2913.63, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). All-pairs comparison tests between the
privacy groups show that all pairwise privacy groups are different (p < 0.05) for indegree, and
only network-private and private users are same for outdegree (p < 0.05).
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Figure 28 (a) Median of indegree with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of indegree.
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Figure 29 (a) Median of outdegree with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of outdegree.
5.2.3 Privacy and Accomplishments
We consider two accomplishments that measure the quantity and quality of user contribu-
tion, through the point system described in Section 3.1. Quantity of contribution is measured by
the points users earn for their activities. To measure quality of contribution we use two metrics:
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Best Answer Percentage (BAP) and Award Rating Percentage (ARP). BAP is the percentage of
a user’s answers that are selected as best. ARP measures how satisfactory a user’s best answers
are. A YA asker can rate a best answer from 1 to 5 to declare how satisfied she is with the answer.
ARPj is the average rating a user j receives for her best answers:
ARPj =
#best answers of jP
i=1
Award rating for best answer i
#Total answers of j * 5
⇤ 100
Figure 30(a) shows median points with standard error for different privacy group users.
It appears that median points of private and semi-private users are higher than public users. In
fact, the CCDF of points in 30(b) shows that while 53.28% of private, 52.35% of QA-private and
45.51% of network-private users have more than 1000 points, only 14.14% of public users have
more than 1000 points.
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows at least one of the privacy groups is different from at least
one of the other groups for award points ( 2 = 75884.12, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). Moreover, all-
pairs comparison tests between the four privacy groups show that besides private and QA-private,
all others are different (p < 0.05). These results indicate that privacy-concerned users contribute
more in YA from a quantitative point of view.
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Figure 30 (a) Median of points with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of points.
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However, unlike quantitative contributions where public users are far behind the private
ones, we found smaller, albeit significant, difference in the qualitative contributions among the
four privacy groups. Figures 31(a) and 32(a) show the medians of best answer percentage (BAP)
and award rating percentage (ARP) of different privacy group users, respectively. Although in
both cases, private and semi-private group users have higher percentage than public users, the dif-
ference is less compared to points (even by a visible inspection on CCDF of BAP (Figure 31(b))
and ARP (Figure 32(b)) shows no difference across all privacy groups). Analyzing the CCDFs
we get 27.96% of public users have best answers percentage more than 20, and 34.91% of pri-
vate, 35.42% of network-private and 37.17% of QA-private users have best answers percent-
age more than 20. On the other hand, 27.10% of public, 33.56% of private, 34.03% of network-
private and 36.01% of QA-private users have award rating percentage more than 20.
For both BAP and ARP, we notice that all privacy groups’ numbers (median or CCDF)
are close, especially private and network-private. So, one important question is how different
privacy groups are in terms of users’ qualitative contribution. We conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test
on both BAP and ARP. The test results show that at least one of the privacy groups is different
from at least one of the other groups for BAP ( 2 = 5832.93, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16) and
also for ARP ( 2 = 5604.056, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). Moreover, all-pairs comparison tests
between the four privacy groups show that only private and network-private groups are the same
(p < 0.05), and all other pairwise privacy groups are different. Thus, we confirm that privacy-
concerned users have higher quantitative and qualitative contributions than others.
5.2.4 Privacy and Best Answer Quality
In YA, the best answer of a question is selected either by the asker of the question or by
the community. If an asker does not select the best answer, the community members do that by
voting. We first look at how different privacy groups are in selecting the best answers by them-
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Figure 31 (a) Median of best answers percentage with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of best
answers percentage.
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Figure 32 (a) Median of award rating percentage with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of award
rating percentage.
selves. We calculate the percentage of the best answers selected out of the total number of ques-
tions asked per user.
Figures 33(a) and (b) show the median and CCDF of the percentage of asker-selected best
answers for different privacy group users, respectively. Analyzing the distribution, we observe
that while 61.35% of private, 57.85% of network-private, 51.61% of QA-private users selected
more than 20% of their best answers by themselves, only 38.35% of public users have done the
selection by themselves. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that at least one of the privacy groups is
different from at least one of the other groups in terms of asker-selected best answers ( 2 =
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Figure 33 (a) Median of percentage of asker selected best answers with standard error bars; (b)
CCDF of percentage of asker selected best answers.
9522.60, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). All-pairs comparison tests between the four privacy groups
show that besides the network-private and private groups, all other pairwise privacy groups are
different (p < 0.05).
Next, we focus on the quality of the best answers that users selected by themselves. We
measure this quality based on community members’ feedback on those answers. Community
members can provide feedback on answers by giving either a thumbs up or a thumbs down (at
most one such feedback per answer). For each user j who selected best answers to his own ques-
tions, we calculate the average number of thumbs as the ratio between the positive community
feedback and the number of asker-selected best answers.
AvgThumbsj =
# Thumbs up – #Thumbs down
# Best answers selected by j
Figures 34(a) and (b) show the median and CCDF of the average thumbs on best answers
selected by the askers, respectively. The distribution shows that all private group users have more
average thumbs on best answers than public users. We observe that while 21.40% of private,
24.62% of network-private, 16.51% of QA-private users have got 5 average thumbs on their
best answers, only 11.45% of public users have got 5 average thumbs on the best answers they
selected. A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that at least one of the privacy groups is different from
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Figure 34 (a) Median of average thumbs on asker selected best answers with standard error bars;
(b) CCDF of average thumbs on asker selected best answers.
at least one of the other groups in terms of average thumbs with  2 = 5680.47, df = 3, p <
2.2e   16. All-pairs comparison tests between the four privacy groups show all pairwise privacy
groups are different (p < 0.05).
5.2.5 Privacy and Abuse Reporting
As a crowd-sourced community, YA relies on its users for self moderation. Thus, users not
only provide questions and answers, but also report inappropriate content using the abuse report
functionality. If the report is valid, the content is deleted from the community. In this way, users
serve as an intermediate layer in the YA moderation process since these abuse reports are verified
by human inspectors. We have already seen that privacy preferences of users have significant
association with a number of different dimensions including retention and accomplishments, thus
we suspect that privacy is also associated with abuse reporting.
The median and CCDF of the valid abuse reports posted by users are shown in Figures 35(a)
and (b), respectively. Although, abuse reports are highly appreciated for maintaining a clean
CQA environment, very few people tend to report abuses. We find that 46% of the users reported
only one abuse and 90% of abuse reports are contributed by only 7.96% of users. So, it’s not
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surprising that all median values are zero in Figures 35(a). However, the private users have very
high variability in abuse reporting compared to the public users.
The distributions in Figure 35(b) show that, on average, private users have posted more
abuse reports than semi-private and public users. Indeed, all three private groups of users have
posted a very large number of valid abuse reports compared to public users. Analyzing the dis-
tribution, we observe that 5.93% of private, 3.15% of network-private, 2.73% of QA-private and
only 0.20% of public users have posted more than 10 valid abuse reports. A Kruskal-Wallis test
shows that at least one of the privacy groups is different from at least one of the other groups in
terms of abuse reporting behavior ( 2 = 37647.77, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). All-pairs comparison
tests between the four privacy groups show that besides the QA-private and network-private
groups, all other pairwise privacy groups are different (p < 0.05).
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Figure 35 (a) Median of average valid abuse reports with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of valid
abuse reports.
5.2.6 Privacy and Deviance
Deviant behavior is defined by actions or behaviors that are contrary to the dominant
norms of the society [78]. Although social norms differ from culture to culture, within a context,
they remain the same and they are the rules by which the members of the community are conven-
tionally guided. YA has established norms as reflected by its community guidelines and terms of
service [8]. We define user behaviors as deviant if they depart from these norms. In Section 4.1,
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we define a deviance score metric that indicates how much a user deviates from the norm in terms
of received flags considering the amount of the user’s activity. In short, we define the deviance
score for a user u as the number of correct abuse reports (flags) she receives over the total content
(question/answer) she posted, after eliminating the expected average number of correct abuse
reports given the amount of content posted:
DevianceQ/A(u) = YQ/A,u   YˆQ/A,u (5.1)
where YQ/A,u is the number of correct abuse reports received by u for her questions/answers,
and YˆQ/A,u is the expected number of correct abuse reports to be received by u for those ques-
tions/answers.
To capture the expected number of the correct abuse reports a user receives for ques-
tions/answers, we considered a number of linear and polynomial regression models between the
response variable (number of correct abuse reports) and the predictor variable (number of ques-
tions/answers). Among them, the following linear model was the best in explaining the variability
of the response variable.
Y = ↵ +  X + ✏ (5.2)
where Y is the number of correct abuse reports (flags) received for the content, X is the number
of content posts and ✏ is the error term. In eq. (5.1), a positive deviance score reflects deviant
users, i.e., those whose deviance cannot be only explained by their activity levels.
Figures 36(a) and (b) show the median and CCDF of the question deviance scores, re-
spectively. In both cases, private and semi-private users’ question deviance scores are higher than
the public users. Also private users’ question deviance scores are higher than semi-private users.
We reach to the same conclusion for the answer deviance scores from the median and CCDF
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Figure 36 (a) Median question deviance scores with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of question
deviance scores.
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Figure 37 (a) Median answer deviance scores with standard error bars; (b) CCDF of answer
deviance scores.
of the answer deviance scores for all users in Figures 37(a) and (b), respectively. The Kruskal-
Wallis test shows that at least one of the privacy groups is different from at least one of the other
groups for question ( 2 = 4432.72, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16) and answer deviance scores
( 2 = 2662.416, df = 3, p < 2.2e   16). All-pairs comparison tests between the four privacy
groups show that besides the network-private and QA-private groups, all other pairwise privacy
groups are different (p < 0.05).
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5.3 Summary and Discussions
By performing a large-scale quantitative study, we have shown how users’ privacy con-
cerns relate to their behavior in Yahoo Answers.We used users’ modifications on their privacy
settings as a proxy of privacy concerns and grouped users into three main categories: private,
semi-private (consisting of two groups, QA-private and network-private), and public.
Our study highlighted a number of results. First, we found that 87.20% of user accounts
on YA are public, the default privacy setting. This result is similar with Gross and Acquisti’s
study [116] on Facebook, where they found that about 90% of user profiles maintained the de-
fault, public setting. While expected, this confirmation warns again about the importance of cor-
rect default settings in online applications.
Second, we discovered that users with enabled privacy settings are more engaged with
the community: they have higher retention, more social network contacts, they are better citizens
in terms of reporting abuses, overall they contribute more and better content, and have higher
perception on answer quality. This is in line with Staddon et al.’s study [259] on Facebook, who
found that users reporting more control and comprehension over privacy are more engaged with
the platform. Therefore, this result is important for two reasons: it applies to a type of online
community not previously studied, and it is based on user logs instead of user surveys, prone to
self-reporting bias.
Third, we found that, on average, privacy-concerned users show more behavioral devia-
tion in asking and answering questions than users with public accounts. At a first look, this result
seems counterintuitive, given that privacy-concerned users keep the environment clean by re-
porting more abuses. However, this result is consistent with our previous analysis in Section 4.2,
which finds that deviance in CQA platforms is not necessarily bad. Deviant users in YA are found
to promote user engagement by attracting more users to answer more of their questions.
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In addition to characterizing the association between privacy concerns and user behavior,
our results may lead to improvements in CQA platforms operation. Whether an expression of
privacy awareness or Internet savviness, users who modify their default privacy settings can be
expected to be better citizens. If they change their account settings early on in their interaction
with the platform, they send a clear signal to platform operators of likely commitment.
CQA platforms could benefit by targeting these users in a number of ways. For exam-
ple, the indication of changing privacy settings can be used in question recommendation, where
questions are routed to the most appropriate users who are more likely to answer. To find such
answerers, typical factors considered are followers, interests, question category, diversity and
freshness; privacy settings can also serve as a complementary factor. Also, some of these users
could be assigned community moderating duties to monitor community health, as our results
show that they report more abuses. However, users who do not change their privacy settings
are found to be less engaged. For these users, CQA platforms could provide extra incentives for
participation and increased retention.
Our work also shows the importance of user-friendly and more practical design of privacy
controls, as we find that increased engagement is associated with the use of privacy controls. For
example, the lack of appropriate visual feedback has been identified as one of the reasons of the
under-utilization of privacy settings [263]. A better interface for setting privacy controls in the
CQA platforms can impact users’ understanding of privacy settings and thus their success in
exercising privacy controls.
We acknowledge that our study is observational, hence we can only associate privacy con-
cerns with user behavior. In the absence of controlled experimental ground truth data, we cannot
draw causal conclusions regarding whether users’ privacy concerns lead to different behavioral
pattens in contribution.
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CHAPTER 6: CULTURES IN COMMUNITY QUESTION ANSWERING SOCIAL NETWORKS1
We have already seen a study on YA’s content abusers in Chapter 4. Moreover, we have
also discussed the relationship between users’ engagement and privacy concerns in Chapter 5.
This chapter views users’ engagement, privacy concerns and abusive behavior through the lenses
of national cultures in YA CQA social networks.
Cultural differences exist in almost all aspects of social interactions. For example, in
some cultures in Asia it may be considered disrespectful for people to express their opinions
or ask questions to authority figures (e.g., teachers, elders). In other cultures (such as USA or
Canada) asking questions is expected or even encouraged.
Cross-country cultural variations have been studied in the real world via small-scale ex-
periments and opinion surveys. Geert Hofstede [130] administered opinion surveys to a large
number of IBM employees from different countries in the 1960s and 1970s. He discovered five
cultural dimensions (individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long
term orientation), that can be attributed to the existence of cultural variations. Three of these
dimensions, individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance, have been used to as-
sess cultural differences in online contexts such as Twitter communication [104], emoticon us-
age [224] and online scheduling [239]. In brief, individualism reflects the extent to which an
individual is integrated into a group (e.g., individualistic cultures like USA emphasizes mostly
on their individual goals, as opposed to collectivist cultures like China that emphasizes on group
harmony and loyalty). Power distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of an
organization or society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally (e.g., in high power
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [149]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
76
distance countries subordinates simply comply with their leaders). Uncertainty avoidance defines
the extent to which society members feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity (e.g., the
stereotypical Swiss plans everything ahead supposedly to avoid uncertainty).
Psychologist Robert V. Levine [174] proposed the Pace of Life metric based on the walk-
ing speed of city people over a distance of 60 feet, the service time for standard requests for
stamps, and the clock accuracy of city banks. During the 1990s, Levine employed 19 experi-
menters in large cities from 31 countries and computed country-specific Pace of Life ranks. He
found significant differences in Pace of Life across cultures and ranked the cultures based on that.
Such cross-cultural variations that sociologists and psychologists already found in the
offline world lead to our main research question:
R8 : Does national culture determine how we participate in online Community Question An-
swering (CQA) social networks?
National cross-cultural variations have been studied in a number of online contexts, in-
cluding social networks (e.g., Twitter [111], Facebook [234]), location search and discovery (e.g.,
Foursquare [250]) and online scheduling (e.g., Doodle [239]). If cultural variations exist in CQA
platforms, they could be used for more informed system design, including question recommenda-
tion, follow recommendation, and targeted ads.
In this chapter, we analyzed about 200 thousand sampled YA users from 67 countries
who were active between 2012 and 2013. We tested a number of hypotheses associated with
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and Levine’s Pace of Life. Our results indicate that YA is not
a homogeneous subcultural community: considerable behavioral differences exist between the
users from different countries.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents how we selected a
representative sample of countries for the study. We introduce the hypotheses and present the
77
results relating to Levine’s Pace of Life and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in YA in Section 6.2
and Section 6.3, respectively. We discuss the impact of these results in Section 6.4.
6.1 Data Preparation
We studied a random sample of about 200K users from YA who were active between 2012
and 2013. These users posted about 9 million questions (about 45 questions/user), 43 million
answers (about 215 answers/user), and 4.5 million abuse reports (about 23 reports/user). They
are connected via 490K follower-followee relationships in a social network. The indegree and
outdegree distributions of the social network follow power-law distributions, with an exponential
fitting parameter ↵ of 1.83 and 1.85, respectively.
In our dataset, we have users from 67 countries. Figure 38 shows the number of users in
our dataset as a function of the number of Internet users taken from the World Bank.2 We find
a linear relationship between the number of users per country in our YA dataset and the number
of Internet users in the World Bank dataset for each country. It means that the YA users from our
dataset are not skewed by country. Instead, they represent a sample of global Internet users.
To investigate how sensitive this correlation is to the number of users per country, we
computed the Pearson correlation between the number of YA users in x countries and their re-
spective Internet population. The x countries were ranked based on the number of YA users found
in the dataset, and x was varied from top 20 to all 67 countries. Figure 39 shows that there are
several peaks in the correlation, but the values are high and between 0.5 and 0.7. We select as a
threshold the second highest correlation peak and thus included in the study 41 countries which
have at least 150 users per country.
2http://www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2
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Figure 38 The number of Internet users and YA users for 67 countries. The regression line and
95% confidence interval area are also shown. The countries are represented by a 2-letter country
code based on ISO 3166.
6.2 Levine’s Pace of Life
In this section, we analyze Levine’s Pace of Life cultural dimension in the context of YA
and show how it relates to user activities such as questioning, answering and reporting. In his
book [173], psychologist Robert Levine defines Pace of Life as “the flow or movement of time
that people experience”. With the help of 19 experimenters, he collected and compared three
indicators of the Pace of Life in 36 large cities from 31 countries around the world during a warm
summer month between 1992 and 1995 [174]. The indicators are:
• Walking speed: They measured walking speed of 35 men and 35 women over a distance
of 60 feet in main downtown areas in each city. Measurements were done during prime
business hours after controlling a number of variables such as sidewalks, crowd, effects
of socialization. They found significant differences in pedestrians walking speed—for
example, pedestrians in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil walked only two-thirds as fast as pedestrians
in Zurich, Switzerland.
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Figure 39 Number of top countries based on the number of YA users and correlation with their
number of Internet users. All correlations are statistically significant with p-value<0.05.
• Postal speed: In each city, they measured the time it took postal workers to serve a standard
request for stamps and considered this time as a proxy for work speed. They handed each
clerk money and a note written in the local language requesting a common stamp. For
example, in the United States, the clerk was handed a 5 dollar bill with a request for one
32-cent stamp. They found that overall Western Europe was the fastest to serve a standard
request.
• Clock accuracy: To quantitatively measure time concerns, the researchers checked the
clock accuracy of randomly selected 15 downtown banks in each city. The reported times
were then compared to those reported by the telephone company, which was considered
accurate.
Levine combined these three scores into a country-specific Pace of Life score and con-
cluded that “the Pace of Life was fastest in Japan and the countries of Western Europe and was
slowest in economically undeveloped countries. The pace was significantly faster in colder cli-
mates, economically productive countries, and in individualistic cultures” [174].
Intuitively, to cope with the rigid perception of time, people from the higher Pace of Life
countries have to be planned and organized in their daily activities. On the other hand, people
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from lower Pace of Life countries might allow some unstructured activities, as in those countries
the expectation of following the ‘right’ time is more relaxed.
Applying these findings to online communities such as CQA platforms, we expect that
people from higher Pace of Life countries, such as the USA, will be less likely to ask or answer
questions during busy hours of the day, e.g., office hours. From these ideas, we hypothesize the
following in YA:
H1 : Users from countries with a higher Pace of Life score show more temporally predictable
activities.
To test this hypothesis, we calculate how probable a country’s users are in asking, an-
swering and reporting at different times of day and correlate that with that country’s Pace of Life
rank. For example, if a user only asks or answers questions in the evening, he is temporally more
predictable than a user who asks or answers in the morning, afternoon and night. In a Twitter
study [111], Golder and Macy also find diurnal mood rhythms in different cultures.
In order to calculate temporal predictability, we only consider working days, as week-
ends are less predictable. More specifically, similar to [105], we divide the working day in five
time intervals: morning (6:00 - 8:59), office time (9:00-17:59), evening (18:00-20:59), late night
(21:00- 23:59), sleeping time (00:00 - 05:59). All the reported times are users’ local time. We use
information entropy [58], a measure of disorder, to calculate the temporal predictability.
For a given activity (asking, answering, or reporting) and C intervals, we can compute
p(c), the probability of an activity belonging to interval c. We measure the normalized entropy
for user u for all activities as:
Entropyu =
 Pc2C p(c)log(p(c))
|logC| (6.1)
We calculate users’ normalized entropies for all their questions, answers and abuse re-
ports and refer to them as question, answer and report entropy, respectively. In our dataset, each
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country has on average 134K questions, 642K answers and 67K abuse reports. Normalized en-
tropy ranges from 0 to 1. A normalized question entropy close to 0 indicates that most of the
questions the user asked are within one time interval of the day, whereas the closer to 1, the more
likely is that the user asked questions during all intervals. Finally, the question/answer/report
entropy for a country c, Entropyq/a/r,c, is defined as the geometric mean of all Entropyq/a/r,u
computed for the users of that country:
Entropyq/a/r,c =
⇣Y
u2Uc
Entropyq/a/r,u
⌘ 1
|Uc| (6.2)
where Uc is the set of users in country c. We use geometric mean to account for the skewed distri-
bution of the entropy scores, something that the regular arithmetic mean cannot handle.
Table 9 shows Pearson correlations between question, answer, report entropy and Pace
of Life ranks, where lower ranks mean higher Pace of Life. For both questions and answers,
the overall Pace of Life ranks have positive correlations with question and answer entropy with
r = 0.67 and r = 0.37, respectively. These positive relationships are seen in the Figures 40
and 41. We find positive correlations between walking speed rank, post office service time rank,
and clock accuracy time rank with question entropy with r = 0.48, r = 0.60 and r = 0.48,
respectively. For answers, we find positive correlations between post office service time rank, and
clock accuracy time rank with entropy with r = 0.38 and r = 0.29, respectively. However, we do
not find any statistically significant relationships between report entropy and Pace of Life ranks.
These results confirm that users from countries with a higher Pace of Life score show
more temporally predictable asking and answering behavior in YA.
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Table 9 Pearson correlations between question, answer, report entropy and Pace of Life rank.
Lower ranks mean higher Pace of Life. p-values are indicated as: p < 0.005(⇤ ⇤ ⇤), p < 0.05(⇤⇤),
p < 0.1(⇤).
Entropy
Pace of Life Question Answer Report
Overall 0.67*** 0.37* 0.18
Walking speed 0.48** 0.18 0.06
Post office 0.60** 0.38* 0.19
Clock accuracy 0.48** 0.29* 0.21
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Figure 40 Pace of Life overall rank vs. average question entropy per country. Countries shown
are the ones in our dataset for which a Pace of Life rank has been published. Countries are ranked
in decreasing order of their Pace of Life value. A regression line is also shown.
6.3 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions
In this section, we analyze a number of cultural dimensions in YA proposed by Geert
Hofstede. We show how three cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede—individualism, power
distance and uncertainty avoidance are manifested in the ecosystem of YA.
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory is a framework for analyzing cultural variability.
In his original model [129], Hofstede proposed four primary dimensions by surveying in the
1960s and 1970s a large number of IBM employees from 40 countries: power distance (PDI),
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Figure 41 Pace of Life overall rank vs. average answer entropy per country. Countries shown are
the ones in our dataset for which a Pace of Life rank has been published. Countries are ranked in
decreasing order of their Pace of Life value. A regression line is also shown.
individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and masculinity (MAS). Later [130], he added
two more dimensions: long-term orientation (LTO) and indulgence versus restraint (IVR). Three
of the dimensions, individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance, have been used in a
number of recent studies of online behavior [104, 224, 239]. We also use these three Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions and relate them to a number of hypotheses in the context of YA.
6.3.1 Individualism (IDV)
Individualism is the extent to which an individual is integrated into a group. In individu-
alistic societies (high IDV) such as the USA and England, personal achievements and individual
rights are emphasized; an individual is expected to take care of only himself and his immediate
family. In collectivist countries such as those of India, China, and Japan, individuals are expected
to place the family and group goals above those of self. In this work, we investigate how individ-
ualism is related to users’ contribution, (un)ethical behavior and privacy settings in YA.
The usage of the Internet takes time from a number of daily activities including face-to-
face socialization. In collectivist countries, people are expected to give a fair amount of time
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on sociability, hence traditionally they seem to spend less time on the Internet compared to the
people from the individualistic cultures [71]. In YA we expect that users from individualistic
countries spend more time online, hence they can provide more answers and eventually they can
contribute more to the community than their direct benefits from the community. We hypothesize
the following:
H2 : Users from countries with higher individualism index provide more answers.
H3 : Users from countries with higher individualism index contribute more to the community
than what they take away from the community.
We correlate the geometric mean of the number of answers posted by the users from a
country with that country’s individualism index (a higher score means higher individuality). We
use geometric mean as an average because of the skewed distributions of the number of answers.
In the calculation of the geometric mean, we exclude the users who have not provided any an-
swers. We observe a positive correlation, shown in Figure 42, with r = 0.46, p < 0.005. This
means that, on average, users from individualistic countries provide more answers.
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Figure 42 Individualism index vs. the average number of answers posted by users per country. A
regression line is also shown.
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To quantify users’ contribution compared to their take away, we compute yielding scores
of the users. The yielding score of a user is simply a difference between his contribution and his
take away. For yielding scores, we consider YA’s point system, which awards two points for an
answer, ten points for a best answer, and penalizes five points for a question:
Yieldingu = f(contribution)  f(takeaway)
= 2.0 ⇤ Au + 10.0 ⇤BAu   5.0 ⇤Qu
(6.3)
where Qu is the number of questions posted by user u, Au is the number of answers posted by u,
and BAu is the number of best answers posted by u.
Finally, a country’s yielding score Y ieldingc is defined as the geometric mean of all Y ieldingu
computed for the users of each country c:
Y ieldingc =
⇣Y
u2Uc
Y ieldingu
⌘ 1
|Uc| (6.4)
where Uc is the set of users in country c and we take only those users having yielding scores
more than zero. We correlate a country’s geometric mean of the yielding score with the country’s
individualism index and we obtain a positive correlation (Figure 43) with r = 0.37, p < 0.05.
This result suggests that the more individualistic a country is, the more its users contribute to YA
than what they take away from the community.
There might be multiple explanations about why users from individualistic countries
contribute more to the community as reflected by hypotheses H2 and H3. One explanation is
that individualistic cultures have a more favorable collaborative environment [254], so individ-
uals feel the urge to contribute to the community. Another explanation could be that users from
individualistic cultures simply want more points than collectivist cultures. As points are awarded
for contribution (e.g., an answer earns two points) and participation (e.g., each login earns one
point), users might be tempted to contribute more. In fact, we obtain a positive and significant
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Figure 43 Individualism index vs. yielding score per country. A regression line is also shown.
correlation (r = 0.42, p < 0.01) between a country’s points (calculated as geometric mean of
the country’s user points) and its individualism index. Finally, there might be other confounding
factors (e.g., internet penetration) that affect the contribution of a country’s users on the platform.
Thus, it is difficult to confirm whether the users’ behavioral differences on contribution are due to
their cultural differences.
The degree to which a culture is collectivist or individualistic has an implication on its
users’ online (un)ethical behavior. For example, the more individualistic (less collectivistic) a
culture, the lower the rate of software piracy [133] and online music piracy [155]. Personal rights
are paramount in individualistic cultures, where people do not feel obligated to engage in group
cooperation that involves conspiracy. Group cooperation and conspiracy are two key elements for
the real world unethical behaviors such as corruption [223]. Triandis et al. [276] used Hofstede’s
individualism index and found that the countries with higher collectivist scores show the most
corruption.
Based on this online and offline user unethical behavior that is influenced by culture, our
intuition is that we could observe a similar trend in YA. In CQA platforms, the expectation is that
users would provide helpful answers to posted questions. As such, users are required to follow
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the Community Guidelines and the Yahoo Terms of Service while answering. When users post
bad answers, community members flag them. Later, human moderators check whether these flags
are applied correctly or not. We expect that the more collective a culture is, the more probable the
answers from its users will be flagged as abusive. Formally, we hypothesize that:
H4 : Users from more collective (less individualistic) cultures have higher probability to vio-
late CQA norms.
To this end, for each user u, we first calculate pu, the probability that his answers violate
community norms (and thus are correctly flagged by other users):
pu =
# correctly flagged answers from u
# total answers from u
(6.5)
Finally, Pc, the geometric average of all pu probabilities computed for each country c:
Pc =
⇣Y
u2Uc
pu
⌘ 1
|Uc| (6.6)
where Uc is the set of users in country c.
The Pearson correlation r =  0.48, p < 0.05 shows that the probability of abuses in an-
swers provided by the users from a particular country is negatively correlated with that country’s
individualism index. Figure 44 indeed shows that the probability decreases with an increasing
individualism index, meaning that if an answer comes from an individualistic country, it is less
probable to violate community rules.
Next, we will discuss individualism and privacy concerns. Although online privacy con-
cerns are global, the extent to which people perceive these concerns as real varies across cultures.
For example, in the United States, privacy is a basic human right, endorsed by the American
Bill of Rights, while Asian countries show little or no recognition on privacy in their legal sys-
tems [71]. A survey of 1261 Internet users from five big cities—Bangalore, Seoul, Singapore,
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Figure 44 Individualism index vs. the probability that an answer from a country is correctly
flagged. A regression line is also shown.
Sydney and New York—shows that Internet users from individualistic cultures are more con-
cerned about privacy than those in collective cultures [52]. We expect that a similar trend also
exists in CQA platforms. We hypothesize that:
H5 : Users from higher individualism index countries exhibit higher level of concern about
their privacy.
We use the modifications of the privacy settings on users’ YA accounts as a proxy of pri-
vacy concern. In YA, privacy settings are typically available for users to personalize for con-
tent (questions or answers) and follower-followee network. Intuitively, privacy-concerned users
would take the opportunity to change the default privacy settings. So, we consider the fraction
of public privacy profiles in a country to draw a conclusion on how concerned its users are about
their privacy. However, the default privacy in YA is public. It might be possible that many of the
users in the public group are dormant: users who signed up, asked and answered some questions,
and disappeared quickly. These users might skew the results of our study, thus, we only consider
active users from our dataset— users who have asked and answered more than 10 questions dur-
ing our observation interval. These active users are about 79% of our dataset. We note that our
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conclusions remain the same if we consider more active users by filtering users who have asked
and answered more than 20 questions.
Based on Hofstede’s Individualism index, the Hofstede Centre3 has tagged countries
as individualistic or collectivist. In our study, we use this classification. Figure 45 shows the
percentage of user profiles with public privacy settings in a country, as function of the country’s
ranking in the collectivist and individualistic class. The figure shows that, on average, collectivist
countries have a higher percentage of public profiles: collectivist countries such as Spain, Peru,
Argentina, and Mexico have higher percentage of public profiles than individualistic countries
such as United Kingdom, United States, Australia or Italy.
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Figure 45 Percentage of public privacy settings vs. rank of collectivist and individualistic
countries, respectively. Country ranks are based on the percentage of public privacy settings and
they are separately done for collectivist and individualistic countries.
6.3.2 Power Distance Index (PDI)
PDI is the extent to which the less powerful members of an organization or society expect
and accept that power is distributed unequally. This dimension sheds light on how a society han-
dles inequalities among its members. In countries with high PDI, such as countries from Latin,
3http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html
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Asian, African and Arab world, everybody has a place in the social hierarchy and people accept
the situation without questioning it. However, in Anglo and Germanic countries, which are low
power distance countries, people seek distribution of power and ask for justifications of power
inequality.
PDI essentially measures the distribution of wealth and power between people in a coun-
try or culture. In YA, we can use the indegree (number of followers) as a proxy of wealth and
power. For example, the larger the number of followers users have, the larger an audience they
have for direct communication. Higher indegree users are also found to be more central (thus
more retained [152]) across a number of network centrality metrics [151]. Moreover, these users’
questions are forwarded to more users, hence more likely to be getting an answer. A study [150]
on YA shows that users receive more answers from close neighborhoods. Given the high number
of questions that remain unanswered (42% in YA reported by a study [241]) in CQA platforms,
bringing answers not only shows a user’s potential capability, but also makes the platform mature
and informative. Taking ideas from the unequal distribution of wealth and power in higher power
distance countries, we expect that in YA, users from those countries also have inequality in their
indegrees. Garcia et al. [104] have found similar indegree inequality in Twitter. We hypothesize
the following in YA:
H6 : Users from higher power distance countries show a larger indegree imbalance in follow
relationships.
We correlate countries power distance index (higher index means power distance is high)
with their users’ indegree imbalance. A user’s indegree imbalance is calculated as the difference
between her friends’ average indegree and her indegree. Finally, a country’s indegree imbalance
is the geometric mean of the indegree imbalance of its users.
For all countries, except Panama and Philippines, we obtained a positive indegree im-
balance, meaning that for those countries, on average, a user’s contacts have more contacts than
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the user. This supports a well-known hypothesis friendship paradox in sociology. The friend-
ship paradox states that your friends have on average more friends than you have, however, most
people think that they have more friends than their friends have [92]. It has been shown that the
paradox holds for both Twitter [128] and Facebook [281]. Now we also show it for YA.
Figure 46 shows the relation between PDI and indegree imbalance (excluding Panama
and Philippines). The figure indeed shows a positive correlation. We obtained a positive corre-
lation r = 0.65, p < 0.005 between indegree imbalance and PDI for all countries (including
Panama and Philippines). This supports the hypothesis that users from countries with higher PDI
are more comfortable with indegree imbalance.
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Figure 46 Power distance index vs. indegree imbalance. A regression line is also shown.
6.3.3 Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)
UAI is the extent to which people feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.
Individuals from countries exhibiting strong UAI tend to minimize uncertainty and ambiguity
by careful planning, and enforcing rules and regulations. On the other hand, low uncertainty
avoidance cultures maintain a more relaxed attitude in unstructured situations.
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For example, Switzerland has a reasonably high uncertainty avoidance index (58) com-
pared to countries such as Singapore (8) and Sweden (29). In fact, an online scheduling behavior
study [239] on Doodle (http://doodle.com/) shows that Switzerland and Germany have a high
advance planning time of 28 days. In YA, our related hypothesis is:
H7 : Users from countries with higher uncertainty avoidance index exhibit more temporally
predictable activities.
Figures 47, 48, 49 show the relationship between question, answer and abuse report en-
tropy vs. uncertainty avoidance index, respectively. Note that a higher UAI means lower un-
certainty and ambiguity. The negative relations in the figures indicate that users from countries
with higher uncertainty avoidance index tend to have lower question, answer and abuse report
entropies, thus they are more temporarily predictable. All the entropies have negative relation to
uncertainty avoidance index: r =  0.43 for questions, r =  0.55 for answers, and r =  0.51
for abuse reports. All correlation values are statistically significant with p < 0.05.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
AR
AU
BR
CL
CO
FR
DE
IN
ID
IE
IT
KE
MXPK PE
PH
SG
ES
GB
US 
VE
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
25 50 75
Uncertainty avoidance index
Qu
es
tio
n 
en
tro
py
Figure 47 Question entropy vs. uncertainty avoidance index. Only countries having more than
300 users are plotted. A regression line is also shown.
93
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
AR
AU
BR
CL
CO
FRDE
IN
ID
IE
IT
KE
KW
MX
PK
PE
PHSG
ES
GB
US UY
VE
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
25 50 75 100
Uncertainty avoidance index
An
sw
er
 e
nt
ro
py
Figure 48 Answer entropy vs. uncertainty avoidance index. Only countries having more than 300
users are plotted. A regression line is also shown.
6.4 Summary and Discussions
In this chapter, we analyzed about 200 thousand sampled Yahoo Answers users from 67
countries. We studied users’ behavioral patterns such as temporal predictability of activities,
engagement, (un)ethical behavior, privacy concerns, and power inequality and how they compare
with a number of cultural dimensions (Pace of Life, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance and
Power Distance). We find that behavioral differences exist across cultures in YA. Table 10 shows
a summary of all the hypotheses involving cultural indices and the results found.
Observing the global spread of information and communication technologies, researchers
sometimes predicted that the online world would be converging into a “one-world culture” [175].
With the advent of the large-scale online behavioral datasets in the past decade from online plat-
forms like Twitter, Facebook and Foursquare, researchers showed that the Internet does not have
a homogeneous culture. Instead, country-specific cultural variations do exist. We showed the
same non-homogeneity, but in a very different online context—community question answering.
We acknowledge that our study is observational and lacks controlled experimental ground
truth data. Therefore, we cannot draw causal conclusions whether cultures shape the ecosystem
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Figure 49 Report entropy vs. uncertainty avoidance index. Only countries having more than 300
users are plotted. A regression line is also shown.
of YA. However, our results hint at the importance of culture-aware CQA moderation. Note that
CQA platforms like YA employ human moderators to evaluate reported abuses and determine
the appropriate responses, from removing content to suspending user accounts. We find that
collective cultures are more probable to provide bad answers. At a minimum, more attention of
moderators are expected in these cultures to keep the environment clean.
We find that individualistic cultures are more engaged in YA, e.g., by providing more
answers and contributing more than their take away. These results confirm the generalization
that individualistic cultures are highly attracted to the Internet. Researchers often attribute the
egalitarian, democratic nature of the Internet to this engagement [70].
The evidence of different engagement patterns and difference in pace of life across cul-
tures in CQA platforms imply that some core functionalities such as question recommendation
and follow recommendation could benefit from exploiting cultural factors. In question recom-
mendation, questions are routed to the most appropriate answerers. To find out such answerers,
factors such as followers, interests, question diversity and freshness [272] are considered. Our
study suggests that including cultural variables such as individualism can be useful. For example,
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Table 10 Pearson correlation coefficients in hypotheses related to pace of life, individualism,
uncertainty avoidance and power distance. p-values are indicated as: p < 0.005(⇤ ⇤ ⇤), p <
0.05(⇤⇤), p < 0.1(⇤).
Pace of Life Correlation
Users from countries with a higher Pace of Life score show more temporally predictable activities
(asking, answering and reporting)
rq =
0.67***
ra = 0.37**
rr = 0.18
Individualism Correlation
Users from higher individualism index countries provide more answers r = 0.46***
Users from countries with higher individualism index contribute more to the community than what
they take away from the community
r = 0.37**
Users from more collective (less individualistic) cultures have higher probability to violate CQA
norms
r =
 0.48**
Users from higher individualism index countries exhibit higher level of concern about their privacy NA
Power distance Correlation
Users from higher power distance countries show larger indegree imbalance in follow relationships r = 0.65***
Uncertainty Avoidance Correlation
Users from countries with higher uncertainty avoidance index exhibit more temporally predictable
activities (asking, answering and reporting)
rq =
 0.43**
ra =
 0.55**
rr =
 0.51**
as users from collective cultures are less probable to answer, questions from those communities
should be routed to a larger number of potential answerers.
Another variable, Pace of Life, could also be a factor in question recommendation. Our
results show that users from countries with a higher pace of life are temporally more predictable.
In those cultures, if questions are forwarded to answerers during the busy hours of the day (e.g.,
during office hours), the questions are less likely to get an answer. Solutions could include rout-
ing questions to a larger number of potential answerers, diversifying the set of answerers to in-
clude users from countries with a lower Pace of Life, or delaying routing for after work hours.
In the follow recommendation, CQA platforms recommend which other users one can
follow based on shared interests, common contacts, and other related factors. We find that in YA,
lower power distance countries show less indegree imbalance in follow relationships. For follow
recommendation in those countries, users to be followed may be recommended to a user with the
same level of indegree as them.
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CQA platforms could also exploit cultural differentiations to improve targeted ads. Okazaki
and Alonso [221] analyzed online advertising appeals such as “soft sell” appeal (that works by
creating emotions and atmosphere via visuals and symbols) and “hard sell” appeal (that provides
focus product features, explicit information, and competitive persuasion) across a number of
cultures. They found individualistic cultures like the USA are more attracted to “hard sell” ap-
peal, where collective cultures like Japan are attracted to “soft sell” appeal. Ju-Pak’s study [142]
also confirms that fact-based appeal is dominant in the USA, but text-limited, visual layouts
are popular in collective cultures like South Korea. Linguistic aspects in the ads might also be
important. For example, focusing on ‘I’, ‘me’ in individualistic cultures and ‘us’ and ‘we’ in
collective cultures. Finally, CQA sites could leverage cultural variations in their platforms by, for
example, placing textual, informative feature ads to users from individualistic cultures and visual
and symbolic ads to users from collective cultures.
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CHAPTER 7: AEGIS: A SEMANTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIVACY AS CONTEXTUAL
INTEGRITY IN SOCIAL ECOSYSTEMS1
Our analysis of YA users’ privacy settings in Chapter 5 reveals that 87.20% of users have
platform-provided default privacy settings. Our work on bloggers’ retention in a blog social net-
work (Blogster) finds that 92% bloggers do not change their default privacy settings [152]. These
results on default privacy are consistent with a variety of other social networks: it has been shown
many times that while users are invited to change the default privacy settings, in reality very few
do it. For example, more than 99% Twitter users retained the default privacy setting where their
name, location, biographical information, website, and list of followers are visible [162]. Other
studies [1, 116, 163] show that the majority of Facebook users have default or permissive privacy
settings.
More worrisome, when the default settings are not matched with user preferences, most of
the time they tend to be more open and visible, exposing the user provided content to more users
than expected [184]. Users’ unwillingness to change the default policy is sometimes exacerbated
by the complexity of the process; default privacy controls are too cumbersome to properly un-
derstand and use [168, 180, 263]. Users’ online privacy, in general, is already a hot issue due to
lack of formal framing [218]. Results from our studies in YA [148] and Blogster [152], as well as
supports from the literature, warn again about the importance of correct default settings.
Default privacy related privacy concerns have been further aggravated in social ecosys-
tems. Social ecosystems [274] refer to the collection of rich datasets of user-to-user interactions
in support of social applications. This data is collected from Internet-mediated social interactions
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published in [145, 146]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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(such as declared relationships in online social networks or tagging/contributing content in user-
generated content platforms), from public profiles (to infer homophily relationships), and from
phone-recorded real life interactions (such as co-location sensing and activity identification).
Social ecosystems have enabled a large set of social applications, such as recommender sys-
tems [15, 49, 110], email filtering [109, 157], defending against Sybils [44, 307] and against
large-scale data crawls [207]. The novel scenarios activated by social ecosystems, however, raise
serious concerns regarding user privacy.
The primary aspect of social ecosystems, that of aggregating data from various sources
to provide it (possibly processed) to a diversity of applications, significantly amplify the privacy
concern. First, aggregated data from different contexts of activity presents a more complete and
possibly uncomfortable picture of a person’s life. Second, data is to be exposed to a variety of
applications, themselves from different contexts of activity, from personal to professional.
Numerous solutions addressed privacy in social ecosystems, typically in the context of
a particular system [17, 91, 97, 267] or for particular application scenarios [69, 95, 231]. Little
addressed, however, is the setting of a default privacy policy that protects the user and, at the
same time, allows the user to benefit from application functionality.
The privacy challenge is fundamentally due to the lack of a universal framework that
establishes what is right and wrong [218]. Nissenbaum proposed such a framework in her for-
mulation of privacy as contextual integrity [216]. To the best of our knowledge, one line of work
approaches privacy as contextual integrity by proposing a formal language for expressing generic
privacy expectations [22]. In this chapter, we ask the following research question:
R9 : Can we generate default privacy policies based on contextual integrity theory that restrict
user information to be shared or transferred inappropriately?
We employ semantic web techniques to implement Nissenbaum’s framework for defin-
ing privacy as contextual integrity, with a specific focus on defining application and platform-
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independent default privacy settings. To this end, we propose Aegis, an extensible, fine-grained
privacy model for social ecosystems based on semantic web technologies. The model implements
the basic concepts of Nissenbaum’s privacy framework: social contexts, norms of appropriate-
ness, and norms of distribution. It builds on ontologies used to encode social data and implicitly
represent social contexts, and on Resource Description Framework (RDF) statements/SPARQL
queries to define and verify access to data.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 introduces the contextual
integrity theory and discusses its relevance to social ecosystems. Section 7.2 describes the system
and data models, and the system architecture. We present our policy specification in Section 7.3.
Section 7.4 presents our prototype implementation and experimental evaluation. Section 7.5
concludes the chapter with discussions.
7.1 Privacy as Contextual Integrity in Social Ecosystems
While notoriously difficult to define [217], privacy is understood as an individual’s right
to determine to what extent her data can be communicated to others. Privacy is typically seen not
simply as the absence of information about us in the minds of others, but rather as the control we
have over information about ourselves [99, 238].
Social ecosystems, which combine users’ social information from diverse sources and
incorporates richer semantics, pose a daunting task in terms of privacy enforcement. It has to ex-
ercise a more complex representation of users’ social world, ranging from object-centric domains
(e.g., common preferences) to people-centric domains (e.g., declared friendship relationships).
Privacy-preserving default policy generation in such a complex system could be leveraged by
contextual integrity, a social theory-based account of privacy proposed by Nissenbaum [216].
Instead of defining the term “privacy”, Nissenbaum proposes a reasoning framework for privacy
as contextual integrity, where privacy is seen as neither a right to secrecy nor a right to control,
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but a right to an appropriate flow of information about an individual (referred to as “personal
information”).
Nissenbaum’s account of privacy as contextual integrity is based on two non-controversial
facts. First, every transfer of personal information happens in a certain social context and all
areas of life (and online activity makes no exception [218]) are governed by context-specific
norms of information flow. Second, people move among a plurality of distinct contexts, thus
altering their behavior to correspond with the norms of those contexts, aware to the fact that in-
formation appropriately shared in one context becomes inappropriately shared into a context with
different norms. For example, it is appropriate to discuss romantic entanglements with friends,
financial information with banks, and work-related goals with co-workers, but sharing romantic
experiences with the bank is out of place.
On the basis of these facts, Nissenbaum suggests that contextual integrity is maintained
when two types of norms are upheld: Norms of appropriateness and Norms of distribution. Norms
of appropriateness circumscribe the type of information about persons that is appropriate to re-
veal in a particular context. So, it is appropriate to share medical information with doctors, but
generally not appropriate to share it with employers. Implemented in social ecosystems, this type
of norm specifies where context-specific data can be communicated. For example, if Alice is a
colleague of Bob in the professional context, then requests from Alice regarding Bob’s gaming
context such as the games owned by Bob should be denied, as the requests do not comply with
the norms of appropriateness.
Norms of distribution cover the transfer of a third party’s personal information from one
user to another. In a social ecosystem, the norm of distribution suggests a default policy that
restricts the distribution of information. For example, if Alice and Bob have a shared content—
e.g., Bob’s picture that he shared with Alice—then a request from Charlie to Alice regarding the
content should not succeed without Bob’s consent, even if Alice owns Bob’s picture now.
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7.2 System Model and Architecture
Nissenbaum’s framework is articulated for protecting the citizen from an overly curious
government. For the digital context, her approach works best as a default privacy policy, which is
precisely the focus of this chapter. Thus, our proposed system, Aegis, enforces default policy as
contextual integrity by modeling two assumptions from real world. First, information is always
tagged with the context in which it is revealed. Second, the scope of privacy norms is always in-
ternal to a context. To implement this, Aegis implements the constructs of user roles and actions,
resources, contexts, and privacy norms.
7.2.1 System Model
Similar to Dey et al.’s definition of a context [75], we define the social context of a user as
the collection of social information that describes the user in a domain. For example, data about
Bob’s education, skills, and LinkedIn connections describe Bob’s Professional context.
Our system model is defined by the following:
1. There is an unrestricted set of disjoint social contexts in the system;
2. A user belongs to only one social context at any time;
3. A user can have one or more roles in every social context s/he is part of;
4. Each piece of data (resource) is assigned to only one context; however, users can share
a resource with other users, in which case the resource is replicated in each of the other
users’ current contexts;
5. A request for a resource is made on behalf of the requester’s role in the particular context in
which the requester is when the request is made;
6. A request specifies an action, which could be read, write, delete or replicate to another
user’s ownership.
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Note that in real life users can be simultaneously part of multiple contexts: for example,
Alice is both a friend and a colleague for Bob. However, at any given time, only one of these
contexts will be considered, perhaps the prominent one given the physical environment (e.g., at
work) or based on a system-wide ranking of contexts (e.g., work has higher priority over friend-
ship, to limit sensitive data exposure).
Implementing contextual integrity in the default privacy policies is thus reduced to imple-
menting the norms of appropriateness and distribution in this system model.
7.2.2 Modeling Social Contexts and Roles
We model social contexts, and therefore the entire social ecosystem (consisting of a set
of social contexts), based on ontologies. An ontology is a set of entities, instances, functions,
relations and axioms, and is used as a vocabulary for expressing the knowledge of a domain.
The traditional advantages of using ontologies apply in this case as well: first, an ontology
provides a common vocabulary, thus it ensures formal and structured representation of users’
contextual data. Second, using ontologies provide semantic interoperability, thus data can be
used by a variety of applications. Third, high-level logic inferences are possible as data model
have semantics associated with it. For example, if Bob has content in his professional context
(contents subClassOf ProfessionalContext) and recommendations are content, then recommen-
dations are inferred to belong to Bob’s professional context. Finally, a social ecosystem can be
built incrementally by adding new context ontologies. We can also reuse existing web ontologies
from different domains to meet the demand of an exhaustive scale social ecosystems ontology.
For example, an ontology [210] is already available to model bloggers’ interest in a blogging
community.
To represent the data model, we classify online social contexts into entity classes (e.g.,
friendship context, professional context, blogging context). The context classification is inherent
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in the modeling process because context definition depends on underlying entities and relation-
ships among the entities.
Our context ontology is divided into an upper ontology and domain-specific ontologies.
The upper ontology is a high-level ontology which captures general contexts (e.g., Friendship,
Professional, Gaming). The domain-specific ontologies are collections of low-level ontologies
which define the details of general contexts and their properties in each sub-domain.
Figure 50 shows a class hierarchy of the entities considering some online contexts of a
user, where the top level class (root) is the context itself. All generic contexts are subclasses of
the root context entity and all domain-dependent descriptors (classes, properties) have some com-
mon properties to inherit from the root. The lower level sub-classification expresses the domain
dependence of the contexts.
The addition of new social contexts to the ecosystem happens naturally, with the im-
plementation of new sensors for new social signals (see next section): the developers of social
sensors have to be aware of the ontology of the social contexts to which the sensors report, in
order to maintain structural data representation. Another way to extend the social ecosystem is
by extending a social context itself when new relevant social signals become available: for exam-
ple, Facebook recently added a service called Gifts which allows users to buy presents for their
friends. Consequently, the social context model needs to be adaptive to accommodate additions
of new contexts. Ontologies help in designing a scalable context model.
Figure 51 gives an example of three contexts of a user’s digital world: Professional, Friend-
ship and Gaming. The representation of the ontology is person-centric which gives a user-oriented
viewpoint of the data model. The three large circles in the model are the contexts; each circle
encodes context-specific knowledge and they are subclasses of Context.
Roles are modeled as relationships: for example, isColleagueOf in Alice’s ecosystem
specifies that Bob has the role of a colleague in her professional context. Roles, as relationships,
104
Friendship
Context
Context
Professional
Context
Gaming
Context
Blogging
Context
'Other'
Context
Context
specific
ontologies
isa
Upper
Ontology
Figure 50 Context entities and their domain dependent elements.
are thus asymmetrical: Charlie might be a follower in Alice’s followers ecosystem but Alice
might not be Charlie’s follower.
We use OWL [209] to model social contexts. OWL is more expressive than other ontol-
ogy languages such as RDFS [209]. Moreover, W3C Web Ontology Working Group has defined
OWL from an existing rich language DAML+OIL2.
7.2.3 Aegis Architecture
Our general architecture fits the Social Hourglass infrastructure introduced in [135]. The
focus of this work is the Privacy Management Layer, presented in Figure 52. It receives input
from users’ personal aggregators and outputs privacy-compliant social data to applications. The
input from each user’s personal aggregator is a labeled, directed ego net, that represents the user’s
recorded social interactions with other users, with each type of interaction semantically tagged.
A brief explanation of the Social Data Acquisition and Aggregation Layer at the bottom
of Figure 52 (that belongs to the social hourglass infrastructure) is presented next. (For more
details we refer the reader to [135].) A social sensor is an application running on behalf of a
user on a user’s device as an independent application or in the browser) and observing one or
more social signals (for example, Facebook interactions of the user with other users). It reports
2http://www.daml.org/2000/12/daml+oil-index.html
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processed social data in the form of <contact ID, type of interaction, strength of interaction>
to the user’s aggregator. The aggregator runs on the user’s trusted device (e.g., mobile phone
or home computer, but not on a shared computer or a commercial service). It processes all such
information received from the social sensors deployed on behalf of its user and reports an aggre-
gated and personalized social edge to the Social Data Management Layer and to the Contextual
Policy Definer. For user ego, this social edge is of the form <ego, alter, context, weight>, where
alter is a user ego interacted with in context with the interaction strength weight. Social data
management can be implemented by various solutions; to provide surveillance privacy protec-
tion [120], distributed solutions such as Prometheus [158] can be used.
Social sensor design and implementation are context specific: for example, a LinkedIn
sensor observes its user’s professional data and a Facebook sensor observes the user’s friendship
data based on the ontology shown in Section 7.2.2. In addition to requirements related to sensor
accuracy and performance, sensor design should address the following. First, a particular sensor
can target one context only (thus, report one label only), but is capable of collecting data from
different social signals. For example, a gaming sensor could collect gaming related data from
multiple services, e.g., Stream3 and Giantbomb4. Moreover, by using the ontology vocabulary,
sensors should be able to distinguish context-specific data from the wealth of social data existing
in a service. Second, sensors should be able to cope with changes in ontology and act immedi-
ately.
The Privacy Management Layer in Figure 52 is responsible for managing and enforcing
privacy policies, and thus for extracting and applying the default policies as well. This compo-
nent communicates with the Social Data Management Layer which implements social contexts
and roles.
3http://www.steamcommunity.com/
4http://www.giantbomb.com/
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socially aware applications along with Aegis, as a form of privacy management layer.
The Contextual Policy Definer generates default access control policies based on a social
ontology and the contextual integrity norms and stores them in the Policy Repository. Policies
in the Policy Repository can be edited with the GUI-based Policy Editor. The Contextual Policy
Definer generates default policies based on the following rule: only roles in a user’s social con-
text are allowed access to the user’s data associated with that particular context. An example of
a default policy extracted with this rule is the following: all users with a Colleague role in Bob’s
Professional context can access (all) his data associated to the Professional context. Our policy
model is granular; it defines a policy for every resource covering all the contexts a user could
belong to.
The Policy Manager consists of extractor and evaluator for handling access requests. In
particular, any access request is intercepted by the Policy Evaluator, which evaluates the policy.
Permitted access requests are finally fulfilled by returning data from the social ecosystem knowl-
edge base (SEKB) through social data extractor. The policies are stored in the policy repository
and the policy extractor extracts policies from the policy repository.
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7.3 Policy Specification
A policy is defined as a set of RDF statements. As shown in the architecture, the contex-
tual policy definer generates policies that obey the two information norms of contextual integrity:
norms of appropriateness and distribution.
Let us take as example a policy generated by the policy definer for the resource groups
in the Professional context: Bob’s colleagues can read his professional group involvement in the
Professional context. The policy can be formalized as the SPARQL query (Figure 53), <Policy>,
where the prefixes p: and se: represent the namespace of the policy model and of the social
ecosystems model, respectively:
social data extractor. The policies are stored in the policy
repository and the policy extractor extracts policies from the
policy repository.
IV. POLICY SPECIFICATION
A policy s defined as a set of RDF statements. As shown
in the architecture, the contextual policy definer generates
policies that obey the two information norms of contextual
integrity: norms of appropriateness and distribution.
Let us take as example a policy generated by the policy
definer for the resource groups in the Professional context:
Bob’s colleagues can read his professional group involvement
in the Professional context. The policy can be formalized as
the following SPARQL query, <P licy>, where the prefixes
p: and se: represent the namespace of the policy model and
of the social ecosystems model, respectively:
<Policy>
ASK
where {
?req rdf:type p:requestor.
?req p:allowed p:read.
p:read p:performedOn Bob.
?req se:isColleagueOf Bob.
Bob se:professionalMember ?group.}
<Augmented Policy>
ASK
where {
Alice rdf:type p:requestor.
Alice p:allowed p:read.
p:read p:performedOn Bob.
Alice se:isColleagueOf Bob.
Bob se:professionalMember ?group.}
Accept request
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Add request specific 
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Default 
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the requested 
resource
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Fig. 4: Request handling process.
A basic access request is a triple <rstr, rsc, act>, where
rstr is a user who requests the access (e.g., an instance of
se:Person), rsc is the resource requested (e.g., se: Photo), and
act is the type of action (read/insert/delete).
When a request such as “Alice wants to see Bob’s profes-
sional group involvement” comes to the policy manager, the
predefined policy variable ?req will be replaced by Alice
as shown by the augmented policy. The policy evaluator will
temporarily insert policy-related auxiliary RDF statements to
the knowledge base, such as the first three statements of the
augmented SPARQL query, and executes the query over the
modified knowledge base. The above policy representation
states that the access request will be granted if Alice and Bob
are colleagues. The same access request from Bob’s teammate
in the Gaming context will be denied because of lack of
appropriate triples in the SEKB, thus implementing the norm
of appropriateness.
Similarly, the system will disallow access to a resource that
is shared or co-owned with someone, upholding the norms
of distribution. For example, the following policy restricts
Charlie’s access to Bob’s photos that he previously shared with
Alice.
<Policy>
ASK
where {
?req rdf:type p:requestor.
?req p:allowed p:read.
p:read p:performedOn Bob.
?req se:isFriendOf Bob.
Bob se:hasPhoto ?photo.
?photo se:status se:notShared}
Our policy representation is granular, as it allows policies
for each resource. For the request, the policy manager will
infer the context and will decide whether the default or
personalized policy will be enforced (see policy evaluation
flow chart from Figure 4). As in the data model we have
hierarchy among classes (which eventually define resources)
and a group of classes belong to a context, we can infer
the context from requested resource. Note that a default
auto generated policy could be personalized by the user and
in this case, the personalized policy will be evaluated. For
example, from a requested resource recommendation, a context
inference is possible from the following SPARQL query to
knowledge base:
PREFIX rdf:<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-
rdf-syntax-ns#
PREFIX rdfs:<http://www.w3.org/2000/01/
rdf-schema#
PREFIX se:<http://www.dsg.cse.usf.com/se>
SELECT ?superClass
Where {
se:requestedResource rdfs:subClassOf
?superClass .}
The policy engine will extract the policy of the inferred context
and execute it.
Figure 53 A sample norms of appropriateness policy.
A basic access request is a triple <rstr, rsc, act>, where rstr is a user who requests the
access (e.g., an instance of se:Person), rsc is the resource requested (e.g., se: Photo), and act is
the type of action (read/insert/delete).
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Figure 54 Request handling process.
When a request such as “Alice wants to see Bob’s professional group involvement” comes
to the policy manager, the predefined policy variable ?req will be replaced by Alice as shown by
the augmented policy. The policy evaluator will temporarily insert policy-related auxiliary RDF
statements to the knowledge base, such as the first three statements of the augmented SPARQL
query, and executes the query over the modified knowledge base. The above policy representation
states that the access request will be granted if Alice and Bob are colleagues. The same access re-
quest from Bob’s teammate in the Gaming context will be denied because of lack of appropriate
triples in the SEKB, thus implementing the norm of appropriateness.
Similarly, the system will disallow access to a resource that is shared or co-owned with
someone, upholding the norms of distribution. For example, the policy in Figure 55 restricts
Charlie’s access to Bob’s photos that he previously shared with Alice.
Our policy representation is granular, as it allows policies for each resource. For the re-
quest, the policy manager will infer the context and will decide whether the default or person-
alized policy will be enforced (see policy evaluation flow chart from Figure 54). As in the data
model we have hierarchy among classes (which eventually define resources) and a group of classes
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social data extractor. The policies are stored in the policy
repository and the policy extractor extracts policies from the
policy repository.
IV. POLICY SPECIFICATION
A policy is defined as a set of RDF statements. As shown
in the architecture, the contextual policy definer generates
policies that obey the two information norms of contextual
integrity: norms of appropriateness and distribution.
Let us take as example a policy generated by the policy
definer for the resource groups in the Professional context:
Bob’s colleagues can read his professional group involvement
in the Professional context. The policy can be formalized as
the following SPARQL query, <Policy>, where the prefixes
p: and se: represent the namespace of the policy model and
of the social ecosystems model, respectively:
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A basic access request is a triple <rstr, rsc, act>, where
rstr is a user who requests the access (e.g., an instance of
se:Person), rsc is the resource requested (e.g., se: Photo), and
act is the type of action (read/insert/delete).
When a request such as “Alice wants to see Bob’s profes-
sional group involvement” comes to the policy manager, the
predefined policy variable ?req will be replaced by Alice
as shown by the augmented policy. The policy evaluator will
temporarily insert policy-related auxiliary RDF statements to
the knowledge base, such as the first three statements of the
augmented SPARQL query, and executes the query over the
modified knowledge base. The above policy representation
states that the access request will be granted if Alice and Bob
are colleagues. The same access request from Bob’s teammate
in the Gaming context will be denied because of lack of
appropriate triples in the SEKB, thus implementing the norm
of appropriateness.
Similarly, the system will disallow access to a resource that
is shared or co-owned with someone, upholding the norms
of distribution. For example, the following policy restricts
Charlie’s access to Bob’s photos that he previously shared with
Alice.
<Policy>
ASK
where {
?req rdf:type p:requestor.
?req p:allowed p:read.
p:read p:performedOn Bob.
?req se:isFriendOf Bob.
Bob se:hasPhoto ?photo.
?photo se:status se:notShared}
Our policy representation is granular, as it allows policies
for each resource. For the request, the policy manager will
infer the context and will decide whether the default or
personalized policy will be enforced (see policy evaluation
flow chart from Figure 4). As in the data model we have
hierarchy among classes (which eventually define resources)
and a group of classes belong to a context, we can infer
the context from requested resource. Note that a default
auto generated policy could be personalized by the user and
in this case, the personalized policy will be evaluated. For
example, from a requested resource recommendation, a context
inference is possible from the following SPARQL query to
knowledge base:
PREFIX rdf:<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-
rdf-syntax-ns#
PREFIX rdfs:<http://www.w3.org/2000/01/
rdf-schema#
PREFIX se:<http://www.dsg.cse.usf.com/se>
SELECT ?superClass
Where {
se:requestedResource rdfs:subClassOf
?superClass .}
The policy engine will extract the policy of the inferred context
and execute it.
Figure 55 A sample norms of distribution policy.
belong to a context, we can infer the context from requested resource. Note that a default auto
generated policy could be personalized by the user and in this case, the personalized policy will
be evaluated. For example, from a requested resource recommendation, a context inference is
possible from the SPARQL query (Figure 56) to knowledge base:
social data extractor. The policies are stored in the policy
repository and the policy extractor extracts policies from the
policy repository.
IV. POLICY SPECIFICATION
A policy is defined as a set of RDF statements. As shown
in the architecture, the contextual policy definer generates
policies that obey the two information norms of contextual
integrity: norms of appropriateness and distribution.
Let us take as example a policy generated by the policy
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A basic access request is a triple <rstr, rsc, act>, where
rstr is a user who requests the access (e.g., an instance of
se:Person), rsc is the resource requested (e.g., se: Photo), and
act is the type of action (read/insert/delete).
When a request such as “Alice wants to see Bob’s profes-
sional group involvement” come to the policy manag r, the
predefined policy variable ?req will be replaced by Alice
as shown by the augmented policy. The policy evaluator will
temporarily insert policy-related auxiliary RDF statements to
the knowledge base, such as the first three statements of the
augmented SPARQL query, and executes the query over the
modified knowledge base. The above policy representation
states that the access request will be granted if Alice and Bob
are colleagues. The same access request from Bob’s teammate
in the Gaming context will be denied because of lack of
appropriate triples in the SEKB, thus implementing the norm
of appropriateness.
Simila ly, the system w ll disallow access to a resource that
is shared or co-owned with someone, upholding the norms
of distribution. For example, the following policy restricts
Charlie’s access to Bob’s photos that he previously shared with
Alice.
<Policy>
ASK
where {
?req rdf:type p:requestor.
?req p:allowed p:read.
p:read p:performedOn Bob.
?req se:isFriendOf Bob.
Bob se:hasPhoto ?photo.
?photo se:status se:notShared}
Our policy representation is granular, as it allows policies
for each resource. For the request, the policy manager will
infer the c ntext and will decide whether the efault or
personalized policy will be enforced (see policy evaluation
flow chart from Figure 4). As in the data mode we have
hierarchy among classes (which eventually define resources)
and a group of classes belong to a cont xt, we can infer
the context from requested resource. Note that a default
auto generated policy could b personalized by the user and
in this case, the personalized policy will be evaluated. For
exa l , t resource recommendation, a context
inference is possible from the following SPARQL query to
knowledge base:
PREFIX rdf:<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-
rdf-syntax-ns#
PREFIX rdfs:<http://www.w3.org/2000/01/
rdf-schema#
PREFIX se:<http://www.dsg.cse.usf.com/se>
SELECT ? uperClass
Where {
se:requestedResource rdfs:subClassOf
?superClass .}
The policy engine will extract the policy of the inferred context
and execute it.
Figure 56 Context inference.
The policy engine will extract the policy of the inferred context and execute it.
7.4 Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of Aegis in Java Platform Standard Edition 6 (Java
SE 6). We used the capabilities offered by Jena5 to implement both the knowledge base and the
policy manager. Jena is a framework for building semantic web applications, and provides a col-
5http://jena.apache.org/index.html
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lection of tools and Java libraries to develop semantic web and linked-data applications, tools and
servers. Jena is currently the most comprehensive framework to manage RDF and Web Ontology
Language (OWL) data in Java applications as it provides APIs for RDF data management, an
ontology API for handling OWL and RDFS ontologies and a query engine compliant with the
SPARQL specification. We leverage TDB6 for persistent storage of knowledge base.
Aegis was deployed and evaluated on a machine equipped with 2 GHz Intel Core i7 pro-
cessor, 4 GB 1333 MHz DDR3 RAM, Mac OS X Lion 10.7.5 operating system, and Java 1.6
runtime environment.
Our evaluation of the prototype implementation of Aegis had the following objectives.
First, we wanted to evaluate the performance of the policy engine in executing default policies for
realistic workloads with a realistically large number of users. For this, we chose three real social
network datasets from different domains and experimented with default policy enforcement.
Second, we wanted to investigate the scalability of the policy engine in executing default policies.
Ideally, the policy engine should scale well with the size of the social ecosystem knowledge base.
Finally, we wanted to measure the overhead induced by default policies.
7.4.1 Experimental Setup
We constructed social ecosystems knowledge base from three different real networks.
Table 11 presents a summary of these datasets.
• soc-Slashdot0811 (from [172]): a network of friend/foe links between the users of Slash-
dot, a news website which features user-submitted and editor-evaluated technology-oriented
news. Using Slashdot Zoo feature, users can tag each other as friends or foes.
• BlogCatalog (from [308]): a blogging website where registered users can create online
profiles, post blogs, and automatically receive blogging updates from the users with whom
they have declared “friend” relationships.
6http://jena.apache.org/documentation/tdb/index.html
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• Facebook (from [286]): a highly popular online social network. The dataset contains friend
links of the users.
To provide test cases, we selected 13 sizes ranging from 100 to 70,000 users from the
above networks. To create a sub-graph of each size, we randomly picked a node as a seed in a
network and applied snowball sampling algorithm. Although snowball sampling is biased toward
high-degree nodes, it preserves the topological structure of a graph [136]. For each sampled sub-
graph, we created a SEKB containing nodes of type Person and the relationships among them.
More specifically, a ego’s (user) connections are randomly labeled according to the data model
(se: isFriendOf, se: isColleagueOf, se: isTeammateOf ) to abstract a user’s social ecosystem
and contexts (Friendship, Professional and Gaming). Also, we added users FriendshipGroup,
ProfessionalGroup and GamingGroup using a random string generator as resources in relevant
contexts to invoke different test cases.
We considered two types of responses: (type1) positive authorization access control re-
sponse and (type 2) negative authorization access control response. Type 1 accesses are allowed,
while type 2 are denied by the default policies. To this end, we generated two types of access
requests. They are as follows: User U1 belongs to the context C1 of user U2 and she requests
U2’s resource R1 from the same context C1. And, User U1 belongs to the context C1 of user
U2 and she requests U2’s resource R2 from different context C2. For each sample size of each
dataset we evaluated both requests 10 times and report the average evaluation time. Moreover, we
performed the same experiments with no policy enforcement to measure the policy enforcement
overhead.
Table 11 Summary of the real networks used.
Network Num. of Users Num. of Edges
soc-Slashdot0811(Slashdot) 77,360 905,468
BlogCatalog 88,784 4,186,390
Facebook 63,731 1,545,686
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7.4.2 Results
The performance results of the policy engine in executing default policies are shown in
figures 57, 58, 59. They show positive (figure 57), negative (figure 57) authorization access time,
and the number of requests answered by the policy engine per second (figure 59) for random
authorizations. Our observations are as follows:
First, for all datasets and both types of authorizations, the time needed to fulfill access
requests increases linearly with the size of the social ecosystem knowledge base (SEKB). As
such, inference time of the default policies vary according to the size of the SEKB.
Second, for the same size of SEKB, positive and negative authorization take about the
same time. Intuitively, a positive authorization should take less time than a denied request due to
less scanning in the knowledge base. To assess the significance of the time difference, we ran
a two sample t-test in which we compared the time taken for positive and negative authoriza-
tion time for all sizes of SEKB. A t-test determines if two sets of data are significantly different
from each other [317]. We obtained a p-value of 0.96, thereby confirming that the difference is
not statistically significant. This is due to the implementation of the semantic data store, TDB:
data structures in TDB use TDB B+Trees, a custom implementation of threaded B+Trees. The
threaded nature implies that long scans such as negative authorizations of indexes (it uses triple
and quad indexes) proceeds without needing to traverse the branches of the tree.
Third, for up to 10, 000 users in the SEKB, both accepted and denied access request ex-
ecute fast on our tested machine (tens of milliseconds). However, as the knowledge base in-
creases with the number of users, performance decreases. This is more visible for the BlogCat-
alog dataset, which has about three times more edges per node than the other datasets (see Ta-
ble 11). This behavior is due to the stress SEKB puts on memory: a denser graph requires more
memory, thus with the increase in the number of users represented, penalties related to swapping
will take place. Obvious solutions to this performance limitation include 1) increasing system
114
memory to realistic capacity for an in-production server and 2) employing distributed solutions
for SEKB data management.
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Figure 57 Access time for positive authorization.
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To evaluate the overhead introduced by the policy engine for executing default policies,
we tested the time needed to execute request with and without default policies in place. For each
sampled size, we took the average access time for positive and negative authorizations both with
and without default policies. Figure 60 shows the comparison. The difference between access
requests with and without policies ranges from 3.17ms to 12.06ms. To assess the significance of
this overhead, we ran a two sample t-test in which we compared the access time with and with-
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Figure 59 Number of requests answered per second.
out default policies. The p-value of this t-test is 0.81, which implies the overhead is statistically
insignificant. So, we conclude that the action of default policy enforcement does not impose a
significant burden on social ecosystems.
One of the limitations of the workloads is that they only contain ego-nets and social groups.
However, a social ecosystem ontology is a more diverse collection of entity types and relations
(as shown in Figure 51). A long chain of context inferences, such as “X is a photo, which is con-
tent, and the content belongs to the friendship context” will likely take longer time. Moreover,
overlapping contexts (such as professional and friendship and gaming) will create denser ego-
nets, hence more memory required per user. Consequently, the scalability plots shown in Fig-
ure 60 will change, also function of the available physical memory. However, the limited avail-
ability of appropriate real-world traces prevented us from doing more sophisticated performance
analysis.
7.5 Summary and Discussions
In this chapter, we have proposed a privacy model for social ecosystems based on the
semantic web standard. The privacy model leverages contextual integrity for generating default
policies that protect user’s information from other users. We designed an architecture in sup-
116
100
101
102
103
104
100 500 1000
2500
5000
7500
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
Ti
me
 t
ak
en
(m
s)
Number of users in SEKB
Slashdot without default policy
Slashdot with default policy
BlogCatalog without default policy
BlogCatalog with default policy
Facebook without default policy
Facebook with default policy
Figure 60 Performance overhead of the policy engine with and without default policy enforce-
ment.
port of the proposed privacy model, demonstrated its feasibility by building Aegis, a prototype
implementation, and evaluated its performance and scalability using three large real networks.
The experimental evaluation shows that our system scales well, and policy enforcement does not
impose significant overhead.
Aegis addresses “social privacy” [120] problems such as those that emerge through the
necessary renegotiation of social spheres as social interactions get mediated by OSN providers.
Social privacy problems occur when access to data is inappropriately protected due to wrong
default or personalized settings. Often the default settings serve the business model of the service
provider rather than the user’s interests, following the “opt out” model. Aegis mitigates social
privacy threats by generating default privacy policies that restrict user information to be shared
or transferred inappropriately. At the same time, Aegis does not restrict users from choosing
personalized and maybe relaxed privacy settings.
Although our privacy model is designed for targeting user’s aggregated social data, the
model is generic enough to be used in existing online social networks. For example, Google+ and
Facebook allow users to select the type of relationship with another user. This information can be
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leveraged to provide higher granularity in social privacy and to implement privacy as contextual
integrity for default privacy settings.
While Aegis addresses social privacy, it may aggravate surveillance and institutional
privacy. Surveillance privacy threats emerge when users’ social interactions and personal infor-
mation are leveraged by authorities or OSN service providers. Institutional privacy [237] refers
to those privacy problems related to users losing control and oversight over the aggregation,
processing and mining of their online social information. The aggregation of social data in social
ecosystems and the ontology-based labeling (thus, the addition of processed information) cre-
ates new sensitive data that would not have been directly available. For example, users’ context-
specific data (such as work, personal, etc.) would increase the accuracy of user profiling to an
overly curious, possibly hostile political regime. These problems are alleviated by implementing
the social ecosystem as a distributed architecture, as in [158]. A distributed architecture elimi-
nates the need for a central, omniscient authority that is in a privileged position to observe all the
activity in the system.
One of the limitations of our work is that we could not experiment with a real social ecosys-
tem due to the unavailability of users’ data from multiple sources. Ideally, a social ecosystem
should be an aggregation of social data from various social network platforms (e.g., Facebook,
LinkedIn, Steam). Instead, we took three large networks and constructed social ecosystems from
those networks. Experiments on a real social ecosystem would give more insights on our system.
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CHAPTER 8: A SURVEY OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS1
In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive review of solutions to privacy and security
issues in OSNs. While previous literature reviews on OSN privacy and security are focused on
specific topics, such as privacy preserving social data publishing techniques [313], social graph-
based techniques for mitigating Sybil attacks [305], or OSN design issues for security and pri-
vacy requirements [310], we address a larger spectrum of security and privacy problems and
solutions. First, we introduce a taxonomy of attacks based on OSNs’ stakeholders. We broadly
categorize attacks as attacks on users and attacks on the OSN and then refine our taxonomy based
on entities that perform the attacks. These entities might be human (e.g., other users), computer
programs (e.g., social applications) or organizations (e.g., crawling companies). Second, we
present how various attacks are performed, what counter-measures are available, and what are
the challenges still to overcome.
8.1 A Taxonomy of Privacy and Security Attacks in Online Social Networks
We propose a taxonomy of privacy and security attacks in online social networks based
on the stakeholders of the OSN and the forms of attack targeted at the stakeholders. We identify
two primary stakeholders in online social networks: the OSN users and the OSN itself. One one
hand, OSN users reveal an astonishing amount of information ranging from personal to profes-
sional; the misuse of this information can have significant consequences. In the ecosystem of an
OSN, users interact with other users or strangers, use third-party social applications and clicks on
ads placed by advertisers. Also, OSNs possess users’ social data and sometimes publish sample
1Much of the work in this chapter was first published as a technical report in [147]. Permission is included in
Appendix A.
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datasets after doing an anonymization. Users’ information leakage might happen to all of these
entities.
On the other hand, OSN services handle users’ information and manage all users’ activi-
ties in the network, being responsible for the correct functioning of its services and maintaining
a profitable business model. Indirectly, this translates into ensuring that their users continue to
happily use their services without becoming victims of malicious actions. However, attacks such
as Sybil, DDoS, spam and malware on OSNs may translate into reputation damage, service dis-
ruption, or other consequences with direct effect on the OSN.
We thus classify online social network privacy and security issues into the following
attack categories (summarized in Table 12).
1. Attacks on Users: these attacks are are related to information disclosure threats. We iden-
tify various such attacks based on the attacker, i.e., an entity who can exploit user informa-
tion :
(a) Attacks from other users: Users might put themselves at risk by interacting with other
users, specially when some of them are strangers or mere acquaintances. Moreover,
some of these users may not even be human (e.g., social robots [134]), or may be
crowdsourcing workers interacting with users for mischievous purposes [265]. There-
fore, the challenge is to protect users and their information from other users.
(b) Attacks from social applications: For enhanced functionality, users may interact with
various third-party-provided social applications linked to their profiles. To facilitate
the interaction between OSN users and these external applications, the OSN provides
application developers an interface through which to access user information. Un-
fortunately, OSNs put users at risk by disclosing more information than necessary to
these applications. Malicious applications can collect and use users’ private data for
undesirable purposes [93].
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(c) Attacks from the OSN: Users’ interactions with other users and social applications
are facilitated by the OSN services, in exchange for, typically, full control over user’s
information published on the OSN. While this exchange is explicitly stated in Terms
of Service documents that the user must agree with (and supposedly read first), in
reality few users understand the extent of this exchange [94] and most users do not
have a real choice if they don’t agree with the exchange. Consequently, the exploita-
tion by the OSN of user’s personal information is seen as a breach of trust, and many
solutions have been proposed to hide personal information from the very service that
stores it.
(d) De-anonymization and inference attacks: OSN services publish social data for oth-
ers (e.g., researchers, advertisers) to analyze and use for other purposes. Typically,
this data is anonymized to protect user information. However, an attacker can de-
anonymize social data and infer attributes that the user did not even mention in the
OSN (such as sexual or political orientation inferred from the association with other
users).
(e) Crawling attacks: Large-scale distributed data crawlers from professional data aggre-
gators exploit the OSN-provided APIs or scrape publicly viewable profile pages to
build databases from user profiles and social links. Professional data aggregators sale
such databases to insurance companies, background-check agencies, credit-ratings
agencies, or others [31]. Crawling users’ data from multiple sites and multiple do-
mains increases profiling accuracy. This profiling might lead to “public surveillance”,
where an overly curious agency (e.g., government) could monitor individuals in pub-
lic through a variety of media [216].
2. Attacks on the OSN: these attacks are aimed at the service provider itself, by threatening its
core business.
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(a) Sybil Attacks: Sybil attacks are characterized by users assuming multiple identities
to manipulate the outcome of a service [77]. Not specific to OSNs, Sybil attacks were
used, for example, to determine the outcome of electronic voting [242], to artificially
boost the popularity of some media [236], or to manipulate social search results [143].
However, OSNs have also become vulnerable to Sybil attacks: by controlling many
accounts, Sybil users are illegitimately increasing their influence and power in the
OSNs [307].
(b) Compromised Accounts: Compromised accounts are legitimate user accounts that are
created and used by their fair owners, but have been compromised by attackers [84].
Unlike Sybil accounts, these accounts already have established social connections and
normal social network usage history. But suddenly they are hacked by attackers are
later used for the ill purposes of the attacker.
(c) Social Spam: Social spam are contents or profiles that an OSN’s “legitimate” users
don’t wish to receive [127]. Spam undermines resource sharing and hampers interac-
tivity among users by contributing phishing attacks, unwanted commercial messages,
and promoting websites. Social spam spreads rapidly via OSNs due to the embedded
trust relationships among online friends, which motivates a user to read messages or
even click on links shared by her friends.
(d) Distributed Denial-of-service attacks (DDoS): DDoSes are common forms of attacks,
where a service is sent a large amount of seemingly inoffensive service requests that
overload the service and deny access to it [202]. As many popular services, OSNs are
also subjected to such coordinated, distributed attacks.
(e) Malware Attacks: Malware is the collective name for programs that gain access, dis-
rupt computer operation, gather sensitive information, or damage a computer without
the knowledge of the owner. ONSs are being exploited for propagating malware [89].
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Table 12 Categories of attacks.
Attacks on Users Attacks on the OSN
Attacks from other users Sybil attacks
Attacks from social applications Compromised accounts
Attacks from the OSN Social spam
De-anonymization and inference attacks Distributed Denial-of-service attacks (DDoS)
Crawling attacks MalwareAttacks
Like social spam, malware propagation is rapid due to the trust relationships in social
networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Mitigating attacks on users (Sections 8.2
to 8.6) include discussions of attacks from other users (Section 8.2), from social applications
(Section 8.3), from the OSN itself (Section 8.4), de-anonymization and inference attacks (Sec-
tion 8.5), and crawling attacks (Section 8.6). A summary of the mitigating solutions for the at-
tacks on users is presented in Figure 61. Mitigating attacks on the OSN (Sections 8.7 to 8.11)
includes a discussion of Sybil attacks (Section 8.7), attacks from compromised accounts (Sec-
tion 8.8), social spam (Section 8.9), distributed denial-of-service attacks (Section 8.10) and mal-
ware (Section 8.11). A summary of the mitigating solutions for the attacks on OSNs is presented
in Figure 62. Section 8.12 highlights some challenges and discusses future research directions.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.13.
8.2 Mitigating Attacks from Other Users
Users reveal an astonishing amount of personally identifiable information on OSNs, in-
cluding physical, psychological, cultural and preferential attributes. For example, Gross and
Acquisti’s study [116] shows that 90.8% of Facebook profiles have an image, 87.8% of profiles
have posted their birth date, 39.9% have revealed phone number, and 50.8% profiles show their
current residence. The study also shows that the majority of users reveal their political views,
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dating preferences, current relationship status, and various interests (including music, books, and
movies).
Due to the diversity and specificity of the personal information shared on OSNs, users put
themselves at risk for a variety of cyber and physical attacks. Stalking, for example, is a common
risk associated with unprotected location information [121]. Demographic re-identification was
shown to be doable: 87% of the US population can be uniquely identified by gender, ZIP code
and full date of birth [270]. Moreover, the birth date, hometown, and current residence posted
on a user’s profile are enough to estimate the user’s social security number and thus expose the
user to identity theft [116]. Unintended revealing of personal information brings other online
risks, including scraping and harvesting [179, 266], social pushing [139], and automated social
engineering [27].
Given the amount of sensitive information users expose on OSNs and the different types
of relationships in their online social circles, the challenge OSNs face is to provide the correct
tools for users to protect their own information from others while taking full advantage of the
benefits of information sharing. This challenge translates into a need for fine-grained settings,
that allow flexibility within a type of relationships (as not all friends are equal [20, 59]) and flex-
ibility with the diversity of personal data. However, this fine granularity in classifying bits of
personal information and social relationships leads to an overwhelmingly complex cognitive task
for the user. Such cognitive challenges worsen an already detrimental user tendency of ignoring
settings all together, and blindly trusting the default privacy configurations that serve the OSN’s
interests rather than the user’s.
Solutions to these three challenges are reviewed in the remainder of this section. Sec-
tion 8.2.1 surveys solutions that allow fine tunings in setting protection of personal data. The
complexity challenge is addressed in the literature on two planes: by providing a visual interface
in support of the complex decision that the user has to make (Section 8.2.2) and by automating
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the privacy settings (Section 8.2.3). To address the problem of users not changing the platform’s
default settings, researchers proposed various solutions presented in Section 8.2.4.
8.2.1 Fine-grained Privacy Settings
Fine-grained privacy advocates [163, 251] argue that fine-grained privacy controls are
crucial features for privacy management. Krishnamurthy et al. [163] introduce privacy “bits”—
pieces of user information grouped together for setting privacy controls in OSNs. In particular,
they categorize a user’s data into multiple pre-defined bits, namely thumbnail (e.g., user name
and photo); greater profile (e.g., interests, relationships and others); list of friends; user-generated
content (such as photos, videos, comments and links) and comments (e.g., status updates, com-
ments, testimonials and tags about the user or user content). Users can share these bits with a
wide range of pre-defined users, including friends, friends of friends, groups, and all. Current
OSN services (e.g., Facebook and Google+) have implemented this idea by allowing users to cre-
ate their own social circles and to define which pieces of information can be accessed by which
circle.
To help users navigate the amount of social information necessary for setting correct
fine-grained privacy policies, researchers suggest various ways to model the social graph. One
model is based on ontologies that exploits the inherent level of trust associated with relationship
definition to specify privacy settings. Kruk [165] proposes Friend-of-a-Friend (FOAF)-Realm, an
ontology-based access control mechanism that uses RDF to describe relations among users. The
system uses a generic definition of relationships (“knows”) as a trust metric and generate rules
that control a friend’s access to resources based on the degree of separation in the social network.
Choi et al. [53] propose a more fine-grained approach, which considers named relationships
(e.g., “worksWith”, “isFriendOf”, “knowsOf”) in modeling the social network and the access
control. A more nuanced trust-related access control model is proposed by Carminati et al. [47]
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based on relationship type, degree of separation, and a quantification of trust between users in the
network.
For more fine-grained ontology-based privacy settings, semantic rules have been used.
Rule-based policies represent the social knowledge base in an ontology and define policies as
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) rules. SWRL is a language for the Semantic Web, which
can represent rules as well as logic. Researchers used SWRL to express access control rules that
are set by the users. Finally, access request related authorization is provided by reasoning on
the social knowledge base. Systems that leverage OWL and SWRL to provide rule-based access
control framework are [46, 86, 192]. Although conceptually similar, [46] provides richer OWL
ontology and different types of policies; access control policy, admin policy and filtering pol-
icy. A more detailed semantic rule-based model is developed by Masoumzadeh and Joshi [192].
Rule-based privacy models have two challenges to overcome. First, authorization is provided
by forward reasoning on the whole knowledge base, challenging scalability with the size of the
knowledge base. Second, rule management is complex and requires a team of expert administra-
tors [88].
Role and Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) are other types of fine-grained
privacy models that employ roles and relationships in modeling the social graph. The working
principle of these models is two-fold: 1) track roles or relationships between resource (e.g., pho-
tos) owner and the resource accessor; 2) enforce access control policies in terms of the roles or
relationships. Fong [98] proposes a ReBAC model based on the context-dependent nature of
relationships in social networks. This model targets social networks that are poly-relational (e.g.,
teacher-student relationships are distinct from child-parent relationships), directed (e.g., teacher-
student relationships are distinct from student-teacher relationships) and tracks multiple access
contexts that are organized into a tree-shaped hierarchy. When access is requested in a context,
the relationships from all the ancestor contexts are combined with the relationships in the target
access context to construct a network on which authorization decisions are made. Giunchiglia et
127
al. [108] propose RelBac, another relation-based access control model to support sharing of data
among large groups of users. The model defines permissions as relations between users and data,
thus separating them from roles. The entity-relationship model of RelBac enables description
logics and as well as the reasoning for access control policies.
In practice, many online social networks (such as Facebook) have already implemented
fine-grained controls. A study of Bonneau et al. [32] on 29 general purpose online social network
sites shows that 13 of them offer a line-item setting where individual data items could be set with
different visibility. These line-item settings are granular (one data item is one ‘bit’) and flexible
(users can change social circles).
8.2.2 View-centric Privacy Settings
Lack of appropriate visual feedback has been identified as one of the reasons for confus-
ing and time consuming privacy settings [263]. View-centric privacy solutions are built on the
intuition that a better interface for setting privacy controls can impact users’ understanding of
privacy settings and thus their success in correctly exercising privacy controls. These solutions
visually inform the user of the setting choices and consequences of his choices.
In [180], the authors propose an alternative interface for Facebook privacy settings. This
interface is a collection of tabbed pages, where each page shows a different view of the profile
as seen by a particular audience (e.g., friends, friends of friends, etc.), along with controls for
restricting the information shared with that group. While this solution provides visual feedback
on how other users will see her profile, it’s management is tedious for users with many groups.
A simpler interface is proposed by C4PS (Colors for Privacy Settings) [225], which ap-
plies color coding for different privacy visibilities to minimize the cognitive overhead of the
authorization task. This approach applies four color schemes for different groups of users; red–
visible to nobody; blue–visible to selected friends; yellow–visible to all friends; and green–visible
to everyone. A user can change the privacy setting for a specific data item by clicking the buttons
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on the edge of the attribute. The color of the buttons shows the visibility of the data. If users click
“selected friend” (blue) button, a window will open in which friends or groups (a pre-defined
set of friends) are granted access to the data item. A recent work of Sternel et al. [262] also have
used colors for privacy settings and proposed a new interface in the shape of a wheel.
A similar approach is implemented in today’s most popular OSNs in different ways. For
example, Facebook provides a dropdown of viewers (e.g., only me, friends, and public) with
icons as visual feedback. In the custom setting, users can set more granular scales, e.g., share the
data item with friends of friends, friends of those tagged and restrict sharing with specific people
or lists of people. A qualitative study [283] of teenage OSN users shows that colorful privacy
settings enable to have more control over the sharing of their information.
8.2.3 Automated Privacy Settings
Automated privacy settings methods employ machine learning to automatically configure
a user’s privacy setting with minimal user effort.
Fang and Lefevre’s privacy wizard [91] iteratively asks a user about his privacy prefer-
ences (allow or deny) for specific (data item, friend) pairs. The wizard constructs a classifier
from these preferences, which automatically assigns privileges to the remaining of the user’s
friends. The classifier considers two types of features: community structure (e.g., to which com-
munity a friend of the user belongs) and profile information (such as age, gender, relationship
status, education, political and religion views, work history). The classifiers employed (Naive-
Bayes, NearestNeighbors and Decision Tree) use uncertainty sampling [176], an active learning
paradigm, acknowledging the fact that users may quit labeling friends at any time. Bilogrevic
et al. [28] also have employed machine learning techniques and proposed SPISM for privacy-
aware information sharing in mobile social networks. Their system uses personal and contextual
features and automatically defines what information to be shared with others and with what gran-
ularity.
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Social Circles [2] is an automated grouping technique that analyzes the users’ social
graph to identify “social circles”, clusters of densely and closely connected friends. The authors
posit social circles as uniform groups from the perspective of privacy settings. The assumption
is that users will share the same information with all friends in a social circle. Hence, friends are
automatically categorized into social circles for different circle-specific privacy policy settings.
To find the social circles, they used a (↵,  ) clustering algorithm proposed in [204]. While conve-
nient, this approach limits users’ flexibility in changing the automate settings.
Danezis [66] aims to infer the context within which user interactions happen, and enforces
policies to prevent users that are outside that context from seeing the interaction. Conceptually
similar to Social Circles, contexts are defined as cohesive groups of users, e.g., groups that have
many links within the group and fewer links with non-members of the group. The author used a
greedy algorithm to extract the set of groups from a social graph.
An inherent tradeoff for this class of solutions is ease of use vs. flexibility: while the
average user might be satisfied with an automatically-generated privacy policy, the more savy
user will want more transparency and possibly more control. To this end, the privacy wizard [91]
provides for advanced users the visualization of a decision tree model and tools to change it.
Another challenge for some of these solutions is bootstrapping: a newcomer in the online social
network has no history of interactions to inform such approaches.
8.2.4 Default Privacy Settings
Studies have shown that users on OSNs often do not take advantage of the privacy con-
trols available. For example, more than 99% Twitter users retained the default privacy setting
where their name, list of followers, location, website, and biographical information are visi-
ble [162]. Similarly, the majority of Facebook users has default settings [1, 116, 163]. Under-
utilization of privacy options are mostly due to poor privacy setting interface [180], intricate
privacy settings [189], and inherent trust in OSNs [1, 35]. The problem with not changing the
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default settings is that they almost always tend to be more open that the users would prefer [184].
To overcome this situation, approaches to automatically generate more appropriate default pri-
vacy settings have been proposed.
PriMa [258] automatically generates privacy policies, acknowledging the fact that the
average user will find the task of personalizing his access control policies overwhelming, due to
growing complexity of OSNs and the diversity of user content. The policies in PriMa are gen-
erated based on the average privacy preference of similar and related users, the accessibility of
similar items from similar and related users, closeness of owner and accessor (measured by the
number of common friends), the popularity of the owner (i.e., popular users have sensitive profile
items), etc. However, a large number of factors and their parametrized tuning contribute to longer
policy generation and enforcement time. A related approach, PolicyMgr [248], uses supervised
learning of user-provided example policy settings and builds classifiers that are then used for
automatically generating access control policies.
Aegis [145, 146] is a privacy framework and implementation that leverages the ‘Privacy
as Contextual Integrity’ theory proposed by Nissenbaum [216] for generating default privacy
policies. Unlike the approaches just presented above, this solution does not need user input or
access history. Instead, it aggregates social data from different OSNs in an ontology-based data
store and then applies the two norms of Nissembaum’s theory to regulate the flow of information
between social spheres and access to information within a social sphere.
8.3 Mitigating Attacks from Social Applications
Social applications, written by third-party developers and running on OSN platforms,
provide enhanced functionality linked to a user profile. For example, Candy Crush Saga (a so-
cial game) and Horoscopes (users can check horoscope) are two popular social applications on
Facebook.
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The social networking platform works as a proxy between users and applications and
mediates the communication between them. To better understand this proxy, we show data flow
between a third-party social application and the Facebook platform in Figure 63. An applica-
tion is hosted on a third-party server and runs on user’s data that are taken from the Facebook
platform. When a user installs the application on Facebook, it takes permission from the user to
use some of her profile information. Application developers write the application pages of an
application using Facebook mark-up language (FBML)—a subset of HTML and CSS extended
with proprietary Facebook tags.
When a user interacts with an application, such as clicks an application icon on Facebook
to generate horoscopes (step 1 on Figure 63), Facebook requests the page from the third-party
server where the application is actually hosted (step 2). The application requests the user’s profile
information using secret communication with Facebook (step 3). The application uses the infor-
mation (e.g., birth date may be used to create horoscopes) and returns a FBML page to Facebook
(step 4). Facebook finally transforms the application page from the server by replacing the FBML
page with standard HTML, JavaScript (step 5), and transmits the output page to the end user (step
6).
User ApplicationServerFacebook
1. Interact 
with the app
6. Display 
output page
2. Request for app URL
3. Communication, 
query user data
(session secret required)
4. Output page
Facebook markup(FBML)
5. Transform  
to HTML+JS 
Figure 63 Data flow in a Facebook application.
OSN users are facing multiple risks while using social applications. First, an application
might be malicious; it could collect a high volume of user data for unwanted usage. For example,
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to show this vulnerability, BBC News developed a malicious application that could collect large
amounts of user data in only three hours [154].
Second, application developers can violate developer policies to control user data. Appli-
cation developers are supposed to abide by a set of rules set by the OSNs, called “developer poli-
cies”. Developer polices are intended to prohibit application developers from misusing personal
information or forwarding it to other parties. However, reported incidents [200, 260] show that
applications violate these developer policies. For example, a Facebook application, “Top Friends”
enabled everyone to view the birthday, gender and relationship status of all Top Friends users,
even though those users kept their privacy for those information to private [200], violating the
developer policies that private information of friends are not accessible. The Wall Street Journal
finds evidence that Facebook applications transmit identifying information to advertising and
tracking companies [260].
Third, third-party social applications can query more data about a user from an OSN,
regardless whether needed or not for proper operation. A study by Felt and Evans [93] of 150
of the top applications on Facebook shows that most of the applications only needed user name,
friends, and their networks. However, 91% of social networking applications have accessed data
that they do not need for operation. This violates the principle of least privilege [244], which
states that every user should only get the minimal set of access rights that enables him to com-
plete his task.
Finally, a poorly designed API might lead to application impersonation attacks, where
an attacker successfully assumes the identity of a legitimate application and possess users’ data
shared with the application. For example, recently, many OSNs use OAuth 2.0 protocol to grant
access to API endpoints. Hu et al. [132] show that the application impersonation attack is possi-
ble due to OAuth’s multiple authorization flows and token types. Their investigation on 12 major
OSN providers show that 8 of them are vulnerable to application impersonation attacks.
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We identified three classes of solutions that attempt to minimize the privacy risks stated
above: (i) by anonymizing social data made available to applications (Section 8.3.1); (ii) by defin-
ing and enforcing more granular privacy policies that the third-party applications have to respect
(Section 8.3.2); and (iii) by providing third-party platforms for executing these applications and
limiting the transfer of the social data from applications to other parties (Section 8.3.3).
8.3.1 Anonymizing Social Data for Third-party Applications
Privacy-by-proxy [93] uses special markup tags that abstract user data and handle user
input. Third-party applications do not have access to users’ personal data, rather they use users’
IDs and tags to display data to users. For example, to display a user’s hometown, an applica-
tion would use a tag <hometown id=“3125”/>. The social network server would then replace
the tag with real data value (e.g., “New York”) while rendering the corresponding page to the
user. However, applications might rely on private data for operations, for example a horoscope
application might require users’ gender information. A conditional tag handles this dependency
(e.g., <if-male> tag can choose the gender of an avatar). Privacy-by-proxy ensures privacy by
limiting what applications can access, which might also limit the social value and usability of
the applications. Data availability through proxy also means that application developers have to
expose the business logic to social network sites (in a form of Javascript to end users). This might
discourage third-party developers in the first place. Moreover, applications could still develop
learning mechanisms to infer attributes of a user. For example, developers might include scripting
code in the personal data dependent conditional execution blocks (if-else) that could send infor-
mation to an external server when the block executes.
Similar to Privacy-by-proxy, PESAP [240] provides anonymized social data to applica-
tions. However, PESAP secures the information flow inside the browser, so that applications
cannot do information leakage though outgoing communications with other third-parties. The
anonymization is provided by encrypting the IDs of the entities of the social graph with an application-
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specific symmetric key. Applications use a REST API to get access to the anonymized social
graph. PESAP provides a re-identification end-point in order to enable users to see the personal
information of their friends in the context of social applications. Secure information flow tech-
niques protect the private information in the browser of a user. This is done by a dynamic, secure
multi-execution flow technique [74], which analyzes information flow inside a browser and en-
sures that the flow complies with certain policies. The multi-execution flow technique labels the
inputs and the outputs of the system with security labels and runs a separate sub-execution of the
program for each security label. The inputs have designated security labels and can be accessed
by a sub-execution having the same or a higher security label. Figure 64 shows the data flow in a
PESAP-aware browser.
Application 
Code
User
Secure Multi-Execution
Browser
Reidentification AppPortal RESTapi App
Anonymous data
Private data
Figure 64 Data flow in a PESAP aware browser [240].
8.3.2 Enforcing Additional Privacy Policies to Social Applications
Besmer et at. [26] propose an access control framework for applications, which adds a
new user-application policy layer on the top of the user-user policy to restrict the information ap-
plications can access. Upon installing an application, a user can specify which profile information
the application could access. However, the framework still uses user-to-user policy to addition-
ally govern an application’s access to friends’ information on behalf of the user (Alice’s installed
applications will not get her friend Bob’s private data if user-user policy of Bob denies Alice to
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do so). An additional friendship-based protection restricts the information the application can
request of a user’s friends. For example, Alice installs an application which requests her friend
Bob’s information and Bob did not install the application. Consider that Bob’s default privacy
policy is very permissive. But Alice is a privacy conscious and she allows applications to access
only the Birth Date attribute. According to friendship-based protection, when the application will
request Bob’s information via Alice, it will only be able to get Bob’s birth date. So, friendship-
based protection enables Alice’s privacy policies to extend to Bob. The model works well for
privacy-savvy concerned users who make informed decisions about an application’s data usage
while installing an application. An additional functionality could be a set of restrictive default
policies for average users.
Similar to the previous work, Cheng et al. [50] also propose an access control framework.
However, Besmer et at.’s approach allows applications to transmit users’ data to their servers. On
the contrary, Cheng et al.’s framework only permits privacy-nonsensitive data to be transmitted,
if any functionality of the application runs outside of the OSN. Applications (or functions of an
application) that run under the surveillance of the OSN can only get the raw private data.
8.3.3 Third-party Platforms for Running Social Applications
Egele et al. [85] note that, since popular OSN services such as Facebook did not imple-
ment user-defined access control mechanisms to date, pragmatic solutions should not rely on
the help of OSNs. They introduce PoX, a browser extension for Facebook applications that runs
on a client machine and works as a proxy to provide fine-grained access controls. PoX works
as a reference monitor which sits between applications and the Facebook server and controls
an application’s access to users’ data stored on the server. In so doing, an application requests
the proxy for users’ profile data. Upon receiving the request, the proxy performs access control
checks based on user-provided privacy settings. If the request is allowed, the proxy signs the
access request with its key, sends the request to the OSN server, and finally replays the result
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from the server to the application. This application to server data flow is shown in Figure 65. An
application developer needs to use the PoX server-side library instead of the Facebook server-
side library. One potential challenge is to motivate application developers to write PoX-aware
applications when existing mechanisms (e.g., Facebook application environment) are perfectly in
place.
2. Request user profile data from proxy
5. Transmit allowed data to app server
3. Request data 
allowed by ACL
4. Transmit allowed 
data to proxy
Facebook server
Client
1. Open application without 
sending session secret Facebook
Application
6. Display application page
Client-side
proxy
Figure 65 A data-flow between applications and server with PoX [85].
xBook [252] is a restricted ADSafe-based JavaScript framework that provides a server-
side container in which applications are hosted and a client-side environment to render the appli-
cations to users. xBook is different than PoX in that it not only controls third-party applications’
access to user data (which PoX also does), but also it limits what applications do with the data.
Applications are developed as a set of components; a component is a smallest granular building
block of codes monitored by xBook. A component also reveals the information that the compo-
nent can access and the external entity with which it communicates. During the deployment of
an application in xBook, an application developer requires to specify these information. From
the specification, xBook generates a manifest for the application. A manifest is a set of state-
ments that specifies what user data the application will use and with which external services it
will share the data. At the time of installing the application, the manifest will be presented to
the user. In this way, a user will be able to make a more informed decision before installing an
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application. Although xBook controls third-party applications’ access to user data and limits
application’s data usage, it has to deal with two challenges. First, the platform itself has to be
trusted by users and by applications, as it is expected to protect users’ personal data and enable
third-party applications to execute. Second, hosting and executing applications in xBook requires
resources (storage, computation and maintenance) that may be difficult to provide in the absence
of a business model. A recent and similar approach of xBook is MUTT [247], however, it has the
challenges related to xBook to overcome.
8.4 Protecting User Data from the OSN
The “notice-and-consent” approach to online privacy is the status-quo for practically all
online services, OSNs included. This approach informs the user of the privacy practices of the
service and provides the user a choice whether to engage in the service or not.
The limitations of this approach have been acknowledged for long. First, the long and
abstruse privacy policies offered for reading are virtually impossible to understand, even if the
user is willing to invest the time for reading them. For example, on August 2014, we found 4389
words on Facebook’s privacy policies and 3473 words on Twitter’s privacy policies. Second,
such policies always leave room for future modifications; therefore, the user is expected to read
them repeatedly in order to practice informed consent. And third, long as they are, these privacy
policies tend to be incomplete [55], as they often cannot include all the parties to which user’s
private information will be allowed to flow (such as advertisers). Consequently, generally people
do not read the Terms of Service and when they do, they do not understand them [94].
A second serious deterrent for users protecting their online privacy is the “take-it-or-
leave-it” “choice” the users are offered. While it may seem as a free choice, in reality the cost
of not using the online service (whether email, browsing, shopping, etc.) is unacceptably high.
Cornered in this space of falsely informed and lack of choice, users may look for solu-
tions that allow them to use the online service without paying the information cost associated
138
with it. Researchers built on this intuition in two directions. The first direction tends to hide the
user information from the very service that stores it (Section 8.4.1). The second taps into differ-
ent business models than the ones that make a living from user’s private information and replaces
the centralized service provider with a fully decentralized solution that is privacy-aware by design
(Section 8.4.2).
8.4.1 Protection by Information Hiding
This line of work is empirically supported by the Acquisti and Gross’s study [1] that
shows that while 60% of users trust their friends completely with their private and personal in-
formation, only 18% of users trust Facebook to the same degree.
The general approach for hiding information from the OSN is based on the observation
that OSNs can run on fake data. If the operations that OSNs perform on the fake data are mapped
back to original data, users can still use the OSNs without providing them real information. Fake
data could be ciphertext (encrypted) or obtained by substituting the original data with pre-mapped
data from a dictionary. Encrypted data can be stored on a user’s trusted device (including third-
party servers or a friend’s computer). Access controls are provided by allowing authorized users
(e.g., friends) to get the original data from the fake data. Different implementations of this idea
are presented next.
flyByNight [187] is a Facebook application that enables users to communicate on Face-
book without storing a recorded trace of their communication in Facebook. The flyByNight Face-
book application generates a public/private key pair and a password during configuration. The
password is used as a key to encrypt the private key and the key is stored on flyByNight server.
When a user installs the application, it downloads a client-side JavaScript from the FlyByNight
server. This JavaScript does key generation and cryptographic operations. The application knows
a user’s friends and their public keys who have also installed the flyByNight application. To
send messages to friends, a user enters the message into the application and selects the recipient
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friends. The client-side JavaScript encrypts the content of the message with other users’ public
keys, tags the encrypted message with the Facebook ID numbers of their recipients, and sends
them to a flyByNight message database server. The encrypted messages reside on the flyByNight
server. When a user reads a message, she provides the password to get the private key (stored
in the flyByNight key database). The private key is used to decrypt the message. flyByNight
operates under the regulation of Facebook, as it is a Facebook application. It is possible that
the computation load on the Facebook servers due to encryption, as well as the suspicious lack
of communication among users might attract Facebook’s attention and lead to deactivating the
application. In the worst case, users lose their ability of hiding their communication, but previous
messages remain hidden from the OSN.
Persona [17] hides user data from the OSN by combining attribute-based encryption
(ABE) and public key cryptography. The core functionalities of current OSNs such as profiles,
walls, notes, etc., are implemented in Persona as applications. Persona uses an application “Stor-
age” to enable users to store personal information, and share them with others through an API.
Persona application in Facebook is similar to any third-party Facebook application, where users
log-in by authenticating to the browser extension. The browser extension translates Persona’s
special markup language. User information is stored in Persona storage services rather than on
Facebook and other Persona users can access the data given that they have the necessary keys
and access rights. Similar to the flyByNight, Persona’s operation depends on the OSN, as core
functionalities are implemented as applications.
NOYB [119] distorts user information in an attempt to hide real identities from the OSN,
allowing only trusted users (e.g., friends) to get access to the restored, correct information. To
implement this idea, NOYB splits a user’s information into atoms. For example, Alice’s name,
gender and age (Alice, F, 26) are split into two atoms: (Alice, F) and (26). Instead of encrypt-
ing the information, NOYB replaces a user’s atom with pseudorandomly picked another user’s
atom. So, Alice’s first atom is substituted with, for example, the atom (Athena, F) from Athena’s
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profile, and the second atom with Bob’s atom from the same class (38). All atoms from the same
class for all users are stored in a dictionary. NOYB uses ciphered index of a user’s atom to sub-
stitute an atom from this dictionary. Only an authorized friend knows the encryption key and can
reverse the encryption. A proof-of-concept implementation of NOYB as a Firefox browser plugin
adds a button to ego’s Facebook profile that encrypts his information and another button on alter’s
page that decrypts alter’s profile. The cleverness of NOYB is that it stores legitimate atoms of
information in plain text, thus not raising the suspicions of the OSN. The challenge, however, is
the scalability of the dictionaries: the dictionaries are public, contain atoms from both NOYB
users and non-users, and are maintained by a third party with unspecified business/incentive
model.
FaceCloak [188], implemented as a Firefox browser extension, protects user information
by storing fake data in the OSN. Unlike NOYB, it does not replace a user’s information with
another user’s information, rather it uses dictionaries and random Wikipedia articles as replace-
ments. A user, say Alice, can protect information from the OSN by using a special marker pre-
defined by FaceCloak (@@ in their implementation). When Alice submits the form to the OSN,
FaceCloak intercepts the submitted information, replaces the fields that start with the special
marker by appropriate fake text and stores the fake data in the OSN. It uses a dictionary (for
profile information) and random Wikipedia articles (for walls and notes) to provide fake data.
Now, using Alice’s master key and personal index key, FaceCloak does the encryption of the
real data, computes MAC keys, computes the index, and sends them to a third-party server. Now
consider one of Alice’s friends Bob, who has installed FaceCloak in his browser, and Bob wants
to see Alice’s information. After downloading Alice’s page (which also includes fake data from
the OSN), FaceCloak computes indexes of relevant fields using master and personal index key of
Alice. Then it downloads the corresponding values from the third-party server. Upon receiving
the value, FaceCloak checks the integrity of the received cipher-text, decrypts it, and substitutes
the real data for the fake data. If the value is not found, then the data is left unchanged. Face-
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Cloak depends on a “parallel” centralized infrastructure to store the encrypted data, which means
that a third-party has to maintain all users’ data, probably without getting any benefits from it.
And, users have to trust the reliability of the third-party server, which also represents a single
point of failure.
Virtual Private Social Networks) (VPSN) [57], unlike flyByNight, FaceCloak, and NOYB,
does not require third-party services to protect users’ information from an OSN. Instead, they
leverage the computational and storage resources of the OSN users to store real profile data of
other users, while storing fake profile data on Facebook. FaceVPSN is a Firefox browser exten-
sion that implements VPSN for Facebook. In FaceVPSN, user Alice changes her profile informa-
tion to some fake information and stores the fake information in Facebook and sends by email her
correct and fake profiles in a prespecified XML format to her friends. In order to access Alice’s
real profile, her friends have to have FaceVPSN installed (as a regular Firefox extension) and use
its GUI to add Alice’s XML file. When Alice’s friend Bob requests Alice’s Facebook page, Face-
book sends an HTML response that has Alice’s fake data from Facebook. FaceVPSN’s JavaScript
code is triggered when “page load” event is fired. The JavaScript code of FaceVPSN searches the
profile information of Alice in Bob’s stored XML file and replaces the fake information with real
information.
Unlike other solutions presented above, FaceVPSN does not risk being suspended by the
OSN (since it is not an application running with the OSN’s support). Like FaceCloak, however,
FaceVPSN requires a user’s friends to install the FaceVPSN extension in order to see the user’s
profile. Moreover, FaceVPSN demands a high degree of user interaction that might affect usabil-
ity. In particular, upon the addition of a new contact to the friend list, the user has to explicitly ex-
change profile information with the new friend and upload it into the FaceVPSN application. On
top of it, every change of profile information has to be emailed as an XML file to all friends, and
the friends are required to go through the XML update process in order to see the changes. This
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entire process affects usability, given the high number of friends a user might have in OSNs (e.g.,
half the Facebook users have more than 200 friends, and 15% have more than 500 friends [253])
While the various implementations of the idea of hiding the personal information from
the OSN have different tradeoffs, as discussed above, there are also risks associated with the
approach itself. First, because the OSN operates on fake data (whether encrypted or randomized),
it will not be able to provide some personalized services such as social search and recommenda-
tion. Second, users end up transferring their trust from the OSN to either a third-party server or
friends’ computers for unclear benefits. The third-party server provides yet another service whose
terms of use are probably presented in yet another incomprehensible Terms of Service document,
with an opt-out “choice”. Friends’ computers require extra care for fault tolerance and malicious
attacks. In fact, a recent user study [18] finds that higher usability costs, lack of trust, and poor
performance are the main causes of poor or no adoption of these services.
8.4.2 Protection Via Decentralization
An alternative to obfuscate information from the OSN is to migrate to another service that
is especially designed for user privacy protection. Research in this area explored the design space
of decentralized (peer-to-peer) architectures for managing user information, thus avoiding the
centralized service with a global view of the entire user population. The typical overlay used in
most of these solutions is based on distributed hash tables, preferred over unstructured overlays
for their performance guarantees. In addition, data is encrypted and only authorized users get
access to the plain text. In this section, we discuss decentralized solutions for OSNs. There are
three dimensions that differentiate the solutions: (1) how the distributed hash table has been
implemented (e.g., OpenDHT, FreePastry, Likir DHT)? (2) where to store users’ content (e.g.,
nodes run by the user, by the friends or cloud infrastructures)? (3) how to manage encryption
keys for access controls (e.g., public-key infrastructure, out-of-band)?
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PeerSooN’s [42] architecture has two-tiers. One tier, implemented using OpenDHT, serves
as a look-up service to find a user. It stores users’ meta-data for example, the IP address, informa-
tion about files, and notifications for users. A peer can connect to another peer asking the look-up
service directly to get all required information. The second tier is formed by peers and it contains
users’ data, such as user profiles. Users can exchange information either through the DHT (e.g.,
a message is stored within the DHT if receiver of a message is offline) or directly between their
devices. The system assumes a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for privacy protection. A user
encrypts data with the public keys of the intended audience, i.e., the friends of the user.
Safebook [60, 61] is a decentralized OSN, which uses a peer-to-peer architecture to get rid
of a central, omniscient authority. Safebook has three main components: a trusted identification
service for certification of public keys and the assignment of pseudonyms; matryoshkas, a set of
concentric shells around each user, which serve to replicate the profile data and anonymizes traf-
fic; and a peer to peer substrate (e.g., DHT) for the location of matryoshkas that enables access to
profile data and exchange messages.
LifeSocial.KOM [114] is another P2P-based OSN. It implements common functionalities
in OSNs using OSGi-based software components called “plugins”. As a P2P overlay, it uses
FreePastry for interconnecting the participating nodes and PAST for reliable, replicated data
storage. The system uses cryptographic public keys as user ID. To protect privacy, a user encrypts
a private data object (e.g., profile information) with a symmetric cryptographic key. She then
encrypts the symmetric cryptographic key individually with the public keys of authorized users
(e.g., her friends) and appends to the data object. The object and the list of encrypted symmetric
keys are also signed by the user and they are stored in the P2P overlay. Other users in the system
can authenticate the data object by using the public key of the author. But only authorized users
(e.g., friends) can decrypt the symmetric key and thus, the content of the object.
LotusNet [6] is a framework for the implementation of a P2P based OSN on a Likir DHT [5].
It binds a user identity to both overlay nodes and published resources for robustness of the over-
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lay network and secures identity based resource retrieval. Users’ information is encrypted and
stored in the Likir DHT. Access control responsibility is assigned to overlay index-nodes. Users
issue signed grants to other users for accessing their data. DHT returns the stored data to the
requestor only if the requestor can provide a proper grant, signed by the data owner.
Vis-a-Vis [246] targets high content availability. Users store their personal data in Virtual
Individual Servers (VISes), which are kept on the user’s computer. The server data are also repli-
cated on a cloud infrastructure so that the data is available from the cloud when a user’s computer
is offline. Users can share information with other users using peer-to-peer overlay networks that
connect VISes of the users. The cloud service needs to be rented (considering the high volume of
the data users store in OSNs), which makes the scheme monetary dependent.
Prometheus [159] is a peer-to-peer social data management system for socially-aware ap-
plications. It does not implement traditional OSN functionalities (e.g., profile creation, manage-
ment, contacts, messaging, etc.), rather it manages users’ social information from various sources
and exposes APIs for social applications. Users’ social data are encrypted and stored in a group
of trusted peers selected by users for high service availability. Prometheus architecture is based
on Pastry, a DHT-based overlay, and it uses Past to replicate social data. An inference on social
data is subject to user defined access control policy enforced by the trusted peers. Prometheus
relies on a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for user authentication and message confidentiality.
The toughest challenge for decentralized OSNs is to convince traditional OSN users to
migrate to their systems. Centralized social networks have large, established user bases and they
are accessible from anywhere. Moreover, they already have a mature infrastructure, making good
revenues from users’ data and maintaining excellent usability. However, decentralized OSNs are
still an alternative for centralized OSNs, specially for privacy-concerned users. For example,
Diaspora (https://joindiaspora.com/) is a fully operating open source, stable and decentralized
OSN, which relies on user contributed local servers to provide all the major centralized OSN
functionalities.
145
8.5 Mitigating De-anonymization and Inference Attacks
Analysis of social data has become immensely popular in a variety of domains. Researchers
and agencies collect or purchase social data to do the analysis. For example, Kwak et al. [167]
collected the entire Twitter network as of 2010: 41.7 million Twitter profiles, 1.47 billion follower-
following relations, and 106 million tweets. In addition, some organizations and OSN service
providers publish social data for others to analyze. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission published a repository of approximately 500, 000 email messages of Enron Corpora-
tion.
However, publishing and allowing the collection of social network data involves privacy
disclosure risks. For example, in 2006 AOL released an anonymized dataset of twenty million
search keywords for over 650,000 users [12]. The dataset was published for research purpose
and novel findings emerged (e.g., [220]) However, despite the fact that the data released was
anonymized, users’ privacy was compromised. To make the point, the New York Times identified
an individual from this dataset by cross referencing users with phonebook listings.
Privacy attacks in published or collected social network data can be categorized into two
categories: de-anonymization attacks and inference attacks. In de-anonymization attacks, an
attacker uses external background knowledge and published social data to de-anonymize/identify
users in the social graph, and thus learn sensitive user information. We find four types of privacy
breaches due to de-anonymization attacks in the literature: (1) Identity disclosure reveals the
identity of a user and makes him vulnerable in the real world; (2) Social attributes disclosure
refers to the disclosure of sensitive data associated with a user; (3) Relationship disclosure refers
to the situation when the relationships of a user are exposed and this information exploited; (4)
Social graph property disclosure refers to the disclosure of various graph metrics, such as degree,
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, or clustering co-efficient.
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Typically, two types of methods are available for privacy preserving social network data
anonymization: (1) edge modification-based approaches and (2) clustering-based generalization.
Edge modification-based approaches preserve privacy by modifying the social graph structure via
addition, deletion or randomization of the edges. Clustering-based generalizations cluster nodes
and edges into groups and anonymize a subgraph into a super-node [315]. So, details about users
are hidden. More in-depth discussion on de-anonymization attacks can be found in [313]. In the
following, we discuss the types of de-anonymization attacks, how these attacks take place, and
what solutions were proposed to combat such attacks. In this work, we include the latest work on
de-anonymization attacks.
8.5.1 De-anonymization Attacks
In de-anonymization attacks, an attacker uses external background knowledge and pub-
lished social data to de-anonymize/identify users in the social graph, and thus learn sensitive user
information.
We categorize privacy breaches due to de-anonymization attacks into four classes:
1. Identity disclosure reveals the identity of a user and makes him vulnerable in the real world.
For example, although a published dataset on the disease-infection network could advance
research on how the disease transmits in communities, an adversary (e.g., an insurance
company) that can identify an individual and his disease could exploit this information in
unintended ways (for example, for denying insurance).
2. Social attributes disclosure refers to the disclosure of sensitive data associated with a user.
For example, disclosure of a user’s date of birth, gender and home address could allow
the inference of the user’s social security number (SSN) and hence could lead to identity
theft [116].
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3. Relationship disclosure refers to the situation when the relationships of a user are exposed
and this information exploited. For example, two nodes (e.g., companies) in a transac-
tion network are connected by an edge and a weight (e.g., transaction expense) if they
are involved in a financial transaction. An adversary, for example a competitor company,
can detect whether two target companies have done a financial transaction if it can infer
whether an edge exists between the two companies in the network. The adversary can
learn the transaction expense from the edge weight and can exploit that information to get
advantages.
4. Social graph property disclosure refers to the disclosure of various graph metrics, such as
degree, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, or clustering co-efficient. An attacker
can find out the most central users in the network and can make the network structurally
vulnerable. For example, an attacker can identify and remove the highest betweenness
centrality nodes to disrupt communications between other nodes in the network [213].
8.5.1.1 De-anonymization Attack Techniques
Anonymization is usually done by substituting personally identifying information as-
sociated with each user with a random ID [296]. However, this substitution is not sufficient to
preserve users’ privacy. For example, consider a social network in Figure 66(a) that has been
anonymized in Figure 66(b) by replacing user names with random IDs. Now, if an attacker knows
that Alice, David and Asley are friends of Bob and Alice-David and Asley-David are also friends,
a subgraph shown in Figure 66(c), then the attacker can uniquely identify the subgraph in the
anonymized network (shown in Figure 66(d)). So, the attacker will be able to re-identify Bob
in the anonymized and published social network.
Researchers have shown different techniques to perform de-anonymization attacks. Back-
storm et al. [16] present two types of attacks—active and passive. In active attacks, the attacker
is assumed to be able to modify the network prior to social network data release. The attacker
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Figure 66 Anonymization and de-anonmymization attacks.
chooses an arbitrary set of target individuals (whose privacy she wants to compromise), creates
a small number of new user accounts, makes connections with target individuals (thus forms
edges), and establishes a highly distinguishable pattern comprising nodes and edges among the
new accounts. The attacker can then efficiently find the subgraph in the released anonymized
network, thus can expose the identities of the target individuals.
In passive attacks, an attacker does not have to create new accounts or connections. The
intuition is that most nodes in social networks form small uniquely identifiable subgraphs. So,
the attacker simply has to form a coalition with other users. The attacker recruits k   1 number
of his neighbors and forms a coalition of size k. The users in the coalition know names of their
neighbors outside of the coalition. Finally, the attacker tries to identify the subgraph (formed
by the coalition) in the published social network, and compromises the privacy of neighboring
nodes.
Narayanan et al. [211] demonstrate the feasibility of a large-scale de-anonymization at-
tack under the assumption that the attacker has background knowledge of a different network
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whose membership partially overlaps with the target network. Using a de-anonymization al-
gorithm, the authors show that a third of the common users of both Twitter and Flickr can be
identified in the anonymous Twitter social graph with a low (12%) error rate.
Both attacks [16, 211] presented above use a subgraph as background knowledge. How-
ever, the way an attacker achieves this knowledge is different. In [16], an attacker creates the
background knowledge by adding nodes and edges in the social graphs or forming a coalition
among nodes. In [211], the authors propose to collect network data by crawling OSNs, or deploy-
ing third-party malicious applications.
8.5.1.2 Privacy Preserving Anonymization Methods
In order to combat de-anonymization attacks, a social network should be anonymized
properly before publishing. We categorize privacy preserving social network data anonymization
methods into two categories: (1) edge modification-based approaches and (2) clustering-based
generalization.
Edge modification-based approaches preserve privacy by modifying the social graph
structure via addition, deletion or randomization of the edges. Zhour and Pei [314] consider a
de-anonymization attack, where an attacker, equipped with the background knowledge about
the target’s 1-hop neighbors, attempts to re-identify the target in the anonymized dataset using
neighborhood matching. Their anonymization method is inspired by k-anonymity model. Al-
though not targeted to social network data publishing, k-anonymity model ensures that each
user’s information in a released dataset cannot be identified from at least k   1 other individuals
in the dataset [271] .
Zhour and Pei extend k-anonymization to social networks. The goal of the anonymization
is to ensure that even knowing the neighborhood of a node, an attacker will not be able to re-
identify the node in the anonymized dataset with confidence higher than 1k . Let we have a social
network G = (V,E) and the anonymized network Gˆ = (Vˆ , Eˆ), where there exists a bijection
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function f : V ! Vˆ and for each (u, v) 2 E, (f(u), f(v)) 2 Eˆ. The authors assume that
an attacker has the knowledge of the neighborhood subgraph of a node u 2 V (G), denoted
by NeighborG(u). The goal of the k-anonymization is to ensure that there exist at least k   1
other nodes v1, v2, v3, . . . , vk 1 2 V (G) such that NeighborGˆ(f(v1)), . . . ,NeighborGˆ(f(vk 1))
are isomorphic. The anonymization method first extracts the neighborhoods of all nodes in the
network. Then it greedily combines nodes into groups and anonymizes the neighborhoods of the
nodes in the group, until k-anonymity conditions are met. To anonymize neighborhoods of two
nodes such as NeighborG(u) and NeighborG(v), the method first finds all perfect matches of
neighborhood components in NeighborG(u) and NeighborG(v). For those unmatched compo-
nents, it tries to pair similar components based on anonymization cost and anonymizes them (this
might involve an addition of an edge between two nodes).
Liu and Terzi [181] propose k-degree anonymity to combat de-anonymization attacks.
They assume that an attacker has the background knowledge of the degree of a target node. The
attacker could search the degrees of the nodes in the published network and could re-identify a
target node. k-degree anonymity ensures that for every node u in the graph, there exist at least
(k   1) other nodes having the same degree as u. Similar to the work of Zhour and Pei, even
having the degree background knowledge, an attacker will not be able to re-identify the node in
the anonymized dataset with confidence higher than 1k . Their anonymization algorithm has two
steps. In the first step, it starts from a degree sequence d of the original network G(V,E) and
constructs a new degree sequence dˆ that is k-degree anonymous, so that degree anonymization
cost is minimized. In the second step, the algorithm constructs a graph Gˆ = (Vˆ , Eˆ) such that
dGˆ = dˆ, Vˆ = V and Eˆ = E. To solve the first step, the authors used a dynamic programming
method, while the second step is based on a set of graph construction algorithms given a degree
sequence with constraints. To construct the new degree sequence the algorithm uses a random-
ized edge swap transformation strategy.
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Clustering-based generalizations cluster nodes and edges into groups and anonymize a
subgraph into a super-node [315]. So, details about users are hidden.
Hay et al. [123] propose a vertex clustering-based generalization approach to combat
de-anonymization attacks. They model an attacker’s background knowledge as the access to
an entity that answers a restricted knowledge query about a target node in the network. They
assume three types of queries: vertex refinement queries return the local structure of a node in
an iterative refined way (e.g., degree of a node, the set of neighbors degrees of a node); subgraph
queries confirm a subgraph around a target node; hub fingerprint queries for a target node re-
turns the vectors of distances between the node and a set of hubs (note that in social networks
a hub is defined as a node with high betweenness and degree centrality [213]). The anonymity
method is based on structural similarity. The intuition is that structurally similar nodes may be
indistinguishable to an attacker. The anonymity method generalizes a social graph by grouping
nodes into partitions and publishes the number of nodes in each partition including the densities
of edges across and within the partitions. The size of the partition is at least k (a positive integer),
which is similar to k-anonymity in relational data. The method used a simulated annealing algo-
rithm for partitioning [243].
Zheleva and Getoor [311] consider a link re-identification attack, where nodes have mul-
tiple types of edges and an attacker attempts to re-identify sensitive edges. As a background
knowledge, they assume that an attacker can predict a sensitive edge based on other non-sensitive
edges. They describe five anonymization techniques: i) remove all sensitive edges; (ii) remove
some non-sensitive edges which significantly contribute to the prediction of a sensitive edge;
(iii) collapse the anonymized nodes into a single node for each equivalence class (they assume
that nodes are clustered into equivalence classes) and publish the count of same types of edges
between two equivalence class nodes; (iv) similar technique as (iii), but it needs the equivalence
class nodes to have the same constraints as any two nodes in the social network; (v) remove all
edges.
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Campan and Truta [43] propose an edge generalization technique, leveraging the k-
anonymity model. In their model, each node is similar to at least other (k   1) nodes considering
attributes and associated structured information (e.g., neighborhood structure of nodes). Nodes
are partitioned into clusters and nodes from a cluster are combined into one single node. Edges
between two clusters are collapsed into a single edge. An edge between two clusters are labeled
with the number of edges between them. While this approach is similar to [311], two major dif-
ferences are: (i) [43] considers all relationships are the same type, but in [311] there are different
types of relations; (ii) [43] considers both generalization and structural information loss while
clustering.
The main challenge for anonymization methods is providing sufficient anonymity while
preserving (all) the relevant structural properties of the network. Without preserving enough of
the structural properties of the original network, publishing anonymized social network datasets
loses its value. Moreover, Aggarwal et al. [3] show that social graphs reveal robust statistical
information about linkage behavior, which is hard to hide using structural-based anonymiza-
tion, such as the approaches we have already discussed. Differential privacy [83] has seen much
research attention recently as an alternate of aforementioned structural-based anonymization
techniques. Differential privacy makes no assumption about an attacker’s background knowledge.
It adds controlled levels of “noise” to the original graph and generates statistically similar, but
anonymized graphs. Qian et al. [297] employ a statistical hierarchical random graph (HRG)
model to infer the social graph structure and achieve the differential privacy by sampling possible
HRG structures via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Lu and Miklau [186] estimate param-
eters for the exponential random graph model (EGRM) under differential privacy. ERGMs are a
powerful statistical modeling tool for social networks.
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8.5.2 Mitigating Inference Attacks
The goal of an inference attack is to infer undisclosed private information about a user
using other published details of that user. For example, a person might not want to state her polit-
ical affiliation in Facebook because of privacy concerns. But if he is a member of “ban the same
sex marriage” group, then from this group membership an inference may be possible regarding
his political affiliation.
Zheleva and Getoor [312] study four social networks (Facebook, Flickr, Dogster and Bib-
Sonomy) and show how an attacker can exploit public and private user profiles to learn private
attributes such as user location and gender. They show that declared social relationships and
inferred group memberships are enough to predict undisclosed private information. Using the
classification model LINK-GROUP, a combination of link and group-based classification models,
they were able to accurately discover the information of private-profile users.
Heatherly et al. [125] describe three sanitization techniques to prevent undisclosed private
information inference from a released social network dataset. First, they build classification mod-
els to accurately predict private data from the available details (attributes) of a user. Then they
apply the sanitization techniques to reduce the accuracy of the models. In brief, the techniques
are as follows: (i) remove some details (e.g., attributes) to decrease the classification accuracy of
sensitive attributes; (ii) alter the link structure of the social graph by adding and removing links
and (iii) provide a generalization of details. For example, if a user inputs a favorite activity as
“Boston Celtics”, the name will be replaced by a more generalized term “Basketball”. Experi-
menting on a Facebook dataset, the authors conclude that removal of attributes and friendship
links together in the published data is the best way to reduce classifier accuracy.
Dey et al. [76] attempt to infer the age of over one million Facebook users in New York
city. Exploiting the Facebook social graph, they design an iterative algorithm which estimates a
user’s age based on her friends’ ages (e.g., from inferred high school graduation year), friends
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of friends’ edges and so on. They find that for most users, including users who take maximal
measures to prevent privacy leakage by hiding their friend lists, it is possible to estimate ages
with an error of only a few years. The authors recommend to hide high school graduation year
and friend lists to other users who are not friends from users’ profiles as a solution.
Minkus et al. [201] show how an attacker could infer, in an automated fashion, attributes
about babies and young children —who do not even have their own OSN accounts— due to their
parents’ OSN behavior. First, they use age detection algorithms to the parents’ public Facebook
photos to automatically identify photos of their children. Then they are able to learn personally
identifiable information, such as, name, birth date, and address of the child using automated
textual analysis of their parents posts and linking them with publicly available data (voter regis-
tration list). To mitigate the risks, their suggestion includes enforcement of more privacy preserv-
ing mechanisms by showing messages to parents, or automatically restricting photos containing
children to a more private setting if a child’s face is detected in a photo.
8.6 Mitigating Attacks from Large-scale Crawlers
OSNs enhance social browsing experience by allowing users to view public profiles of
others. This way a user meets others, gets a chance to know strangers and eventually befriends
some of them. Unfortunately, attackers are there in the vast landscape of OSNs, who exploit this
functionality. Users’ social data are always invaluable to marketers. Professional data aggregators
build databases using public views of profiles and social links and sale the databases to insurance
companies, background-check agencies and credit-ratings agencies [31]. For example, crawling
100 million public profiles from Facebook created news recently [39]. Sometimes crawling is a
violation of terms of service. Facebook states that someone should not collect “...users’ content
or information, or otherwise access Facebook, using automated means (such as harvesting bots,
robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our prior permission” [90].
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One solution of the problem could be the removal of the public profile view functionality.
But removal of the public profile view functionality is against the business model of OSNs. Ser-
vices like search and targeted advertisements bring new users and ultimately revenues to OSNs,
but openly accessible contents are necessary for their operation. Moreover, removal of the public
view functionality will undermine user experience, as it makes a connection, communication and
sharing easy with unknown people in the network.
OSN operators such as Facebook and Twitter attempt to defend large-scale crawling by
limiting the number of user profiles a user can see from an IP address in a time window [261].
However, tracking users with low level network identifiers (e.g., IP address, TCP port numbers
or SSL session IDs) is fundamentally flawed as a solution of this problem [295]. Aggressive
attackers may gather a large vector of those identifiers by creating a large number of fake user
accounts, gaining access to compromised accounts, virtualizing in a cloud, employing botnets,
and forwarding requests to proxies. Until now, researchers have leveraged encryption based tech-
nique [295] and crawler’s observational behavior [207] to combat the problem.
ONS’s anti-crawling techniques suffer from the fact that web clients can access a partic-
ular page using a common URL accessible to all clients [295]. This can be exploited by a dis-
tributed crawler e.g., a crawling thread can download and parse a page for links using a session
key and can deliver those links to another crawling thread to download and parse using different
session keys. So, if some crawlers get banned from the OSNs for malicious activities, the links
they have parsed are still valid and a fresh start is possible from those links. SpikeStrip [295]
overcomes the problem by creating unique, per-session “views” of the protected website that
forcibly tie each client to their session keys. SpikeStrip is a web server add-on that leverages
link encryption technique. It allows OSN administrators to moderate data access, and it defends
against large-scale crawling by securely identifying and rate limiting individual sessions.
When a crawler visits a page, it receives a new session key and a copy of the page whose
links are all encrypted. SpikeStrip appends each user’s session key to those links and then en-
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crypts the result using a server-side, secret symmetric key. It also appends a salt to the link after
encryption to make each link unique. As time passes, the crawler progressively covers more
pages and collects links. However, at a point, the crawler requires to change the session key due
to the expiration of the session or due to a ban from the OSN. As SpikeStrip couples all URLs
to the browser’s session key, this switching of sessions invalidates all the links collected for fu-
ture traversals. Thus, a fresh start to reconstruct the collection should be started from the begin-
ning. The authors implemented mod spikestrip, a SpikeStrip implementation for Apache 2.x and
showed that it imposes only 7% performance penalty on Apache.
PUBCRAWL [138] is based on the observation that the traffic that a crawler generates is
significantly different from fair users. It uses content-based and timing-based footprints to distin-
guish crawler traffic from regular traffic. Content-based features are extracted from URLs (e.g.,
access errors, page revisits) and HTTP headers (e.g., cookies, referrers). Timing-based features
are obtained from the analysis of the time series produced by the stream of requests. Finally,
PUBCRAWL relies on machine learning techniques and trains classifiers using the features that
can separate crawler traffic from user traffic.
Genie [207] exploits browsing patterns of honest/real users and crawlers and thwarts
large-scale crawls using Credit Networks [64, 107]. While PUBCRAWL uses physical network
layer differences, Genie uses social network layer differences. Genie’s design is based on three
observations from real-world datasets: (i) there is a balance between the number of profiles a
honest user views and views requested by other users to her profile, but crawlers view many more
profiles than the number of times their profiles are viewed; (ii) a honest user views profiles of
socially close users.(iii) a honest user repeatedly views a small set of profiles in the network, but
unless re-crawling, the crawlers avoid repeating viewing of other users’ profiles. Genie leverages
these observations and enforces a viewer to make a “credit payment” in the credit network if
a user wants to view a profile. It allows a user (also might be a crawler) to view a profile if a
max-flow between them has at least a threshold value. The required credit payment to view a
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profile depends on the shortest path length from viewer to viewee; a user has to pay more to view
the profile of a distant user in the social graph. As a legitimate user usually views one or two
hop distant profiles, and also other users also view her profile, her liquidity of credits remains
almost the same. On the other hand, a crawler views a lot of distant profiles and gets fewer views.
Eventually it lacks credit liquidity to view the profiles of others. As such, the credit network
poses a strict rate limit on profile views of the crawlers.
Genie might see a large number of honest users’ activities (profile viewing) flagged due
to the existence of outliers in a social network. This might limit the usability of social networks,
because without viewing a profile an outlier will not be able to befriend others. Genie also might
require a fast computation of shortest paths, as for each profile viewing request, it computes all
the shortest paths from viewer to viewee. Intuitively, this operation is too costly in a modern
social network (more than one billion users), even considering the state of the art shortest path
algorithms.
Both SpikeStrip and Genie limit crawlers’ ability to quickly aggregate a significant por-
tion of OSNs user data. Unfortunately, equipped with a large number of user profiles (fake or
compromised) and employing dedicated crawlers for a long time, attackers could still collect a
huge amount of users’ social data.
8.7 Mitigating Sybil Attacks
The Sybil attack is a fundamental problem in distributed systems. The term Sybil was first
introduced by Douceur [77], inspired from a 1973 book after the same name about the treatment
of a person Sybil Dorsett, who manifests sixteen personalities. In Sybil attacks, an attacker cre-
ates multiple identities and influence the working of the system. OSNs including Digg, YouTube,
Facebook and BitTorrent have become vulnerable to Sybil attacks. For example, Facebook an-
ticipates that up to 83 million of its users may be illegitimate [23], which is far more than what
it anticipates (54 million) earlier [48]. Researchers found that Sybil users affect the correct func-
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tioning of the system by contributing malicious contents [115, 143] and illegitimately increasing
influence and power [212, 236].
Malicious activities from Sybil users are posing serious threats to OSN users, who trust
the service and depend on it for online interactions. Sybils cost OSN providers, too, in terms of
monetary losses and time. OSN providers spend significant resources and times to detect, verify,
and shut down Sybil identities. For example, Tuenti, the largest OSN in Spain, dedicates 14 full-
time employees to manually verify user reported Sybil identities [44].
Two categories of solutions are available to defend Sybils: Sybil detection and Sybil
resistance. Sybil detection schemes [44, 112, 290, 303, 307] leverage the social graph structure to
identify whether a given user is Sybil or non-Sybil (Section 8.7.1). On the other hand, Sybil resis-
tance schemes do not explicitly label users’ as Sybils or non-Sybils, rather they use application-
specific knowledge to mitigate the influence of the Sybils in the network [228, 228, 287] (Sec-
tion 8.7.2). In a tutorial and survey Haifeng Yu [305] compiles social graph-based Sybil detection
techniques. In this paper, we report latest works on that category, as well as Sybil resistance
schemes.
8.7.1 Sybil Detection
Sybil detection techniques model an online social network (OSN) as an undirected graph
G = (V,E), where a node v 2 V is a user in the network and an edge e 2 E between two nodes
corresponds to a social connection between the users. This connection could be a friendship
relationship on Facebook or a colleague relationship on LinkedIn, and is assumed to be trusted.
The social graph has n = |V | nodes andm = |E| edges. By definition, if all nodes
correspond to different persons, then the system should have n users. But, some persons have
multiple identities. These users are Sybil users and all the identities created by a Sybil user are
called Sybil identities. An edge between a Sybil user and a non-Sybil user may exist if a Sybil
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user is able to create a relationship (e.g., friend, colleague) with a non-Sybil user. These types of
edges are called attack edges (see Figure 67).
Attackers can launch Sybil attacks by creating many Sybil identities and creating attack
edges with non-Sybil users. Detection systems against Sybil attacks provide mechanisms to de-
tect whether a user (node) v 2 V is Sybil or non-Sybil. Those mechanisms are based on the
authority (e.g., the OSN provider) knows the topology of the network (a centralized solution), or
a node only knows its social connections (a decentralized solution). Some common assumptions
of Sybil detection schemes are below.
• Assumption 1: Attackers can create a large number of Sybil identities in OSNs and can
create connections among those Sybil identities, but they lack trust relationships because
of their inability to create an arbitrary number of social relationships to non-Sybil users.
Intuitively, a social relationship reflects trust and an out-of-band social interaction. So,
it requires significant human efforts to establish such a relationship. The limited number
of attack edges differentiates Sybil and non-Sybil regions in a social graph as shown in
Figure 67.
• Assumption 2: The non-Sybil region of a social graph is fast-mixing. Mixing time deter-
mines how fast a random walk’s probability of landing at each node reaches the stationary
distribution [38, 96]. A limited number of the attack edges causes sparse cut between Sybil
and non-Sybil regions. Non-Sybil regions do not show sparse cut as non-Sybils are well
connected. As such, there should be a difference in terms of mixing time of the non-Sybil
regions compare to the entire social graph.
• Assumption 3: The defense mechanism knows at least one non-Sybil. This assumption is
essential in a sense that without this knowledge the Sybil and non-Sybil regions become
identical to the system.
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Figure 67 The system model for Sybil detection.
Most of the Sybil detection techniques are based on social graphs. Social graph-based
approaches leverage random walks [44, 65, 112, 307], social community [288], and network
centrality [299] to detect Sybils in the network. SybilGuard [307] is a decentralized Sybil de-
tection scheme, which uses Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3. A social graph with
a small quotient cut has a large mixing time, which implies that a random walk should be long
in order to converge to the stationary distribution. So, the presence of too many Sybil nodes in
the network disrupts the fast mixing property, in a sense that they increase social network mixing
time by contributing small quotient cuts. Thus, a verifier, which is itself a non-Sybil node, can
break this symmetry by examining the anomaly of the mixing time in the network. In order to
detect Sybils, a non-Sybil node (say a verifier) can perform a random route starting from itself
and of a certain length w (a theoretically identifiable quantity, but the paper experimentally shows
that this is 2000 for a topology of one-million nodes). A suspect (a node that is in question) is
identified as non-Sybil if it’s random route intersects with the verifier’s random route. As the
underlying assumption is that the number of attack edges should be limited, the verifier’s route
should remain within the non-Sybil region with high probability, given the appropriate choice of
w.
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SybilInfer’s [65] assumptions are also Assumption1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3.
Moreover, it assumes that a modified random walk over a social network, that yields a uniform
distribution over all nodes, is also fast mixing. The core of SybilInfer is a Bayesian inference
that detects approximate cuts between non-Sybil and Sybil regions in social networks. These
identified cuts are used to infer the labels (Sybil or non-Sybil) of the nodes, with an associated
probability.
SybilRank [44] is also a random walk-based Sybil detection scheme, which uses all three
assumptions and ranks user according to their perceived likelihood of being Sybils. Using early
terminated power iteration, SybilRank computes landing probability of random short walks and
from that it ranks users, so that substantial portion of the Sybil users have low rank. The de-
sign of SybilRank is influenced by an observation on early terminated random walks in social
graphs—if a walk of this kind starts from a non-Sybil node, then it has a high degree-normalized
landing probability to land at non-Sybil node than a Sybil node. SybilRank terms the probabil-
ity of a random walk to land on a node as the node’s trust, ranks nodes based on that and filters
lower ranked nodes as potential Sybil users. Rather than keeping computationally intensive a
large number of random walk traces used in other graph-based Sybil defense schemes [306, 307],
it uses power iteration [169] in calculating the landing probability of random walks.
However, one potential problem with all of the previous approaches is that they don’t tol-
erate noise in the prior knowledge about known non-Sybil or Sybil nodes. SybilBelief [112], an-
other random walk-based semi-supervised learning framework, overcomes the limitation. Sybil-
Belief propagates Sybil/non-Sybil label information from known Sybil/non-Sybil labels to the
remaining nodes in the system by modeling the social network as Markov Random Fields. How-
ever, the twist is, a portion of these known Sybil/non-Sybil labels might be inaccurate, which
earlier approaches fail to address.
Viswanath et al. [288] suggest to use community detection algorithms for Sybils’ detec-
tion. They show that although other graph property based Sybil defense schemes have different
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working principles, the core of those works revolves around detecting local communities around
a trusted node. So, existing community detection algorithms could be used to defend the Sybils
also. Although, not explicitly mentioned, their approach is centralized, because community de-
tection requires a central authority to have the knowledge of the entire topology.
Xu et al. [299] propose Sybil detection based on the betweenness rank of the edges. The
betweenness of an edge is defined as the number of shortest paths in the social graph passing the
edge [40]. The scheme assumes that the number of attack edges is limited and Sybil and non-
Sybil regions are separate clusters of nodes. So, intuitively betweenness scores of the attack
edges should be high as they connect the clusters. Their scheme exploits this social network
property and uses a Sybil Resisting Network Clustering (SRNC) algorithm to detect Sybils. The
algorithm computes the betweenness of each edge and identifies the edges with high betweenness
as attack edges.
Social graph based approaches still have some challenges to overcome. First, as graph-
based Sybil detection schemes exploit trust relations, the success of the identification highly
depends on the trust related assumptions. If an assumption is not right in a network, social graph-
based Sybil detection techniques might work poorly in that network (e.g., [156]). For example,
the assumption that Sybils’ have problems in creating social connections with legitimate users
(non-Sybils) is not well established. Although study [208] shows that most of a Sybil identity’s
connections are also Sybil identities and Sybils’ have less relationships with non-Sybil users, sev-
eral other studies [27, 34, 137] show that users are not careful while accepting friendship requests
and Sybil identities can easily befriend with them. Moreover, Sybil users are using advanced
techniques to create more realistic Sybil identities, either by copying profile data from existing
accounts, or by assigning real users to customize them. Social graph-based Sybil detection tech-
niques are vulnerable to such adversarial social engineering attacks. So, recently researchers have
focused on combining user-level activity footprint and graph-level structures (e.g., I´ntegro [33],
VoteTrust [301]).
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Also, another assumption that a social network is fast-mixing may not be right for all so-
cial networks. Study [206] shows that many of the social networks are not fast-mixing, especially
where edges represent strong real-world trust (e.g., DBLP, Epinions, etc.).
Second, the performance of random walk-based Sybil detection techniques depends on
the various relevant parameters of the random walks (e.g., the length of a random walk). These
factors will work for a fixed network size (as all the schemes have shown), but they have to be
updated with the evolution of the social networks.
8.7.2 Sybil Resistance
Sybil resistance schemes do not explicitly label users’ as Sybils and non-Sybils, rather
they attempt to mitigate the impact that a Sybil user can have on others. Sybil resistance schemes
have been effectively used in applications from diverse domains including content rating sys-
tems [51, 275], spam protection [205], online auctions [228], reputation systems [73], and collab-
orative mobile applications [233].
Note two assumptions of Sybil detection schemes: 1) non-Sybil region is fast mixing, 2)
Sybils can not create an arbitrary number of social relationships with non-Sybils. Sybil resistance
schemes also assume that non-Sybils’ have a limited number of social connections, but they do
not rely on the fast mixing nature of the non-Sybil regions. However, Sybil resistance schemes
take an additional application related information such as users’ interactions/transactions/votes
etc. Using the underlying social network of the users and system information, Sybil resistance
schemes determine whether an action performed by a user should be allowed or denied.
Most of the Sybil resistance schemes [205, 228, 287] share a common approach in re-
sisting Sybils—they use a credit network built on the top of the social network of users [284].
Originally proposed in the electronic commerce community, Credit Networks [64, 107] create
mutual trust protocols in a situation where there is pairwise trust between two users, and a cen-
tralized trusted party is unavailable. Nodes in a credit network trust each other by providing
164
A X
X'
X''
X'''
5
2
3
9
10
6
2
2
Rest of the 
network
Figure 68 Credit network based Sybil resistance [284]. The network contains four Sybil identities
as nodes X, X 0, X 00, X 000 of a Sybil user. A directed edge (X,Y) represents how much credit
is available to X from Y. If X wants to pay credits from other three nodes, the credits must be
deducted from X’s single legitimate link to A. So, a Sybil’s other identities do not provide any
additional credits in the rest of the network.
credits up to a certain limit. Nodes use these credits to pay for services (e.g., sending a message,
purchase items, vote casting) that they receive from one another. These schemes assign credits to
the network links, and allow an action between two nodes if there is a path between them that has
enough credit to satisfy the operation. As such, these schemes find a credit assignment strategy
in the graph and apply the credit payment scheme to allow a limited number of illegitimate oper-
ations in the system. A Sybil user has limited number of edges with non-Sybils (hence, limited
credits available), which restricts her to gain additional advantages by creating multiple Sybil
identities. This scenario is shown in figure 68, which is a core defense philosophy of some resis-
tance schemes. In the following, we provide a brief overview of the Sybil resistance schemes.
Ostra [205] leverages existing trust relationships among users to thwart unwanted com-
munication (e.g., spam). It bounds the total number of unwanted communications a Sybil user
can produce by assigning credit values to the trust links. If a user sends a message to another
user, Ostra finds a path with enough credit from the sender to the receiver. If a path is available,
credit is assigned along all the links in the path, which is refunded if the receiver considers the
messages as not unwanted. However, if no such path exists, Ostra blocks the communication,
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but the credit is paid. In this way, Ostra ensures that a user with multiple identities cannot send a
large number of unwanted communications, unless she also has additional trust relationships.
Bazaar [228] is targeted to strengthen the users’ reputation in online marketplaces like
eBay. The opportunity to create accounts freely leads Sybil users to create multiple accounts
and causes the waste of time and significant monetary losses for defrauded users. To mitigate
Sybil users, Bazaar creates transaction network by linking users who have made a successful
transaction. The weight of a link is the amount that has been successfully transferred due to the
transaction. Prior to a transaction, using a max flow based technique, Bazaar computes the repu-
tation of the users doing the transaction and compares with the new transaction value. If it finds
available flow, it removes the value of the transaction between the users as credits, and eventually
adds back if the transaction is a fraud. However, a new transaction is denied if essential flow is
not found.
Canal [287] complements Ostra and Bazaar credit networks-based Sybil resistance schemes
by applying landmark routing-based techniques in calculating credit payments over a large net-
work. One of the major problems of Ostra and Bazaar is that they require computing max-flow
over a graph. However, the huge size of present day network (Facebook has over billion of nodes
in social graph) leads to significant computation complexity to compute the max-flow between
two nodes in the network. As such, this poses a bottleneck to those techniques to practically de-
ploy in a real-world social network. Canal efficiently computes an approximate max-flow (com-
promising accuracy with speed-up) path using existing landmark routing-based algorithm [118,
278]. The main components of Canal are universe creator processes and path stitcher processes.
Universe creator processes continuously select new landmarks and path stitcher processes contin-
uously process incoming credit payment requests. Using real-world network datasets the authors
show that Canal can perform payment calculations efficiently (within a few milliseconds), even if
the network contains hundreds of millions of links.
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MobID [233] makes co-located mobile devices resilient to Sybil attackers. Portable de-
vices in close proximity of each other could collaborate various services (e.g., run localization
algorithms to get a precise street map), which is severely disrupted by Sybil users (Sybils could
inject false information). MobID uses mobile networks to Sybil resilience. More specifically, a
device manages two small networks as it meets with other devices. A network of friends contains
non-Sybil devices and a network of foes contains suspicious devices. Using two networks, Mo-
bID determines whether an unknown device is attempting a Sybil attack. MobID ensures that a
non-Sybil device accepts, and accepted by most other non-Sybil devices with high probability.
So, a non-Sybil device could successfully trade services with other non-Sybil devices.
8.8 Mitigating Attacks from Compromised Accounts
A compromised account is a legitimate account that has been hacked and taken over by
an attacker [84]. The attacker can exploit the account for a number of mischievous purposes,
such as, spreading contents via wall posts or direct messages, liking commercial social pages,
and following others. Note that compromised accounts are different than Sybil or fake accounts
in that compromised accounts have an established trust relationship with others. So, they are
not deemed suspicious to OSNs. Attackers exploit this embedded trust and use the accounts for
increasing influence and power.
User accounts can be compromised in a number of ways. Users might trust third-party
websites or applications with their OSN credentials and those third-parties might be malicious.
Users’ account passwords are sometimes weak and bots could guess them. Attackers also use
cross-site scripting and social phishing to compromise users’ accounts.
Compromised accounts have negative consequences on the OSN. They damage the rep-
utation of the system by providing fake like, following and promoting unwanted content. Vic-
tims of the compromised accounts lose their accounts and hence their social connections. A re-
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search [309] on Twitter compromised accounts shows that about 27% of the compromised users
change to a new account once their accounts are compromised.
A number of solutions [45, 84, 285] have been proposed to detect compromised accounts
in OSNs. These solutions exploit behavioral deviation of the account before and after an account
is compromised. Compa [84] detects compromised accounts using statistical modeling of user
behavior and anomaly detection. It makes two assumptions—(1) a compromised account will
show noticeable behavioral differences compared to the behavior of the legitimate owner of the
account, and (2) an attacker will spread the same malicious content (e.g., tweet or messages)
from a subset of account it has compromised. Compa makes behavioral profile of a user and
checks for a sudden and significant violation of disseminated content from the profile. It makes
the behavioral profile of a user considering content features, such as time of posting, the source
of the content (e.g., third-party applications), language, links of the content, interaction and prox-
imity to other users. Then it computes an anomaly score for a new content comparing it to the
user’s already established profile. The user is put in a suspicious category if a significant portion
of new messages has higher anomaly scores. Finally, Compa groups similar content and hence
compromised accounts using two similarity measures: content similarity and url similarity. One
potential problem with Compa is that attackers can still dodge the system by not posting the same
messages from the accounts it has compromised.
SynchroTrap [45] also assumes that the compromised accounts act together in different
social network contexts (e.g., page like, photo upload, follow others). It further assumes that
those actions are loosely synchronized. SynchroTrap is a more generalized version of Compa for
any social network context, as it assumes that actions (e.g., photo upload) are only coordinated,
the action might be content independent (e.g., follow others). However, SynchroTrap makes the
real difference in terms of scalability. As it is built as an incremental processing system, it can
efficiently process massive OSN user activity data. (The system was successfully deployed on
Facebook and Instagram). First, SynchroTrap abstracts users’ actions using tuples—a combina-
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tion of user ID, timestamp of actions, type of action (e.g., posting), IP address of the users. Then,
for each pair of users, using Jaccard similarity, it computes similarity between two users for their
actions during a period of time. Finally, it uses hierarchical clustering algorithms to group users
having the similar actions.
Viswanath et al. [285] also uses anomaly detection techniques to detect compromised
accounts (anomalous behavior in general). But the difference with Compa is that it doesn’t make
any assumptions about attack strategy (e.g., Compa assumes coordinated posting of the same
content from compromised accounts). They focus on modeling Facebook Like activity behavior
of normal users. In so doing, they use features, such as, temporal (number of likes per day), spa-
tial (number of likes in different categories), and spatio-temporal (summary of the distribution
of like categories using entropy). Of these features, they use principal component (PCA) anal-
ysis technique to detect the features that best explain normal user behavior. They experimented
with Facebook, Yelp and Twitter datasets and found that three to five principal components are
enough to model normal users’ behavior. These components are later used to flag anomalous
users, whose behavior don’t fit the components. Using ground truth data from Facebook com-
promised users, the authors showed that the technique worked well.
8.9 Mitigating Social Spam
Spam is a news in web-based systems (e.g., [197, 219]). However, OSNs have added a
new flavor to it by acting as effective tools for spamming activities and propagation. Social spam
(e.g., [318], [178]) is unwanted content that is directed specifically at users of the OSN. The
worst consequences of social spam include phishing attacks [139] and malware propagation [36].
Spamming activity is pervasive in OSNs and spammers are successful. For example,
about 0.13% of spam tweets in Twitter generate a page visit [115], which is only 0.003%-0.006%
for spam email [144]. This high click-through is due to the fact that OSNs expose intrinsic trust
relationship among online friends. As such, users read and click messages or links that are shared
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from their friends. Study [27] shows that 45% of users on OSNs click on links posted by their
friends’ accounts.
Defending spam in OSNs can improve user experience. OSN service providers will also
be benefited as this will lessen the system workload in terms of dealing with unwanted commu-
nications and contents. Defense mechanisms against spam in OSNs can be classified into two
categories: 1) spam content and profile detection, and 2) spam campaign detection. Spam content
and profile-level detection involve checking individual accounts or contents for an evidence of
spam contents (Section 8.9.1). On the other hand, a spam “campaign” is a collection of malicious
content having a common goal, for example, selling backdoor products [102] (Section 8.9.2).
8.9.1 Spam Content and Profile Detection
Some early spam profile detections [170, 256, 292] used social honeypots. A honeypot
is a trap deployed to capture examples of nefarious activities in networked systems [256]. For
years, researchers have used honeypots to characterize malicious hacker activities [255], to obtain
footprints of email address crawlers [229], and to create intrusion detection signatures [160].
Social honeypots are used to monitor spammers’ behaviors and store their information from the
OSNs [170].
Webb et al. [292] took the first step to characterize spam in OSNs using social honeypots.
They created honeypot MySpace profiles in different geographic locations for harvesting decep-
tive spam profiles on MySpace. An automated program (commonly known as bots) worked on
behalf of a honeypot profile and collected all of the traffic it received (via friend requests). After
four months of the deployment and operation, the bots collected a representative sample of friend
requests (and corresponding spam profiles). Through statistical analysis the authors showed the
followings: (i) spam profiles follow distinct temporal patterns in spamming activity; (ii) 57.2% of
the “About me” contents of the spam profiles are duplicated; (iii) spam profiles redirect users to
predefined web pages.
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In [170], the authors also collected spam profiles using social honeypots. But this work
is different from the previous one in that it not only collects and characterizes spam profiles, it
extracts features from the gathered spam profiles and builds classifiers to detect potential spam
profiles. The authors consider four categories of features such as demographics, content, activity
and connections from the spam profiles collected from MySpace and Twitter. These features are
later used to train machine learning classifiers that are able to distinguish spam and fair profiles.
One of the limitations of these honeypot-based solutions [170, 292] is that they consider
all profiles that sent friend requests to honeypots are spam profiles. But in social networks, it is
common to receive friend requests from unknown person, who might be legitimate users in the
network. The solutions would be more rigorous if legitimate users were not considered. Also,
the methods are effective when spammers become friends with the honeypots. Otherwise the
honeypots will be able to target only a small subset of the spammers. As such, recent research on
honeypot-based spam detection is focusing more on how to build more effective social honeypots
(e.g., [302]). Another problem is that, in social networks, friendship is not always required for
spamming. For example, in twitter, a spammer can use mention (e.g., @user) tag to send spam
tweets to a user.
Stringhini et al.’s solution [264] overcomes some limitations of the previous two honeypot-
based papers by using richer feature sets. The authors deployed honeypots accounts on Facebook,
Twitter and MySpace; 300 on each platform for about one year and logged the traffic (e.g., friend
requests, messages, and invitations). They build classifiers from the following six features: (i) FF
ratio: the ratio of the number of friend requests sent by a user and the number of friends she has;
(ii) URL ratio: the ratio of the number of messages containing URLs and total messages; (iii)
Message similarity: similarity among the messages sent by a user; (iv) Friend choice: the ratio of
the total number of names among the profiles’ friends, and the number of distinct first names; (v)
Messages sent: the number of messages sent by a profile as a feature; and (vi) Friend number: the
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number of friends a profile has. Finally, the authors manually inspected and labeled profiles as
spam and used Random Forest algorithm for classification.
Benevenuto et al. [24] detect video polluters such as spammers and promoters in YouTube
online video social networks using machine learning techniques. The authors considered three
attribute sets: user attributes, video attributes, and social network (SN) attributes in classification.
Four volunteers manually analyzed the videos and built a test set of the dataset labeling users as
spammers, promoters and legitimate users. They proposed a flat classification approach, which
was able to detect correctly 96% of the promoters, 57% of spammers, and wrongly classifying
only 5% of the legitimate users. Interestingly, social network attributes performed the worst in
classification—only one feature (UserRank) was within the top 30 features.
Kayes et al. [150] identify abusive content providers in community question answering
social networks. Similar to the previous approaches, they have used a number of platform-related
features to train machine learning classifiers. But the difference is that they not only used users’
social network and activity-specific features, but also leveraged the crowd-sourced rule violations
reports contributed by the members of the network.
8.9.2 Spam Campaigns Detection
Chu et al. [54] detect social spam campaigns on Twitter using tweet URLs. They col-
lected a dataset of 50 million tweets from 22 million users. They considered tweets having the
same URL as a campaign and clustered the dataset into a number of campaigns. The ground truth
was produced through manual inspection using Twitter’s spam rules and automated URL check-
ing in five services. They obtained a variety of features ranging from individual tweet/account
levels to a collective campaign level and built a classification model to detect spam campaigns.
Using several classification algorithms they were able to detect spam campaigns with more than
80% success rate. The focus of this solution is spam tweets with URLs. However, Twitter spam-
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mers can post tweets without any URL. Even obfuscated URLs (e.g., somethingDOTcom) will
make the detection inefficient.
Gao et al. [102] conduct a rigorous and extensive study on detecting spam campaigns
in Facebook wall posts. They crawled 187 million Facebook wall posts from about 3.5 million
users. Inspired by a study [161] which shows that spamming bot-nets create email spam mes-
sages using templates, they consider wall posts having similar texts as a spam campaign. In par-
ticular, they model the wall posts as a graph: a post is a node and two nodes are connected by an
edge if they have the same destination URL or their texts are very similar. As such, posts from
the same spam campaign will make connected subgraphs or clusters. To detect which clusters
are from spammers, they use “distribute” coverage and “bursty” natures of spam campaigns.
The “distributed” property is characterized based on the number of user accounts posting in the
cluster under the intuition that spammers will use a significant number of registered accounts
for a campaign. The intuition behind the “bursty” property is that most spam campaigns are the
results of coordinated actions of many accounts within short periods of time. Using threshold
filters on these two properties they found clusters of wall posts and classified them as potentially
malicious spam campaigns. Template-based spam campaign detection has been also done in
Twitter [103].
8.10 Mitigating Distributed Denial-of-service (DDoS) Attacks
A denial-of-service (DOS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt to monopolize a
computer resource, so that an intended user cannot use the resource [202]. A Distributed Denial-
of-Service attack (DDoS) deploys multiple attacking entities to simultaneously launch the attack
(we refer readers [203] for a taxonomy of web-based DDoS attacks and defenses). DDoS at-
tacks in social networks are also common. For example, on August 6, 2009, Twitter, Facebook,
LiveJournal, Google’s Blogger, and YouTube were attacked by a DDoS attack [194]. Twitter
experienced interrupted service for several hours, users were complaining of not being able to
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send their Tweets. Facebook users were experiencing longer periods of time (delays) in loading
Facebook pages.
Several papers evaluated how a social network could be leveraged to launch a bot-net
based DDoS on any target of the Internet, including the social network itself. Athanasopoulos
et al. [14] introduce a bot-net “FaceBot” that uses a social network to carry out a DDoS attack
against any host on the internet (including the social network itself). They created a real-world
Facebook application, “Photo of the Day”, that presents a different photo from National Ge-
ographic to Facebook users every day. Every time a user clicks on the application, an image
from the National Geographic appears. However, they placed special codes in the application’s
source code. Every time a user views the photo, this code sends a HTTP request towards a victim
host, which causes the victim to serve a request of 600 KBytes. They used a web server as a
victim and observed that the server recorded 6 Mbit per second of traffic. They introduce defense
mechanisms which include providing application developers with a strict API that is capable of
giving access to resources only related to the system.
Ur and Ganapathy [282] showed how malicious social network users can leverage their
connections with hubs to launch DDoS attacks. They created MySpace profiles which befriended
hubs in the network. Those profiles posted “hotlinks” to large media files hosted by a victim web
server to Hubs’ pages. As hubs receive a large number of hits, a significant number of the visitors
would click those hotlinks. As a consequence, it staged a scenario where a flash crowd was send-
ing requests to the victim web server—a denial of service was the result. They proposed several
mitigating techniques. One approach is to restrict some privileges of a user when he becomes
a hub (e.g., friends of a hub might no longer be able to post comments containing HTML tags
to the hub’s page). But this approach unfortunately restricts the user’s freedom on the OSN. So,
they propose a focused automated monitoring on a hub or creating a hierarchy of a hub’s friend,
so that only close friends will be able to post on a Hub’s profile (the intuition is that close friends
will not exploit the hub). Furthermore, they recommend a reputation based system for social
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networks that scores user behavior. Only users with a higher reputation scores are allowed to post
on the Hub’s profile.
However, bot-net based DDoS attacks are difficult to mitigate, because of the difficulty to
distinguish legitimate communications from those that are part of the attack. As social networks
are flourishing, bot-net based DDoS attacks are becoming stronger, because more legitimate users
are unwillingly becoming part of an attack.
8.11 Mitigating Malware Attacks
Malicious software (malware) is a program that is specifically designed to gain access,
disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive information or damage a computer without the knowl-
edge of the owner. Participatory Internet technologies (e.g., AJAX) and applications (e.g., RSS)
have expedited malware attacks, because they enable the participation of the users. OSNs (all of
them use participatory technologies and applications) are providing themselves as infrastructures
for propagating malware. The “Koobface” is probably the best example of malware propagation
using social networks [89]. It spread rapidly through Facebook social networks. The malware
used Facebook credentials on a compromised computer and sent messages to the owner’s Face-
book friends. The messages redirected the owner’s friends to a third-party website and they were
asked to download an update of the Adobe Flash player. If they would download and install the
file, Koobface would install and infect their system using the same process.
In a survey, Gao et al. [101] discuss a number of methods in which malware propagates
through social networks. For example, using cross-site request forgery (CSRF or XSRF) malware
invites legitimate users to click on a link. If a user clicks, it opens an exploited page containing
malicious scripts. Eventually, the malware submits a message with a URL for a wall post on the
user’s profile and clicks on the “Share” button so that all of her friends can see this message as
well as the link. URL obfuscations are also widely used for malware attacks. An attacker uses
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commonly known URL shorteners to obfuscate the true location of a link and lures other users to
click it.
Unfortunately, malware propagation on social networks exhibits unique propagation vec-
tors. As such, existing Internet worm detection techniques (e.g., [87]) cannot be applied to them.
In the context of OSNs, Xu et al. [300] proposed an OSN malware detection system by leverag-
ing both the propagation characteristics of the malware and the topological properties of OSNs.
They introduced a “maximum coverage algorithm” that picks a subset of legitimate OSN users to
whom the defense system attaches “decoy friends” to monitor the entire social graph. When the
decoy friends receive suspicious malware propagation evidence, the detection system performs
local and network correlations to distinguish actual malware evidence from normal user commu-
nication. However, the challenge for this honeypot-based approach is to determine how many
social honeypots (in this context decoy friends) large-scale OSNs (e.g., billions of Facebook
users) should deploy.
8.12 Challenges and Future Research Directions
As the OSNs are enjoying unprecedented popularity, keeping users engaged with new
functionalities, new privacy and security threats are emerging. The dynamic landscape of privacy
and security attacks have enabled researchers to continuously looking forward for new threats
and provide mitigating techniques. However, there are open problems that still withstand the
plethora of solutions in the literature. An overview of the problems is presented below.
The privacy solutions reviewed in Section 8.2 are focused on specific aspect of privacy,
such as, enabling granular settings, providing visual feedback through designing user friendly and
informed graphical interface, or generating automated or default privacy policies. However, an
integrated privacy solution covering all the planes is still expected. Such a solution might face
multiple challenges, e.g., too much granular privacy settings would be a problem in designing
succinct interfaces, automated or default privacy policies might have different interface require-
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ments. Moreover, automated and default privacy solutions also have bootstrapping problems to
overcome. A newly joined OSN user has no history of interactions that could be used as an input
of automation.
A body of literature has used third-party platforms for protecting users from social ap-
plications (Section 8.3) and from OSNs (Section 8.4.1). The third-party platforms have been
used for appropriate norm following execution of social applications and limiting the transfer
of the social data from applications to other parties. Third-party platforms have been also used to
hide users’ real data to protect them from the OSN. However, those solutions themselves have to
be trusted by users and by applications, as they are expected to protect users’ personal data and
enable a third-party application’s execution. Moreover, research needs to propose promising busi-
ness models for those platforms, because hosting and executing applications on those platforms
have a high requirement of logistics and maintenance.
One possible future research direction includes understanding the privacy leakage and
associated risks when OSNs work as a Web tracker. OSNs (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) continue to
be the login of choice for many websites and applications. As such, OSNs can track their users in
third-party websites by placing cookies to users’ devices on behalf of those websites. Note that
OSNs already know what users do in their platforms. Tracking the users in third-party websites
enables them to create a more detailed user profile. As such, OSNs could essentially work as a
traditional third-party Web aggregator by offering advertisers targeted advertising in publishers’
websites. In general, third-party Web tracking has seen much policy debate recently [164, 193,
273], and OSNs have aggravated the tracking. Research could explore a comprehensive risk
assessment and solutions considering OSNs as potential trackers.
The attacks discussed in this chapter are often closely intertwined. User data collected
though crawling attacks or via social applications may help an attacker to create background
knowledge for launching de-anonymization attacks. An attacker might possess an unprecedented
number of user accounts using malware and Sybil attacks and could use those accounts for so-
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cial spam propagation and distributed denial-of-service attacks. Social spam can also be used to
propagate malware. Some attacks might be a pre-requisite for another attacks. For example, a
de-anonymization attack can reveal the identity of an individual. That identity could be used to
launch an inference attack and to learn unspecified attributes of an individual. Researchers still
need to explore the attacks that are are synergies of attacks.
8.13 Summary and Discussions
Millions of Internet users are using OSNs for communication and collaboration. Many
companies rely on OSNs for promoting their products and influencing the market. It becomes
harder and harder to imagine life without the use of OSN tools, whether for creating an image of
oneself or organization, for selectively following news as filtered by the group of friends, or for
keeping in touch. However, the growing reliance on OSNs is impaired by an increasingly more
sophisticated range of attacks that undermine the very usefulness of the OSNs.
This chapter reviews online social networks’ privacy and security issues. We have cate-
gorized various attacks on OSNs based on social network stakeholders and the forms of attack
targeted at them. Specifically, we have categorized those attacks as attacks on users and attacks
on the OSN. We have discussed how the attacks are launched, what are the available defense
techniques and what are the challenges involved in such defenses.
In online social networks, privacy and security issues are not separable. In some con-
texts privacy and security goals may be the same, but there are other contexts where they may
be orthogonal, and there are also contexts where they are in conflict. For example, in an OSN, a
user wants privacy when she is communicating with other users though the messaging service.
She will expect that non-recipients of the message will not be able to read it. OSN services will
ensure this by providing a secure communication channel. In this context, the goals of security
and privacy are the same. Consider another context where there is a security goal of authenti-
cating a user’s account. OSNs usually do this by sending an activation link as a message to the
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user’s e-mail address. This is not a privacy issue—OSNs are just securely authenticating that
malicious users are not using the legitimate user’s e-mail to register. In this context, security
and privacy goals are orthogonal. However, anonymous views in OSNs (e.g., LinkedIn) present
a context where security and privacy goals are in conflict. Users may want to have privacy (e.g.,
anonymization) while viewing other users’ profiles. However, the viewee might want to secure
her profile from anonymous viewing.
There are also several functionality-oriented attacks that we did not discuss in this chap-
ter. Functionality-oriented attacks attempt to exploit specific functionalities of a social network.
For example, Location-based Services (LSP) such as Foursquare, Loopt and Facebook Places
utilize geo-location information to publish users’ checked-in places. In some LSP, users can
accumulate “points” for “checking in” at certain venues or locations and can get real-world dis-
counts or freebies in exchange for these points. There is a body of research that analyzes the
technical feasibility of anonymous usage of location-based services so that users are not impacted
by location sharing [117, 298]. Moreover, real-world rewards and discounts give incentives for
users in LSP to cheat on their locations, and hence research [124, 316] has focused on how to
prevent users from location cheating.
OSNs and social applications are here to stay, and while they mature, new security and
privacy attacks will take shape. Technical advances in this area can only be of limited effect if not
supported by legislative measures for protecting the user from other users and from the service
providers [218].
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation studies content abuse and privacy in online social networks. Abusive
behavior has a negative impact on the OSNs, victims of abuse refrain temporarily from the com-
munity and ultimately they might leave the community. We focused on CQA social networks
and used user-contributed abuse reports to understand the behavior of content abusers and even-
tually leverage the reports to automatically identify content abusers. Analyzing more than one
year of recorded user activity from a mature CQA platform, Yahoo Answers, we found that the
use of flags is overwhelmingly correct, and correctly flagged contents are removed quickly. We
proposed deviance scores by quantifying how much a user deviates from the norm in terms of
received flags based on her activity and found that extreme deviant users are suspended from the
community. However, the presence of moderate deviant (not suspended) users is not necessarily
bad for the community: they create engagement and have a higher qualitative contribution com-
pared to the suspended users. The social network by which the users are connected channels user
attention, monitors behavior and shows homophily. Our empirical investigations lead us to build
classifiers that used activity-based and social network-based features and successfully identified
fair and suspended users with an accuracy as high as 83%.
Our analysis on the association between users’ engagement and privacy concerns in YA
social networks revealed that privacy preference is correlated with behavior. We found that privacy-
concerned users showed higher retention, had higher qualitative and quantitative contributions,
reported more abuses, had higher perception on answer quality and had larger social circles.
However, these users also exhibited more deviant behavior than the users with public profiles.
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Next, this dissertation has shed light on the collective user behavior that we already dis-
cussed, such as contribution, privacy concerns in CQA social networks. Using Geert Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions and Robert Levine’s Pace of Life, we showed that cultural differences exist in
YA. We found that temporal predictability of activities, contribution-related behavioral patterns,
privacy concerns, and power inequality significantly vary across countries in YA.
Our analysis of YA also found that the majority of users do not change platform-provided
default privacy settings. In fact, this is a common scenario in other general-purpose or interest-
based social networks also (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Blogster). Social ecosystems—the collection
of rich datasets of user-to-user interactions in support of social applications—further aggravates
the problem by collecting richer and contextual user data. We presented Aegis, a privacy model
for social ecosystems based on the semantic web standard, to limit the vulnerabilities associated
with traditional default permissive privacy policies. The privacy model leverages contextual
integrity and generates extensible, fine-grained and expressive default policies to protect users’
information from other users. We provided an architecture and a prototype implementation of the
privacy model that enforced access control policies on a social ecosystem knowledge base. Our
experimental evaluation on three real-world large networks showed that it scales well, and policy
enforcement does not impose significant overhead.
There are several directions of future work related to this dissertation. Our content abuser
work in Chapter 4 shows that moderately deviant users in the CQA community create engage-
ment by attracting more answers and unique answerers to their posted questions. One study [122]
finds that users who ask conversational questions tend to have more neighbors (with whom the
asker has interaction) than users who ask informational questions. This might suggest that de-
viant users tend to ask more conversational questions, which engage a larger number of respon-
ders. Understanding what makes deviant users engaging can be helpful in designing strategies
potentially applicable to a variety of communities. However, due to the observational nature of
the study, we couldn’t draw any causal relationships. We want to further investigate whether
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deviant users ask conversational questions. This requires a linguistic analysis of the questions
posted by the users.
We also want to characterize and identify prosocial users in CQA social networks. In
social psychology, prosocial behavior has been related to multilevel perspective of behaviors that
manifest concerns for the well-being of others [79]. This includes volunteering, cooperative be-
havior, organizational citizenship behavior. In CQAs, a number of behaviors could be identified
as prosocial: providing answers to questions, participating in the community, voting to select best
answers, reporting abuses correctly etc. In our work, we have characterized the efficient abuse
reporters only. In the future, we want to characterize and identify prosocial users considering a
wide spectrum of prosocial behaviors and also using the social networks.
While discussing unethical/deviant behaviors in CQA social networks, we only consider
the content (question and answer) abuse. There are other CQA-specific deviant behaviors, that
warrant further investigation. One such behavior is free riding—getting answers to own questions
without answering much. A question-answering community, like YA, expects its users to resolve
questions. However, a large number of questions still remain unanswered. For example, in our
dataset, 35.09% of the questions do not receive any answer. Figure 69 shows the distribution
of the questions and answers ratio of users. The distribution shows that about 60% users have
asked more questions than they answered and 5.7% users have asked ten times more than they
answered. In the future, we want to further understand the free riding behavior in CQAs.
We want to understand Aegis policy framework presented in Chapter 7 in emerging ap-
plication scenarios, more specifically targeting applications that are built on aggregated social
data. These social applications will run on users trusted devices and their access to social data
store will be managed by Aegis. In order to experiment with Aegis in a real social ecosystem,
we plan to create an “intelligent” mapping of the users in different social network datasets. This
mapping will create a unification of identities from datasets and abstract a single user on multiple
data sources. We also want to understand the system in different platform settings, such as peer-
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Figure 69 Distribution of the questions and answers ratio per user in YA.
to-peer and mobile computing. Moreover, a user study is also required to assess the usability of
the framework.
In Chapter 5, we find that privacy-concerned users are more engaged in the community.
We want to understand what makes users to change their default privacy settings on a CQA plat-
form and also be more engaged.
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